26 N.E.2d 399 | Ind. | 1940
By leave, the appellant has filed a petition to transfer this cause from the Appellate Court of Indiana and for a writ of error to said court. The case originated before the Industrial Board of Indiana. The Appellate Court affirmed with an opinion on January 4, 1940. Transfer is sought by virtue of our rule 24 and Acts of 1901, ch. 247, § 10, p. 565; Acts of 1933, ch. 151, § 1, p. 800, § 4-215, Burns' 1933, § 1359, Baldwin's 1934.
The original Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, ch. 106, § 61, p. 410) provided for an appeal from an award of the Industrial Board "to the appellate court for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil actions." This provision has been carried forward into the present compensation statute. (Acts 1929, ch. 172, § 61, p. 536, § 40-1512, Burns' 1933, § 16437, Baldwin's 1934.) In the case ofKingan Co. v. Ossam (1921),
The Constitution of Indiana provides that: "The powers of the Government are divided into three separate departments; the Legislative, the Executive including the Administrative, 1, 2. and the Judicial; and no person, charged with official duties under one of these departments, shall exercise any of the functions of another, except as in this Constitution expressly provided" (Article 3, § 1); "The judicial power of the State shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts and such other courts as the General Assembly may establish" (Article 7, § 1); "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, co-extensive with the limits of the State, in appeals and writs of error, under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law. It shall also have such original jurisdiction as the General Assembly may confer" (Article 7, § 4); "All courts shall be open; and every man, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay" (Article 1, § 12); and, "In all civil cases, the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate" (Article 1, § 20). These provisions of the Constitution are a part of the fundamental law of the state, declared by the people themselves acting in their sovereign capacity. Ellingham v. Dye (1913),
Under the Constitution the right to a jury trial must remain inviolate in civil cases. This guaranty is self-executing and will be enforced independent of statutory enactment. 3-6. Schembri v. Shearer (1935),
We are not unmindful of the fact that § 18 of the Compensation Act (§ 40-1218, Burns' 1933, § 16394, Baldwin's 1934) makes its provisions compulsory upon the state, political divisions 7. thereof, municipal corporations, and persons, partnerships, and corporations engaged in the business of mining coal, and the employees thereof, without any right of exemption. It was within the power of the General Assembly to fix the liabilities of the state, its divisions, and of municipal corporations, or to provide that there should be no such liabilities. As to those engaged in mining, a different situation exists. The Supreme Court of the United States held in the case of Lower Vein CoalCo. v. Industrial Board (1921),
The Industrial Board of Indiana is not a court; it is an administrative body, vested with quasi-judicial powers. In re Ale (1917),
The Compensation Act provides for agreements between the parties to be approved by the Industrial Board and for a hearing before a member of the board when a dispute arises between 11. an employer and an employee. There may be a review by the full board, in which event the board shall make a finding of facts and an appropriate award. An approved compensation agreement or an award may be reduced to judgment in the circuit or superior court of the county in which the accident occurred. The act also provides:
"An award by the full board shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of (the) fact, but either party to the dispute may, within thirty (30) days from the date of such award appeal to the Appellate Court for errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in ordinary *105 civil cases." (Acts 1929, ch. 172, § 61, § 40-1512, Burns' 1933, § 16437, Baldwin's 1934.)
Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an appeal from an administrative agency. It is correct to say that the orders of an administrative body are subject to judicial review; and 12, 13. that they must be so to meet the requirements of due process. Such review is necessary to the end that there may be an adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the agency has acted within the scope of its powers; that substantial evidence supports the factual conclusions; and that its determination comports with the law applicable to the facts found. The provision of the Compensation Act for a so-called appeal to the Appellate Court, whereby that tribunal is authorized to say whether the finding of facts made by the board and the award entered thereon are contrary to law, supplies every requirement of due process. In other words, when the Industrial Board has made a special finding of facts and entered an order or award, and the Appellate Court has considered whether the award is contrary to law, every essential element of due process has been met and the complaining party has had his day in court.
The Compensation Act is not the first instance in which original jurisdiction was conferred on the Appellate Court. The act creating the Railroad Commission gave that court authority to review the proceedings of the commission. Acts 1905, ch. 53, § 6;Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Railroad Com., etc. (1906),
"The language quoted shows, beyond a peradventure, that it was the legislative contemplation that this court should not assume jurisdiction over any cause which had not originated in a trial court . . ."
In Kingan Co. v. Ossam, supra, it was held that the general statute governing the transfer of cases from the Appellate Court to this court must give way to the Compensation Act, which is special in nature and which indicates by its language that no transfer in cases arising thereunder was contemplated.
