29 F. Cas. 215 | D. Pa. | 1792
The state of the case will appear in the libel, and the testimony and exhibits in this cause.
There have been three points made in this cause: 1st. Dereliction, and a claim of the whole under words used by the captain, said to amount to an express abandonment; and, from the circumstances of tlie case, a dereliction liy implication. 2d. That the delay of the Amiable, while attending on. and giving assistance. to. and saving the goods out of. the Belle Creole, was a deviation which exposed to risque, out of the common course of the voyage, aud would have forfeited any insurance which might have been made on the vessel and cargo, or either of them. 3d. Tlie quantum of salvage, if the first point should be determined against the libellants.
On the first point I have translated an authority out of Burlemaqui, which contains what I believe to be an accurate account of the ideas of the best writers on the subject of dereliction, and occupancy, consequential upon it: “One may acquire, by the right of the first occupant, tilings which the proprietor has abandoned with a design never more to hold them as his own. Although one is not in possession of a thing, the right of recovery is not lost, unless it is renounced in a manner either express or implied. Hence the i...is-tice of those countries whicli confiscate the property of goods shipwrecked, thrown overboard to lighten the vessel, or stolen, in place of returning them to the owners.” The cases of dereliction, in which the maxim of “Oceu-pantis fiunt derelicta” is founded, generally run on the principle of a voluntary abandonment by the owner, with his free consent; and not on such a relinquishment as force, necessity, or danger, compel. The instances of wreck, or goods thrown overboard to lighten the vessel, may he given to elucidate this doctrine; and these are always recoverable, on payment or tender of salvage. It should seem that little prospect of recovery existed in the case of goods ejected, to lighten and save the ship; yet the right of recovery is not lost; but, on proof of property, they are recoverable, on payment, or tender of salvage, if either driven on shore, or taken flotsam or jetsam. If tlie evidence in this .cause, supported (and I think it does not) the captain's consent to give the goods to the libellants, I do hot consider it as binding on the owners; and, according to the authority from Burlemaqui, (and many others) it must he the owner who abandons. The captain is vested with certain powers, both express and implied, over the ship and goods, for certain purposes beneficial to the owner; such as the power of hypothe-cation — of compounding for part, to save the rest — detaining for freight — throwing over part to preserve the residue — but herein he has a qualified and not an absolute propriety. Ho may act. under the limited rights with which he is thus invested for the benefit of the owner. but cannot totally divest hint of all tie-right. and transfer it. without special authority, even for a valuable consideration. He is inhibited, by the marine laws, to sell (thoinrh he may pledge) the tackle, or furniture saved from shipwreck, though necessary for tlie sub-sistance or payment of himself and crew: nor, even in cases of the quantum of salvage, should promises made by the. master, in time of distress, be regarded: but the reward must be measured accoiding to circumstances. Much less to he valued are the expressions he makes use of, tending to shew a dereliction, or abandonment of tlie property. I cannot, therefore, be of opinion that, in this case, there is an express dereliction, in the legal interpretation of the word. As to the implied (1-relic-tion, there are no circumstances to prove it. but those which generally accompany such unfortunate cases. If these were to be taken as proofs of abandonment, on which tlie right of occupancy would attach, there would be an
As to the second point, which respects the quantum of salvage, and tends to shew the risque incurred, by the assistance given to the master and crew of the Belle Creole, to wit, the deviation, I should, in a case which I was under the necessity of determining, consider it as such. 1 am persuaded that the ■delay of the Amiable exposed her to uncommon danger: and. as it was not necessary, in the course of the voyage, for any purposes which insurers might have had in view, but was merely produced by the circumstances ■stated in the libel, it would. I think, have availed, in case of loss, to repel a claim of insurance. And the principle is the same, as to all consequences necessary to be considered in this cause, whether the owner remained his ■own insurer, or threw the risque on others, by a policy descriptive of the voyage. A deviation is not merely the unnecessary going ■out of the track, or course usually taken, but it is also a departure from either the express -or implied terms of the contract. It needs not much reasoning or discussion to shew that ■delays for saving of ships, goods or mariners, producing uncommon risque, cannot be legal excuses on the part of the insured on policies as they are generally made. Such delays being “breaches of the implied terms of the contract, by exposing to hazards not originally counted upon, foreseen, or in the contemplation of the parties. They are justified to the heart, though not (in this respect) to the law. on principles of humanity, commendable in themselves. expected from all, and particularly from those who are exposed to similar misfortunes. Ships with letters of marque may •chase an enemy, but cruising after prizes incurs deviation. But. without entering into many particular references to cases or instances, it appears to me that all excuses for leaving the course, or delays must be front necessity; and not with a view to lucrative •objects. Putting into port by stress of weather — to stop a leak — obtain provisions. Ac. — going out of the track to avoid an enemy —for convoy or other purposes — for the safety of the ship or goods, being beneficial to the insurers, are justifiable. But it is different in the ease of cruizing for prizes, and cases of a similar nature, which might be mentioned: and none of them appear to me stronger than the one in question.
