Appellants, Warehouse Carpet Sales & Service, Inc. (Warehouse) and Glenn E. Teasley (Teasley), the corporation’s sole shareholder and director, appeal an order of the Superior Court of Cobb County, holding them in contempt for failure to comply with a prior order of that сourt.
Appellants are two of several named defendants in a civil action brought by appellee, S.C.J. Associates, Inc. (S.C.J.), regarding a dispute over the acquisition of certain real property. On April 1,1982, all parties consented to an order which was entered for the purpose of avoiding prejudice to the parties during an extended delay in the proceedings. Among other things, this order required Warehouse to continue making timely payments on two outstanding notes, one of which was owed to MaCo Fеderal Credit Union (MaCo) and the other to a bank. Warehouse was also ordered to make additional monthly payments of $2,106.71 to MaCo, to be held in an interest bearing escrow account and applied to any judgment which might be awarded to S.C.J.
In September 1982, S.C.J. moved that Warehouse be held in contempt for refusing to make the required payments to the escrow account. Therеafter, the trial court issued a rule nisi ordering Warehouse to show cause why it should not be held in contempt. Following a hearing held on May 26, 1983, the trial court found both Teasley and the corporation in wilful contempt for failure to make required payments totаling $18,962.52. Teasley was ordered jailed as of June 27, 1983, provided, however, that he could purge himself of the contempt by paying onе-half the arrearage in a lump sum and the remaining one-half in monthly increments of $1,500.00, in addition to making the regular monthly payments of $2,106.71. On aрpeal, appellants contend that refusal or failure to pay money pursuant to a court order is not punishable by contempt, as such punishment would constitute imprisonment for debt. Held:
1. A money judgment may normally be enforced only by execution therеon, not by contempt proceedings. See
London v. London,
“The proper administration of justice demands that courts have the power to enforce their orders and deсrees by contempt proceedings.”
Griggers v. Bryant,
2. Appellants contend that the evidence adduced at the hearing fails to establish a wilful violation of the order. At the hearing, Teasley acknowledged that his last payments on the three obligations were in June 1982 (to the bank), August 1982 (to MaCo on the esсrow account), and December 1982 (to MaCo on the note). He contended that Warehouse had been unable to makе further payments because it had experienced financial difficulties, although it had remained in business. Teasley maintained that hе had received no salary and earned no income in 1982 but admitted that he had borrowed $6,000 from Warehouse since the date оf the court order and that his wife was employed and supported the household. Although he claimed that Warehouse had experienced a negative cash flow after entry of the order, it was shown that during the month prior to the hearing sales had totalеd $42,000, resulting in a profit of $5,200.
“The defenses to both civil and criminal contempt are that the order was not sufficiently definite and certаin, was not violated, or that the violation was not wilful (e.g., inability to pay or comply).”
Schiselman v. Trust Co. Bank,
3. Appellant Teasley further contends that the trial court erred in holding him in contempt because he received no notice that the contempt proceeding was against him personally. Although the rule nisi was issued to Warehouse rаther than to Teasley in his individual *354 capacity, all parties received notice of the proceedings. Furthermore, Teasley was a party to the consent order in his individual capacity and was present and testified at the contempt hearing, аt which both he and Warehouse were represented by the same attorney. At no time during these proceedings did Teasley object to the adequacy of the notice, even after the attorney representing S.C.J. clearly stated at the hearing that S.C.J. was seeking his incarceration and even after the court announced that such a result was being contemplated. Accordingly, the objection was waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. See Schiselman v. Trust Co. Bank, supra at 278.
4. Appellants contend that the written contempt order fails either to recite that the contеmpt was wilful or to set forth a sufficient factual basis to support a finding of contempt. “[T]he words ‘wilful refusal’ and ‘ability to pay,’ although preferable, are not words of art which must appear in every contempt order. [Cit.] It is only necessary that the order spеcify sufficient facts to show that the respondent was in contempt of court.”
Floyd v. Floyd,
Judgment affirmed.