It would seem, therefore, that no objection can be found to the provision of the Compensation Act that vests jurisdiction for review of proceedings instituted before the Industrial 14. Board in the Appellate Court, rather than in local courts or constitutional or statutory courts of general jurisdiction. While the Appellate Court is primarily a court of appeals, it is a creature of the Legislature, and it was well within the power of the General Assembly to give it original jurisdiction to review the proceedings of the Industrial Board.
What has been said leads to the major question here presented; that is, whether this court reached the proper conclusion when it held in Kingan Co. v. Ossam, supra, that the 15. determination of the Appellate Court is final in compensation cases. *107 This requires us to reconsider a great many things that have been said by this court respecting its own jurisdiction. We approach the subject with due appreciation of its gravity. When a court from which there may be no appeal undertakes to speak with regard to its own powers, it ought to exercise great caution and restraint.
The Constitution of Indiana says that: "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, co-extensive with the limits of the State, in appeals and writs of error, under such regulations and 16, 17. restrictions as may be prescribed by law" (Article 7, § 4.) It is to be noted that the jurisdiction of this court in appeals and writs of error is absolute, which is quite different than if the Constitution had provided that such jurisdiction should be exercised in such cases as the Legislature might direct. The only power of the General Assembly over such jurisdiction is to regulate and restrict it. The words, "regulate and restrict," as used in the Constitution, have long had a clear and definite meaning. They do not imply the right to prohibit or forbid. Opinion of the Justices to the Senate (1919),
"It is contended that the power to regulate and restrict the Supreme Court, in appeals, gives the legislature the right to take away the final jurisdiction of appeals, and bestow it upon whomsoever *108 it may see fit. . . . While the legislature may regulate and restrict the Supreme Court, as to how it may take jurisdiction, it cannot take away from the court the jurisdiction over this particular subject, granted by the Constitution, and bestow it upon any other tribunal, and a legislative enactment, which seeks to do so is contrary to the Constitution. The legislature has the undoubted right to regulate appeals, but the power to regulate does not give authority to take away, or bestow it upon another tribunal.
"The only ground upon which the creation of the Appellate Court can be constitutionally justified is, that jurisdiction may be conferred upon it to determine such cases as the legislature may designate, subject to the constitutional power vested in the Supreme Court to review its action, either upon writs of error or certiorari, as an inherent power under the Constitution, which even the legislature cannot take away."
It therefore appears that while the Legislature vested exclusive jurisdiction in the Appellate Court to review the proceedings of the Industrial Board, it did not provide any procedural machinery for an appeal or review. This presents a serious situation. Substantive rules of law of the most important consequences to litigants may be directly or indirectly involved in the exercise of original jurisdiction of the Appellate Court in reviewing compensation cases. These may concern the broad powers of administrative agencies, the materiality and weight of evidence, and many other matters that might be suggested.
Uniformity in the interpretation and application of the law is the keystone of our system of jurisprudence. Special privileges are abhorred and laws of a local or class nature 18, 19. prohibited in so far as possible. These principles are emphasized and reiterated in our state Constitution. We have already quoted the provisions that: "All courts shall be open; *109 and every man, for injury done to him in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without delay" (Article 1, § 12), and, "The Supreme Court shall have jurisdiction, co-extensive with the limits of the State, in appeals and writs of error, under such regulations and restrictions as may be prescribed by law" (Article 7, § 4). The Constitution also provides: That "The General Assembly shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens" (Article 1, § 23); that ". . . in all . . . cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and of uniform operation throughout the State" (Article 4, § 23); that "The General Assembly shall not pass local or special laws, in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: . . . (3) Regulating the practice in courts of justice" (Article 4, § 22); that "The General Assembly . . . shall provide . . . that justice shall be administered in a uniform mode of pleading" (Article 7, § 20); that "The Supreme Court shall, upon the decision of every case, give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record of such case, and the decision of the Court thereon" (Article 7, § 5); and that "The General Assembly shall provide, by law, for the speedy publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court, made under this Constitution" (Article 7, § 6). These quotations are enough to indicate beyond doubt that it was the positive intention of the framers of our Constitution that the laws of this state should be general and uniform so far as it is possible to make them so. Such uniformity cannot be attained or preserved if the courts that interpret and apply the laws are not required to *110 take their controlling precedents from some common source. If other courts than this court are to be permitted to construe statutes and state rules of substantive law, without recourse being provided for review by this court, the result will be as destructive to uniformity as if the Legislature was permitted to enact local and special laws for every county in the state.
