19 S.W.2d 1111 | Tex. App. | 1929
This suit consists of two suits, originally filed in the district court of Foard county, Texas; the first having been brought by J. B. Easley, as plaintiff, against Geo. P. Warner, Clara N. Warner, James B. Watson, and the heirs of David Wallace, as defendants, and on the same day another suit was filed by T. S. Patton et al., as plaintiffs, against the heirs and trustees of the David Wallace estate. The two suits were consolidated by agreement of the parties and tried together. The parties will be designated herein as in the trial court.
The two suits were for the title and possession of land and the oil and gas mining rights involved in the reservations contained in several deeds to sections 21, 23, 27, and 95, in block A, Texas New Orleans Railway Company survey, Foard county, Texas. The case was submitted to a jury upon special issues, and on the answers returned by them the trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs for the oil and gas mining rights in controversy, as against the defendants, and from this judgment the defendants have appealed.
In each of the cases, the plaintiffs in their petition claimed certain of the named sections of land as owners thereof and alleged common source of title. The controversy between the parties arises over a reservation of the mineral rights and minerals, as made in the habendum clause of the deeds, which reservations are practically identical in the several deeds and are as follows: "But do hereby expressly reserve and except * * * all the mines, minerals, and mineral rights whatsoever that may be within, upon, or under the said tract of land or any part thereof."
The defendants contend that this reservation as a matter of law reserves the oil and gas on, in, or under the land, as well as metallic ore, such as copper, silver, lead, or iron. On the other hand, plaintiffs contend that the terms "minerals" or "mineral rights," as used in said reservation, were only intended to reserve metallic ore and metals and mineral products, in the ordinary methods of mining ore and metals, and in effect that the words "minerals" and "mineral rights" were not understood in the community, or generally in the state of Texas, to include oil and natural gas, and further, if the reservation as drawn was sufficient in legal effect to include oil and natural gas, it was a mutual mistake of the parties.
The defendants, in answer to this last proposition, say that the plaintiffs' action is based upon the question of mutual mistake, and the right to reform the instrument is barred by the statutes of limitation. Before going to the heart of the case, we shall dispose of the last question just stated. If the plaintiffs' case is based upon their right to reform the language of the reservations, certainly the assertion of such right comes too late after 25 years. It would clearly be barred. Cleveland State Bank v. Gardner (Tex.Com.App.)
But we do not think a reformation of the deed was necessary to the assertion of the plaintiffs' rights. If the language of the *1112 reservation, as a matter of law, included oil and gas, then the plaintiffs could not recover. On the other hand, if the reservation did, as a matter of law, exclude oil and gas as minerals, the plaintiffs would be entitled to recover, and hence the instrument under which the plaintiffs claim the oil and gas would need no reformation.
The only question for our consideration is: Were the terms "minerals" and "mineral rights" such as to definitely include all minerals and oil and gas as minerals as a matter of law under the term "minerals"? This, notwithstanding the plaintiffs' plea that such was not the intention of the parties at the time of the execution of the reservations. We think that the intentions of the parties cannot give such effect to the reservations, in view of the interpretation given to the term "minerals" and "mineral rights" by the courts of this state. We can serve no useful purpose in discussing the evidence in this case, or the effect of the plaintiffs' pleading and evidence upon the question of intention of the parties, especially where we do not conclude that the plaintiffs' evidence establishes the fact of their intention to exclude oil and gas from the reservations. In any event, we think that the law of Texas had definitely fixed the status of oil and natural gas as minerals at the time of the making of the reservations. Further, for the same reason, we do not deem it necessary to discuss the decisions of other state courts.
The language of the reservations on their face is not ambiguous. Corpus Juris defines "patent ambiguity" as: "One which arises upon the words of the instrument, as looked at in themselves, and before any attempt is made to apply them to the object which they describe." 2 C.J. pp. 1313, 1314, § 2. The law, as stated, having fixed the status of oil and gas as minerals, the language of the reservations, upon the interpretation thereof by the Supreme Court in the case below cited, and the case approved by the Supreme Court, presents no patent ambiguity.
When an instrument is not ambiguous, the intentions of a party to it, particularly as to the thing or estate reserved or conveyed, is a question of law, and it should not be submitted to a jury. Baldwin v. Drew (Tex.Com.App.)
The case at bar is much stronger in favor of the conclusion that oil and gas were included in the reservation, because in this case the reservation contains the additional language: "All mines and minerals and mineral rights whatsoever." In the case of Elliott v. Nelson,
"In the case of Luse v. Boatman,
We therefore hold that the reservations being considered in this case included oil and *1113 natural gas as a matter of law, and therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court, and here render judgment for the defendants (appellants).