On the third point I have taken into consideration all the circumstances of the case, and the law respecting it. so far as I can perceive it applicable. With respect to goods and merchandize. I can find no decided rules as to the proportion of salvage; those of the maritime laws, which have made any designations of proportions, varying from each other, and giving from a twentieth to a half, according to the description and value of the articles saved, and the risk, labour, and expense of salvage. On plate, jewels and money, the salvage is the least: and on articles of other descriptions, according to circumstances. I find, however, that the former articles are not exempted, either from average, contributions, or salvage. The general principle is not confined to mere quantum me-ntir, as to the person saving; but is expanded, so as to comprehend a reward for the risk of life and property, labour and danger, in the undertaking, as well as a premium operating as an inducement to similar exertions. It is laid down as a principle both of justice and policy, that “he who has recovered the property of another from imminent danger, by great labour, or perhaps at the hazard of his life, should be rewarded by him who has been so materially benefitted by that labour.”
I consider, in the case in question, the property risked by the owners of the ship Amiable combined with the danger to which her officers and crew were exposed in the enterprise; and, though 1 do not depreciate the exertions of the officers and crew of La Belle Creole, yet all these exertions would have been useless, unnecessary, and impracticable, if the Amiable had not been present and exposed in the undertaking to risk, and her officers and crew to danger. The labour and difficulty, too, exercised and experienced by the latter, were considerable, and unremit-ted. The season of the year, and the place where the transaction happened, exposed the Amiable and her cargo to extraordinary hazard. With respect to the projwrtion of salvage, all circumstances taken into view, I have, in the general, been guided by what I consider just in the present case, as well as politic in all cases. Combining both these circumstances together. 1 cannot have a better guide, nor one which ought to be more satisfactory to one of the parties in this cause at least, than the 17th article of book 4, c. 19, of the Marine Ordinances of France, on the subject of wreck, which I have translated: "If the effects, however wrecked, are found on the sea. or drawn from its bottom, the third part thereof shall be immediately delivered, without expense, either specifically or in money, to those who have saved them, and the two other thirds shall be kept to be delivered to the owners, if they shall claim them within the time above mentioned: after which they shall be equally divided between us and the admiral, the costs of prosecution being previously deducted from the two thirds.” Although I do not exactly follow, yet 1 have as nearly accommodated my determination to. this ordinance, as I think right. I do therefore adjudge, order and decree. That the libel lants in this cause, to wit. the owner or own
Shares
The captain shall and is hereby directed to receive . S
The chief mate. 4
The second mate. S
The carpenter. 2
And each mariner and the cook one share S
Bach boy half a share. 1
Amounting in the whole to. 20
That the plate and money shall be restored to Captain Davor, for the use of himself and those of the French officers and crew of La Belle Creole, to whom the articles therein contained respectively belong, on payment of the proportion of the appraised value thereof, herein before decreed for salvage. That the whole amount of the proceeds of the sales, of the goods and merchandize, as mentioned in the marshal's return, and account of sales, together with the salvage decreed on 1be plate and money, be brought into court: and, after paying thereout the one third of the amount of the former, and the salvage as aforesaid on the latter, the other two remaining thirds shall be subject to the following expenses and payments, which are hereby directed to be discharged and made forthwith.
The eosts accrued, and to accrue, in this cause, shall be fully paid and discharged, and all expenses incurred in the storage, and on the sale of the whole, as they shall be examined and taxed; and all duties and customs therein locally chargeable, and charged, shall also be paid thereout. After all the said eosts and charges and duties shall be fully paid and discharged, the balance of the said two thirds shall remain in this court, subject to the further order, judgment and decree thereof.
[See note at end of case.]