We are not unmindful that it has been many times said that there is no inherent right to appeal any case to this court and that it is for the Legislature to say what cases may and what may not be brought here. The cases so holding are enumerated and discussed in the dissenting opinion of Morris, J., in Ex parteFrance (1911),
There is a statute in this state which prohibits an appeal in any civil case where the amount in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $50. A subsequent 20-22. section makes the act inapplicable where there is involved and presented a question as to the validity of a franchise or ordinance, the construction or constitutionality of a statute, or rights guaranteed by the state or federal Constitutions. §§ 4-211, 4-213, Burns' 1933, §§ 1319, 1355, Baldwin's 1934. The administrative expense necessary for the operation of this court is not inconsiderable. In addition to the personnel of the court, there must be maintained a clerk's office, an official reporter, a sheriff, and other employees. The opinions of the court are required to be written and published. The burden of this expense ultimately rests upon the shoulders of the taxpayers, and they have a right to demand that the time of this tribunal shall not be consumed with trivial and inconsequential matters. It is common knowledge, and this court judicially knows, that there is also an expense to the parties attached to the appeal of any case. Authenticated records must be obtained and filed, briefs must be prepared and submitted, *112 and the case may be orally argued if a request is made by either party. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to deny appeals in those cases where no important legal principles can possibly be involved and where the expense to the litigants themselves would exceed the amount of the judgment sought to be reviewed. The class of appeals which the above statute undertakes to prohibit is closely akin to moot questions which courts will, on their own initiative and in the absence of any statute, refuse to consider. This statute has long been acquiesced in by this court, and its provisions could be amply justified without predicating it upon the authority of the General Assembly to regulate and restrict the jurisdiction of this court. In the final analysis, this court must be the judge of its constitutional jurisdiction.
Under the common law of England appeals were allowable in chancery cases and writs of error in actions at law. The distinctions in the remedies were these: On appeal in an 23. equity case there was a trial de novo, while under a writ of error in an action at law the record was reviewed and the judgment affirmed, reversed, or modified. In this country the strict differences between appeals and writs of error have not been generally observed and the terms have frequently been used interchangeably. The Legislature of Indiana in 1852 abolished the distinctions between actions at law and suits in equity, and at the same time abolished writs of error in both civil and criminal cases. Provision was made for appeals in all cases where a judicial decision was sought to be brought before the court of last resort for review. (II Revised Statutes 1852, Article I, § 1, p. 27; Article XXVII, § DL, p. 269.) Under the common-law practice, the writ of error had definite characteristics. It was *113
directed to an inferior court, and used to assign error as relating only to matters at law arising upon the face of the proceedings, so that no evidence was required to substantiate or support it. The statutory provision for the transfer of cases from the Appellate Court to this court affords substantially the same relief granted by the common-law writ of error. Pittsburgh,etc., R. Co. v. Hoffman (1928),
The Constitution requires that: "The Supreme Court shall, upon the decision of every case, give a statement in writing of each question arising in the record of such case, and the 24-30. decision of the Court thereon" (Article 7, § 5). This mandate is likewise binding on the Appellate Court of Indiana. Hunter v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. (1930),
It follows from what has been said that this appellant may not be denied his right to present his case to *115 this court for review because the Legislature has not 31. provided a means for bringing it here. But since the statutory procedure for transferring cases from that court to this was intended as a substitute for the writ of error in cases to which it was made applicable, there is no reason why this court cannot adopt and utilize that procedure in the case at bar. It would be less confusing to the courts and lawyers to permit this to be done than to undertake to establish a special procedure for such situations by rule of court. The name given to a proceeding for review is not controlling nor important; the substance of the right is the vital thing. To call a writ of error an appeal, or an application for certiorari a petition to transfer, does no violence to substantive rights. The appellant's petition to transfer, treated as performing the functions of a petition for a writ of error, is sufficient to present the case to us. It has been so considered and we have examined the record.
The record discloses that the appellant filed a claim before the Industrial Board which was heard by one member thereof, resulting in an award of compensation in his favor. There was an appeal to the full board and the case was reconsidered on the record of the evidence presented to the hearing member. Four members of the Industrial Board reversed the award and found for the defendant, the member who had first heard the case dissenting. At the original hearing a physician was asked a hypothetical question embracing certain assumed facts and calling for the opinion of the witness as to whether the accident described had anything to do with the plaintiff's alleged injury. The question was objected to because it "is an unreasonable assumption of facts and does not purport to state the facts in evidence and calls for a conclusion that this *116
member is obligated to decide under the law from all the evidence. It is an invasion of the province of the Hearing Member." The objection was overruled and the witness answered, "I would say no." The appellant here contends that the question was objectionable because it omitted certain pertinent and undisputed facts and because it assumed that certain facts embraced therein had been established when there was no evidence to that effect. On appeal to the Appellate Court it was held that if it be conceded that the question was objectionable for the reasons stated, that did not constitute reversible error because there was competent evidence in the record to support the finding of the full board. It has been long and consistently held by the Appellate Court that the admission of incompetent evidence before the Industrial Board will not cause a reversal of an award where it is supported by competent evidence. John C. Groub Co. v.Brock (1932),
The apparent inconsistency in the situation seems to arise out of the fact that while courts hold themselves bound by said so-called rules of evidence which long experience has 32. demonstrated as being most trustworthy in arriving at the truth of factual controversies, administrative agencies have frequently *117
been relieved from observing these rules. It seems necessary to hold, under the circumstances, that when the administrative agency is authorized to conduct a hearing in a summary manner or without recourse to the technical rules of evidence, the order made pursuant to such inquiry may not be set aside because the rules applicable to court trials were not observed. ConsolidatedEdison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board (1938),
This leads to a consideration of what is the province of a court when a review of an administrative order is sought. It must be conceded that it is the undoubted function of the 33, 34. court to determine the matter of jurisdiction, that is, the power of the administrative agency to decide the question which it has undertaken to decide. Jurisdiction is grounded upon constitutional or statutory authority, the existence of which is always a judicial question. All the other powers of the judiciary with respect to the review of administrative orders may be said to be embraced in the duty to determine if the requirements of due process have been met. The constitutional guaranty of due process is one of broad and comprehensive implications, not readily definable with precision. Among its elements are reasonable notice, an opportunity for a fair hearing, and the right to have a court of competent *118 jurisdiction determine if the finding is supported by evidence.
