17 N.Y. St. Rep. 855 | City of New York Municipal Court | 1888
The question is whether this case is a marine cause, and properly triable forthwith at the chambers branch of the court, without going upon the general calendar. The jurisdiction of this court extends to all kinds of actions wherein the complaint demands judgment for a sum of money only, (Code Civil Proc. § 815;) among them being the actions styled in the Code Civil Procedure, § 317, “marine causes, ” of which latter this court possesses the same jurisdiction as the supreme court; and «hence the recovery therein may be for any amount. In the other actions, for money only, excepting suit on bonds or undertakings given to this court, and suits for breach of promise to marry, the judgment rendered cannot be for more than $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Code Civil Proc. § 316. This court, in money cases, proceeds upon an actual or implied contract, or for damages for a personal tort, or injury to property committed. See McCabe v. Doe, 2 E. D. Smith, 64. The court has, however, no admiralty jurisdiction. The actions known as “marine cases” (Code, § 317, subds. 1, 2) are common-law cases. Seamen, and others belonging to ships and vessels, may sue at common law, in personam, for their wages and services. Abb. Shipp. 493; The Salacia, 32 Law J. Adm. 41. Seamen have a maritime lien on the vessel for their wages and services, i. e., in admiralty; but the owners or charterers are also person
The legislature could confer what jurisdiction it pleases on the city court of Mew York, (formerly marine court,) except that its character as a local court must be preserved, (Anderson v. Reilly, 66 N. Y. 189; Const. N. Y, art. 6, § 19;) for in every respect, except as to those powers and attributes of sovereignty transferred by and under the national constitution to the governmént of the United States, this state is an independent sovereign state, unconnected with the other states of the Union, (McDonald v. Mallory, supra, 546, 547, 552.) The federal courts, therefore, would have exclusive jurisdiction only as to the vessel’s relations with foreign governments, or crimes committed thereon, cases of supplies or repairs to the vessel en route, maritime liens, and like matters. McDonald v. Mallory, supra. The right to prosecute all common-law civil remedies in each state has been specially preserved, and irrespective of the foundation of the right of action; and as the common law is competent to give a remedy, the suitor has the option to sue in the state court, whether the action is to enforce a common-law right, or is based on a statute, either state or federal. Dougan v. Transportation Co., 56 N. Y. 5; Cook v. Whipple, 55 N. Y. 164, 165. It is hence clear, under section 317 aforesaid, that this court has the fullest jurisdiction of the actions styled “marine causes” in said Civil Procedure Code, both as to those for the value of or agreed compensation for services rendered or to be rendered upon a merchant vessel during its voyage, and those to recover damages for assault, battery, or false imprisonment on board such a vessel without the United States; in every way co-equal and co-extensive with that of the supreme court of this state in such cases. A marine cause, under said section 317, subd. 1, is limited to the case of a plaintiff belonging to a vessel in the merchant service who seeks to recover for services rendered or to be rendered on board during its voyage. This, of course, is intended to describe a case in which the admiralty courts of the United States have concurrent jurisdiction, for otherwise the case is sufficiently delineated and expressed by section 315. The United States admiralty jurisdiction covers the entire navigable waters of the Union; but the state courts have, as above stated, full concurrent jurisdiction in suits in personam, and may even institute the latter by attachment of sufficient maritime property, subjecting the defendant’s personal interest in the vessel, etc., to a sale in the state court, or the action may be directly prosecuted in the ordinary way in personam simply; for in these eases there is always a personal defendant. The Hine, 4 Wall. 555. And see The Genesee Chief, 12 How. 443, 453; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 467. And so long as free navigation is not impaired, the respective states may also control such waters until congress enacts otherwise. County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. At common law the natural channels or avenues of