58 F. 101 | 8th Cir. | 1893
after staling the facts as ahoye, delivered the opinion of the court.
The law guards the fiduciary relations with jealous care. It aims to prohibit the possibility of a conflict between the duty of a trustee and his persona] interest. It demands that he look solely to the interest of his cestui que trust; that the agent work with an eye single to the welfare of his principal. It prohibits the agent from all speculation or profit in the subject-matter of his agency, and visits such a breach of duty, not only with loss of the profits gained, but with loss of the compensation which a faithful discharge of duty would have earned. The interests of vendor and purchaser are diametrically opposed. To the vendor the highest price, to the purchasin' the lowest price, is the greatest good. For the agent of a seller to permit himself to become interested in a purchase from his principal is to inaugurate so dangerous a conflict between duty and self-interest that this has long been wisely and strictly forbidden. No man, whether he be principal or agent, can be a vendor and a purchaser at the same time, and an agent of a vendor who intentionally becomes interested as a purchaser in the subject-matter of his agency violates his contract of agency, betrays his trust, forfeits his commission as agent, and is liable to his principal for all the profits he makes by his purchase1. Michoud v. Girod, 4 How. 503, 554, 555; Crump v. Ingersoll, 44 Minn. 84, 46 N. W. Rep. 141; Hegenmyer v. Marks, 37 Minn. 6, 32 N. W. Rep. 785; Jacobus v. Munn, 37 N. J. Eq. 48, 53; Moore v. Zabriskie, 18 N. J. Eq. 51; Berry, Trusts, § 919; Bank v. Tyrrell, 27 Beav. 273, 10 H. L. Cas. 26; Panama, etc., Tel. Co. v. India Rubber, etc., Co., 10 Ch. App. 515, 526; Bent v. Priest, 86 Mo. 475, 482.
There1 is no contention concerning these propositions of law. It is conceded that if Warren, while he was the agent of the vendors, entered into an arrangement with any of the purchasers whereby he1 was to have an interest in the purchase, or the profits of the purchase, of the Heaver tract, or of the farm for which it was eex-changed. the decree should be affirmed. It is conceded that he was the a,gent qf these vendors to effect an exchange of their farm for other property, and that, as such, he adVised and persuaded them to effect (he exchange in question; hut it is strenuously insisted that he was not interested in Flanagan’s purchase of the Heaver tract, or in the profits of the exchange of this tract for the farm. The court below found that he was so interested, and the only question presented by the assignment of errors in this case is whether the evidence warrants that conclusion. The result below casts so serious an aspersion upon the character of the agent for honor and integrity that this case demands, and has received, the most careful and patient consideration. The profits of the transaction were finally realized in 1883 by an exchange of the farm for some houses on Caroline street, in St. Louis, and the disposition of these houses through trust deeds and a conveyance of the fee. The witnesses, in speaking of this transaction, from its inception in the
It was the duty of this agent, Warren, to use reasonable diligence to learn tin; lowest price at which the Beaver tract could be bought, and to buy it for his principals, or give them an opportunity to buy it, at that price. If they' did not wish to buy, and desired only to make an exchange of their farm for other property, then it was his duty to use diligence to get information of the pricey and communicate it to them, to the end that they might make' the best trade possible. This 32 acres of land had been for sale for $9,000 for years. A single honest effort by Warren would hare disclosed its price. His friends Flanagan and Hewitt had no difficulty in learning it, and obtaining an option to purchase it for $9,500, before Warren took his clients to see it. It is perfectly obvious that they never intended to accept the offer, or to buy the land, unless Warren succeeded in persuading his clients into some trade very advantageous to them; indeed, Flanagan testifies 1bat he did not have the money to pay for it. The contract with Haynes, who had no money or property or interest in this land, was but a device to conceal the real parties in interest. This Haynes contract was made October 13, 1882, and the deeds were not exchanged until November 27, 1882, although Flanagan closed his'option for the purchase October 18, 1882. During all fhis time, Warren was corresponding with his clients about consummating this trade, and at one time arranged an extension of time to complete it. Insiead of a cash commission of $900 he took an agreement for one-half the surplus proceeds above $28,500 and interest, to be realized at some indefinite future time from the sale of a piece of land that had just been bought for $9,50®. It is incredible that this agent, if he was expecting no other compensation, should have waived his commission for such a contract. It is incredible, if he was working solely in the interest of his principals, that lie could not, or did not, learn and know who owned this land, and what its price was, before the Haynes contract was made; that .he could be told that it was the cheapest piece of property in St. Louis, and not learn that its price was $9,500 and not $26,500; that Ms friend Flanagan could have
Moreover, the circuit court investigated this question, carefully examined this evidence, and came to this conclusion. The case was then referred to a master to take an account of the profits appellant had derived from the transaction. His report was received, excepted to, and confirmed by the court.
Where the court below has considered conflicting evidence, and made its finding and decree thereon, they must be taken as presumptively correct, and unless an obvious error has intervened in the application of the law, or some serious or important mistake has been made in the consideration of the evidence, the decree should be permitted to stand. Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U. S. 136, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 894; Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U. S. 512, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355; Evans v. Bank, 141 U. S. 107, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 885; Furrer v. Ferris, 145 U. S. 132, 134, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 821.
The decree below is affirmed, with costs.