43 W. Va. 1 | W. Va. | 1896
Aoquilla J. Ward filed liis hill in chancery in the Circuit Court of Barbour county, seeking the cancellation of a deed made to his son Taylor Ward, hearing date the 1 Oth day of January, 1885, and conveying, after the father’s death in consideration of live thousand dollars, a certain valuable farm, known as the “Al. Ward Farm,” in said county. Taylor Ward liled his answer, denying the allegations of the hill to which plaintiff replied generally. Many depositions were taken, and, on a final hearing, the Circuit Court entered a decree canceling the deed as a cloud on the plaintiff’s title. From this decree the defendant appeals.
The single question presented for our consideration is as to whether the deed was fully consummated by delivery. There appears to he no dispute as to the law, hut it is recognized to he as laid down by this court in the case of Davit v. Ellis, 39 W. Va. 226, (19 S. E. 399), following Lang v. Smith, 37 W. Va. 734, (17 S. E. 213) ,and Newlin v. Beard, 6 W. Va. 120, and is to the effect that where the grantor parts with the possession of the deed to the grantee or his agent, reserving no right to recall it or alter its provisions, the delivery is effectual, and the grantee succeeds to the title. “When the deed is found in the possession of the grantee, a-delivery is presumed to have been made by the grantor and it devolves upon the grantor who denies the delivery to rebut such presumption.” 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 447; Ward v. Lewis, 4 Pick. 518, and other" cases therein cited; also, Newlin v. Beard, supra. The investigation is narrowed down to the mere question of fact as to whether the plaintiff, on whom the burden of proof devolved, has established a- non-delivery of the deed in controversy. The allegation of the plaintiff’s bill relating to this subject is in these words : “Further complaining, plaintiff says that after his removal to his said son’s upon the death of his first wife, said deed, for said 406 acres of land, which had never been delivered, was taken by.him with a large number of other valuable notes and papers, and left by him in the care and keeping of his daughter-in-law, the wife of said defendant, for safe keeping only, and to be delivered to him (plaiutilf) alone,
The denial of the defendant’s answer to the allegation of the plaintiff’s bill relating to the delivery of the deed is as follows : “Respondent indignantly denies that he procured the deed in the bill mentioned in .some way unknown
In his testimony, the plaintiff entirely abandons the allegations of his bill, and says, in answer to the question propounded by his attorneys, “What did you do with the deed to Taylor Ward for the Al. Ward farm?” “I handed it to his wife, and told her there was a paper T wanted lici-to keep for me until I called for it.” On cross-examination, the plaintiff develops an exceedingly poor recollection with regard to the disposition of the deed, but says: “I took the deed, and gave it to his wife, either that day or the next; and she was there at my house.” “it was in niy wife’s sick room.” “I can’t say who all were there.” “There may have been two or three i>resent.” “I. can’t recollect whether Taylor was there.” “He might have been there.” “They were living in their own house. They never lived with me. ¡She was coming every few days to wait on my wife.” “I fold her there was a paper L wanted her to take and keep for me. ¡She took it home with her to her own house.” “I never saw that deed after
If that was all the evidence in the case, the plaintiff would necessarily fail, as ihe allegation of his bill is not only not sustained, but'disproven, by his own testimony. He also proves the delivery of the deed to the wife of the defendant, which is a good delivery to him, for the reason that his wife is his agent as to the possession of .his property, and has the legal right to receive and hold the same for her husband. He says', however, that he delivered it to her for a special purpose, and thereby made her his agent. The presumption of the law is against, him, and he must rebut this presumption by a preponderance of testimony. In this he has not succeeded, as the testimony of the defendant and his wife must be considered, at-least, equal to the plaintiff’s testimony. The .plaintiff took the depositions of numerous witnesses to prove that the defendant said on different occasions that he refused to take the deed from his father when he first offered it to him, and that his father then gave it to his wife to keep. . This .testimony, in the main, instead off contradicting, sustains, the defendant and his wife. The defendant, on the other hand, shows, by numerous witnesses, admissions of his father tending to support the delivery of the,deed. It is sufficient to say that the oral testimony, ,as a, .whole, preponderates in favor of the defendant.!
There are circumstances surrounding this transaction that throw more light upon it. One is the attempt of the plaintiff, after he had changed his mind, to “prepare” his testimony. Without letting his son know anything about it, and in his known absence, he takes a witness along with him, and visits the wife of the defendant, and, catching her unawares, asks her for the deed he left with her.
The counsel for the plaintiff insists that this case conics within the rule this Court lias laid ' down in the- case of Smith v. Yoke, 27 W. Va. 639, approved in Bartlett v. Clearenyer, 85 W. Va. 720, (14 S. E. 273), and Richardson v. Ralphsnyder, 40 W. Va. 15, (20 S. E. 854). This rule is simply, in effect, as stated in the opinion of Judge Snyder in the first case (page (142) : “When the testimony leaves the result in doubt, the- Appellate Court ought not to reverse the decree.” There is a growing impression prevailing to some extent-among counsel that the Court has simply adopted this rule to avoid the examination of.cases in which the testimony is conflicting. Such is far from the truth; but the Court means to say that if, after the most careful scrunity, the conflicting testimony leaves the cáse in such a pivotal condition that it is a matter of doubt as to which -side ought to prevail, it becoming a mere matter of conjecture, this Court will not disturb the determination of the lower court, in obedience to another well-established rule, that the burden is on 'the appellant to affirmatively show error to his prejudice. But in no case does this-Court refuse to weigh the testimony, how'ever conflicting, and give the party the benefit thereof in whose favor it plainly preponderates.
In the Casemow under consideration the preponderance 'is clearly with the defendant, and for this reason the decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and the bill is dismissed. > • '- ■ - •
On Rkjikakjng.
'The1 conclusion reached in this case is fully and completely sustained- by the pleadings and evidence. That the plaintiff' delivered- the deed in controversy there cannot be even a plausible doubt. On its face it shows that it was intended for immediate delivery, in the use of the following words; ■ “Bpt it is expressly agreed, understood, and stipulated by the parties hereto that no title shall pass hereby to the land above described until after the death of the said Arquilla J. Ward, but said A. J. Ward shall retain and have exclusive possession, use, and control of said land until his death, when the same shall pass by
The former decree of this court, reversing the decree of the circuit court, and dismissing plaintiff’s bill, will be confirmed.
Reversed.