Waring v. Louisville & Nashville R.

19 F. 863 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1884

Pardee, J.

On the trial of the case, after the plaintiffs had closed and the two writings mentioned in finding “four” were offered, counsel for defendant moved to strike out all the parol evidence adduced by plaintiffs in the case which tended to vary the written receipt and contract and the implication of law arising from the acceptance of rent, which would exclude all of plaintiffs’ evidence, save the lease and notices to quit, aforesaid, on the ground that the said writings constituted a written contract between the parties, complete in all its parts as aided by implications of law, for the lease of the property in question, and that parol evidence is incompetent to vary the terms of such contract. This motion was reserved to be passed upon with the merits. The view that I take of the case is that after the expiration of the five years’ lease, under the understanding and consent of the parties, the continued holding of the defendant was as a tenant at will. Either party could have ended the tenancy without consent of the other. See Bouv. Law Diet, verbo, “Tenant at Will.” This was undoubtedly the case down to August 4, 1882, when a quarter’s rent was paid and the writings purporting to be a charge for and a receipt of rent were given. And that this was the view taken of it by the parties is shown by the negotiations that were carried on with a view to obtain a lease for a fixed term. This simplifies materially the question of the force and effect to be given to the writings of August 4, 1882.

Conceding these writings to amount to a contract between the parties, they are not complete in themselves to show what the contract was. By themselves, they do not make a lease for a quarter, nor for a year, nor for the term of the old lease. We must look to the surrounding circumstances. “Another rule of law, just as well settled, is that the obligation of a contract is what the parties intended to mean when they entered into it. What they both understood to be the contract, that is the contract; and to arrive at the understanding of the parties, the courts are authorized to look at the circumstances which surrounded them when they made it.” Van Epps v. Walsh, 1 Woods, 598; The Orient, 4 Woods, 262; S. C. 16 Fed. Rep. 916. In this case, what were the surrounding circumstances when the writings were made ? The defendant was a tenant at will of the premises in question, desirous of purchasing or obtaining a permanent lease. The plaintiffs were not willing to sell, nor lease for a fixed time, unless with stipulations as to use, and they desired concessions as to a side track to connect with the Mobile & Ohio road. There was no lease, save the old and expired one, in the hands of Harahan. And negotiations were pending between the parties for a new lease. That the plaintiffs intended to grant a lease by the writings is negatived by all the circumstances. That the defendant intended by these writings or that its agents thought it had acquired a lease for any fixed period is negatived by all the circumstances, and by the letter of Harahan, superintendent, written a month afterwards. The legitimate construction of the writings, then, is that they were receipts for rent past due under a tenancy at will. The implication of law resulting from a payment of rent under a tenancy at will, that the tenancy becomes one from year to year, (see Bouv. Law Dict. verbo, “Tenant at Will,” and cases there cited,) is not strong enough to overcome the fact that there was a distinct understanding between the parties as to the nature of the tenancy. Woods, Landl. & Ten. 25, 60, 61, and cases cited; and see, also, Cronmelin v. Thiess, 31 Ala. 418. Had the defendant held over after the expiration of the five-year lease, without any agreement on the part of the plaintiffs as to the character of such holding, the defendant would have been a tenant on sufferance, the plaintiffs having a right to elect whether to resume possession or to treat the defendant as a tenant from year to year. Had the defendant held over without any agreement with the plaintiffs, and had paid, and plaintiffs had received, rent, the law would have implied a contract of lease from year to year. Had the defendant held over without any agreement with the plaintiffs, and then the writings of August 4th had been passed between the parties, I am inclined to the opinion that the law would have implied a renewal of the five-year lease; and this by fair construction of the writings themselves, otherwise •unexplained.

But the case made differs from all of these hypothetical cases. By understanding of the parties the defendant held over as a tenant at will, and thereafter the minds of the contracting parties did not meet, and although rent was paid and received on the terms of the old lease, the character of defendant’s holding was not changed.