History
  • No items yet
midpage
Ward v. State
903 N.E.2d 946
Ind.
2009
Check Treatment

*1 jacket Gray's in shaver discovery of the resisted, coopera and who those injure a beyond finding any preclude together outnumbered who employees tion of in fact Gray that was doubt be reasonable they that is evidence Gray four-to-one Silver's. Long John gun at with a armed Their belief armed. he lieved was "all of that Judge Barnes agree with robbery, We but armed establish to sufficient in the reasonable all of and the evidence that communicated Gray that it is evidence conclu just one lead to therefrom ferences armed. he was an electric Gray used sion," "namely that and more, statements Gray's Without John Long to rob shaver, gun, not a be sufficient would at both stores conduct at 2008 WL Gray, Silver's." he was find that jury to permit as a insufficient the evidence hold thusWe offenses. time of both at the armed fact enhanced Gray's to sustain of law matter flight following Gray's of events The chain robbery charging the counts on convictions demonstrates Long John Silver's from Silver's. Long John confinement and Gray robbery. was as to otherwise Conclusion leaving immediately after almost arrested Silver's, found police Long John court to the trial remanded cause is This car, or in his Gray's person, on no firearm convic- Gray's to reduce instructions with Under the crime. scene of at the crimes John Silver's Long tions to conclude circumstances, impossible it is II) felony rob- (Counts to Class C I and Gray was reasonable doubt beyond a criminal confine- felony D bery Class Long John of the at the time in fact armed judgment respects, the In all other ment. Compare Common robbery. Silver's is affirmed. trial court of the 432, 326 Mass. Delgado, 367 v. wealth (defendant's 716, 717-19 DICKSON, N.E.2d SHEPARD, C.J., and he prove are sufficient JJ., statements RUCKER, SULLIVAN, concur. armed) v. How with Commonwealth was 1211, 1211-

ard, 386 Mass. threats (1982) (despite defendant's robbery, evidence in street

shoot victim ar was when insufficient

was immediately opportunity without

rested found). none was weapon and dispose of a WARD, Appellant Roy Lee by Officer sum, Gray spotted In was (Petitioner below), Long John exiting the he Durbin as was approximately Silver's, and arrested was only 200 feet later seconds

ten to twelve Indiana, Appellee STATE his Gray and away from the restaurant. below). (Respondent time of at the searched automobile were No. 74S00-0707-DP-263. no found but arrest, money was in the sur- found gun No weapon. of Indiana. Supreme Court shaver area, an electric rounding but 7, 2009. April employees restaurant pocket weapon. a concealing Gray was assumed timeframe, the limited that the believe

We failure arrest, police's

proximity area, gun

to recover

Steven E. Ripstra, IN, Jasper, Lorinda Youngcourt, Huron, IN, Meier Attorneys Appellant. for required by statut accordingly, fendant Zoeller, Attorney General F. Gregory appeals now The defendant e.3 Martin, Attor- Deputy B. Indiana, James (1) IN, Attorneys con sentence,4 challenging: General, Indianapolis, death ney death Indiana's stitutionality of Appellee. for (2) statutory written of a statute; the lack DICKSON, Justice. (3) jury pool; petit selecting plan (4) the admis process; selection Ward, appeals defendant, Roy Lee search; rape for the from a warrantless his death of evidence sion evidence; Payne (5) Stacy photographic fifteen-year-old the admission murder of We affirm of the death County, Indiana. Dale, appropriateness Spencer the sentence. sentence. see- defendant's follows appeal This Constitutionality of Indiana's trial, Spencer His ond trial. first Penalty Statute Death guilty verdicts County, resulted the Indiana contends Deviate Con Murder, Rape, and Criminal unconstitutional penalty statute death *5 jury sentencing-phase duct, by a followed States Constitution the United under both sentence. in a death that resulted support, In the Indiana Constitution. and re were and convictions The sentence each of arguments, seven presents he publici pre-trial prejudicial due

versed rejected: previously has which this Court (Ind. State, 1042 810 N.E.2d v. ty. Ward (1) the death sen- for the allows statute 926, denied, 126 S.Ct. U.S. 2004), 546 cert. jury finding aof in the absence tence (2005). remand, On 395, 273 L.Ed.2d 163 mitigators be- outweigh the aggravators a new sought and obtained the defendant in Rit (rejected doubt a reasonable yond re and, following the defendant's judge, (Ind. 258, State, 264-68 N.E.2d chie v. 809 Spencer from change of venue for a quest 828, denied, 126 S.Ct. 2004), 546 U.S. cert. agreed to select County, parties (2005), State v. and 42, L.Ed.2d 76 163 the trial to County,1 with Clay jury from (Ind.2004), 312, Barker, 314-15 N.E.2d 809 Vanderburgh judge's special be held N.E.2d 648 826 granted, remand reh'g and proceeded The State County courtroom. denied, 1022, 126 (Ind.2005), 546 U.S. cert. charges, rape and murder (2) (2005)); it L.Ed.2d 537 666, 163 S.Ct. penalty A guilty.2 pleaded sentencing make a jury permits then determined jury phase Apprendi in violation circum recommendation statutory aggravating charged 466, 120 S.Ct. a reasonable beyond Jersey, 530 U.S. proven v. New were stances (2000), v. Ring and 2348, 435 147 L.Ed.2d circumstances doubt, that the 2428, 584, 153 Arizona, 122 circumstances, S.Ct. 536 U.S. mitigating outweighed (2002) v. (rejected in Holmes L.Ed.2d 556 im should be a sentence death (Ind.2005); State, 136, 138-39 820 N.E.2d de- court sentenced The trial posed. (Brazil, 35-50-2-9(e)(2) County "If Clay § states: county seat of Code Indiana 1. The sentencing recommenda- Indiana) 100 miles from reaches than is more County. tion, the defendant county Spencer seat of the court shall accordingly." agreement, the State plea to a 2. Pursuant con- criminal deviate count of dismissed the fifty also sentenced defendant was 4. The aggravating circumstance well as the duct as challeng- he is not years Rape, a sentence for devi- during criminal the course of of murder ' ing here. ate conduct.