The question of the sufficiency of the evidence to support an administrative order does not depend upon whether such evidence was received in conformity with the rules applicable to 35-37. proceedings in courts; nor will the reviewing tribunal weigh conflicting evidence; enter into the field of determining the credibility of the witnesses; or consider an exercise of discretion, in the absence of a showing of an abuse thereof. These matters are the peculiar responsibility of the hearing agency. In the final analysis, the finding of an administrative agency will not be disturbed when it is subjected to the scrutiny of a judicial review, upon the claim that it is not supported by the evidence, unless it is made to appear that the finding does not rest upon a substantial factual foundation. This may be determined from a re-examination of the evidence upon which the administrative agency acted, or by the original reviewing court hearing evidence, depending upon the legislative scheme under which the agency operates. In the instant case the Compensation Act makes provision for preserving the evidence upon which the board acted and it is available for purposes of review.
In ascertaining whether the finding of the administrative agency meets the requirement of due process, the court will look to the substance rather than the form. The mode by which 38. the facts were found will be regarded as a means rather than an end, and the finding will not be set aside because the agency did not conform to the court-made formulas of proof. If, however, it should be made to appear that the evidence upon which the agency acted was devoid of probative value; that the quantum of legitimate evidence was so proportionately meagre as to lead *119 to the conviction that the finding does not rest upon a rational basis; or that the result of the hearing must have been substantially influenced by improper considerations, the order will be set aside, not because incompetent evidence was admitted, but rather because the proof, taken as a whole, does not support the conclusion reached.
Applying what we believe to be the proper rules, we must hold that the appellant may not claim error on the circumstance that the hypothetical question which the medical witness was 39-41. permitted to answer over objection as to which there was no evidence, nor can he be heard to complain because the full board reached a conclusion different from that of the hearing member on matters with respect to which the credibility of witnesses may have been the determining factor. The fact that the full board decided the case on a transcript of the evidence and reached a different conclusion than the hearing member, who had the witnesses before him, is unimportant here. The hearing before the full board is regarded as a hearing de novo. McGuire v. Universal Gear Corp. (1939),
The full Industrial Board found that the appellant's disability was not directly or indirectly due to any accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment with 42. the appellee. There was evidence that on August 12, 1938, appellant was engaged in digging a ditch for the appellee. The ground was wet and appellant's right foot slipped off the shovel he was using, causing that part of the foot which is midway between the sole and the ankle to come into contact with the shovel. This occasioned pain at the time, but after a few minutes appellant resumed work. That evening he observed a red spot at the point of the alleged injury, but the skin was not broken. Next morning the foot was swollen and painful. The condition grew worse until the 18th when a physician was consulted. At the time of the hearing the foot was yet much swollen and appellant walked with a crutch and was unable to work. He testified he had not previously been troubled with his feet and had been in good health.
Three physicians testified as witnesses — one for the claimant and two for the defendant. Without taking into account the hypothetical question and answer heretofore referred to, there was evidence from which the board might have found that the appellant was suffering from neural syphilis which resulted in a typical Charcot joint of the right ankle coincidentally with the accident complained of, and that appellant's disability was due to said diseased condition rather than to the alleged injury. Appellant's only medical witness testified: "I am on the spot. I don't know whether the disease caused it (referring to the acute swelling that followed the accident) or the injury had anything to do about it and I don't think anybody could say exactly." Upon a consideration of the evidence, the *121 full Industrial Board found for the appellee and entered an award in its favor. In a judicial review of that proceeding the Appellate Court, exercising its original statutory jurisdiction, adjudged that the award was sustained by the evidence and that it was not contrary to law. In this we find no error.
The judgment of the Appellate Court of Indiana is therefore affirmed.
NOTE. — Reported in