17 N.J. Eq. 93 | New York Court of Chancery | 1864
The only controversy in this cause relates to the amount due upon the complainant’s mortgage. The mortgage is given by Cooke and wife to the complainant, to secure the payment of a bond from Cooke to the complainant for $900, dated on the 1st of July, 1856, and payable in one year, with interest at seven per cent. The mortgage bears even date with the bond. A second mortgage upon the premises was given by Cooke and wife to Peter S. Talmage, to secure the payment of $1000, which remains unpaid.
The mortgagor, by his answer, alleges that there remains due on the mortgage of the complainant, but $286.93, with interest from the 11th of January, 1858. He states the origin and history of the transaction to be as follows :
Cooke purchased the mortgaged premises of Aaron E. Ballard, in 1851, for $1200. The purchase money was payable in four equal annual instalments of $300 each, from and after the 15th of November, 1851, bearing interest from 1st April, 1852, and was secured upon the premises. Three of these instalments were paid before the date of' the complainant’s mortgage, and at that date, 1st July, 1856, there remained due to Ballard $300, with some arrears of interest. About that'date, Cooke borrowed of the complainant $500, and as well to secure the payment of that debt, as to indemnify the complainant against the claim of Ballard, which was an encumbrance on the premises) he gave his bond and mortgage for $900, which are the bond and mortgage set out in the complainant’s bill. Ballard’s mortgage having been subsequently cancelled, there remained due on the complainant’s mortgage but $500. Of this -sum, $250 was paid by a note or notes of Cooke to the complainant, which
On or about the 8tli of October, 1857, Cooke gave the complainant his promissory note at three months, for $286.-93, for the balance due on the mortgage, including principal and interest, up to the time of the maturity of the note. This balance was ascertained by an accounting between Cooke and the complainant, and there was a distinct understanding between them, that the payment of the note would be a satisfaction of the mortgage. This note is admitted to he unpaid.
The complainant and the mortgagor are the only witnesses that have been examined. They agree that the sum of $900 was not due to tho complainant at the date of the mortgage, and that there was at that time a subsisting indebtedness of $500. The complainant alleges that tho mortgage was given to secure that indebtedness, and also as a security for future advances. The mortgagor, by his evidence, re-affirms the statement contained in the answer. They agree substantially as to the amount of the debt now due and claimed by tho complainant. They differ only as to the fact whether the debt is secured by the mortgage. Tho real question at issue is, whether the mortgage was given to secure future advances and liabilities, or whether it was given for the specific purpose stated in the answer. As tho character of both witnesses is unimpeached, and as they are equally confident as to the truth of their respective statements, recourse must be had to the admitted facts of the case, and to the written evidence, to determino where the truth lies. The parties speak of transactions which occurred nearly seven years before they were called upon to testify, and it is not surprising that one or both of them should have fallen into error as to the real facts of the case.
The version of the transaction given in the answer is, that the mortgage was in reality given to secure the payment of $500, borrowed by Cooke of the complainant, and that it was
There is another point upon which the allegations of the answer are erroneous, and the witness is mistaken in his testimony. It is alleged in the answer,'and Cooke testifies, that he paid off the Ballard debt, leaving the complainant’s mortgage as security only for $500. That of this sum, he gave his note for $250, and that on the 8th of October,
A mortgage given to secure future advances, duly registered, is good, not only as against the mortgagor, but is entitled to priority over subsequent encumbrances, for all advances made prior to notice of the subsequent encumbrance. Griffin v. New Jersey Oil Co., 3 Stockt. 49; Bell v. Fleming’s Ex’rs, 1 Beasley 13; Robinson v. Urquhart, Ibid. 515.
And the notice must be an actual, not a constructive notice. This was regarded by the Chancellor, in Bell v. Fleming’s Ex’rs, as not altogether a settled question. There is, undoubtedly, some conflict of authority upon the point. In
In Shirras v. Caig & Mitchell, 7 Cranch 51, the Supreme Court of the United States held, that a mortgage given for future advances was a security for all advances made, and liabilities incurred, upon its faith, prior to the receipt of actual notice of the subsequent title. And this view is sustained both by principle and by the current of authority.
Chief Justice Redfield, in a very full and clear exposition of the -principles and authorities upon the subject of mortgages for future advances, says: “ The general view of the American courts, and the uniform declaration of the English courts, as far as we know, is, that nothing short of notice in fact of the subsequent mortgage will have the effect of postponing advances, made by the first mortgagee, in favor of - the intervening security. It is expressed under various forms of language, but the result of the whole is, that if the first mortgagee have knowledge of the existence of a second mortgage upon the estate, he cannot give further credit upon his prior mortgage, provided it is entirely optional with him, whether to make further advances or not. This has often been declared by judges and text writers, and may now be regarded as settled law.” 11 Amer. Law Reg. 19; Trusccott v. King, 6 Barb. 346; Craig v. Tappin, 2 Sandf. Ch. R. 78; 1 Hilliard on Mortgages, Ch. 12, § 71 et. seq.
The complainant’s priority is not affected by the registry of the mortgage. Actual notice was not given before the advances were all made.
It will be decreed accordingly.