951 (3) Ritchie, 266); Statutory 809 N.E.2d at 2. Absence of Written death disproportionate is and vin Jury Petit Selection Plan it dictive because carries no deterrent val Clay contends that Ritchie, (rejected ue 809 N.E.2d at 263 County, jurors from which his drawn, were State, (citing 1251, Evans v. 563 N.E.2d failed to meet the statutory requirements (4) (Ind.1990))); 1264 it imposed is arbi plan for a written for selecting the venire trarily capriciously with undue risk for petit juries failure, and that this not discrimination (rejected and mistake withstanding the otherwise proper selec State, 649, Corcoran v. 739 N.E.2d 651-53 jury, tion of his requires that his sentence (Ind.2000), reh'g granted, 827 N.E.2d 542 be set aside. (Ind.2005); State, v. Harrison 644 1243, (Ind.1995), N.E.2d 1257-58 supersed irregularities Minor grounds

ed on other recognized in Al State, 741, len v. process 737 N.E.2d 743 n. 5 selection do not normally consti tute reversible error absent a showing of (Ind.2000)); it a ra- applied without tional and analysis appellate uniform prejudice substantial to the defendant's State, (rejected review in Hough v. 690 State, rights. Azania v. 1253, 778 N.E.2d (Ind.1997) N.E.2d (citing 277 Bivins v. (Ind.2002), 1257 superceded on other State, (Ind.1994)), N.E.2d 948 cert. Azania, grounds, State 875 N.E.2d 701 (Ind.2007); State, accord Wells v. (1998); L.Ed.2d 457 and Wisehart v. 1141 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), cert. (Ind.1985), cert. de denied, U.S. *6 nied, 1189, 2929, 476 U.S. 91 (2007). L.Ed.2d 567 We have recognized, (6) (1986)); L.Ed.2d 556 require it fails to however, that absent compli substantial that the factfinder consider all mitigation statute, ance with the "the accused need proffered (rejected evidence in Wisehart v. not prejudice." Azania, show actual 778 State, (Ind.1998) 693 N.E.2d (citing 54 N.E.2d at 1257. State, Matheney 688 N.E.2d 907 (Ind.1997)), cert. 119 Chapter 5 of Title Article 28 and Indiang (1999)); 143 L.Ed.2d 502 and Jury 2 through Rules specify (7) the statute to guide fails a sentencer's procedures detailed for jury selection and discretion in choosing between a death Among these, service. one statutory provi and a life sentence parole without requires sion jury commissioner, the under Corcoran, (rejected in 739 N.E.2d at 653 judge's a supervision, prepare to a written State, (citing Stevens v. plan for selecting grand petit jurors, and (Ind.1997), and Wrinkles v. plan approved must be by the coun (Ind.1997))). ty's judges and maintained on file pub for inspection. § lic Ind.Code 33-28-5-12.5

We decline to revisit these issues. with, of and comply otherwise chapter. 5. The section in effect at the time of the this plan specify following: The must the defendant's second trial read as follows: (1) Source of names for the master list. plan 33-28-5-12. Written for selection of (2) Form of the master list. grand petit jurors. and (3) selecting Method of names the (a) supervision supervising Under the master list. judge, jury prepare the commissioner shall (4) of maintaining Forms and method for plan grand a written for the selection of drawn, records of jurors qualified, names petit jurors county. plan and in the The juror's excuses and reasons to be ex- designed objectives must be to the achieve cused. ju potential a followed selection by which defendant means The exclusive explained The ground the that it Tr. at 1085. Clerk jury a rors. may challenge any conformity with from a jury panel in the is collected not selected Chapter 5 are detailed by her requirements provided dise compact § This see- 83-28-5-21. in Indiana Code of State Supreme Indiana Court Division in a criminal trial court permits tion Names on the dise Administration. Court dismiss an stay proceedings, case to of Revenue come from the Indiana Bureau indictment, appropriate re- grant or other Vehicles, the Indiana Bureau of Motor relief, any such granting lief. But before dupli purged these names are then "that court must determine the trial cates, pers under and deceased people petit a grand jury a or selecting either disc, the used a this Clerk ons.6 With has been a jury there substantial failure jury management system commercial chapter." (empha- with this Id. comply randomly jury pool by se formulate added). sis Fol from the master list. lecting names testimony, lowing the Clerk's ab- timely challenged The prem motion court denied the defendant's a and the trial court plan, sence of written and file a on the failure to establish Clay County a The ised hearing. conducted plan. procedures all were written testified that Clerk (5) jury Jury assem- drawing qualified Indiana Rule directs Method of names of jurors prospective bly process requires administra- service. (6) by prospec- by jury pool annually Procedures to be followed compile the se- tor to jurors requesting to be excused from tive lecting approved names from lists jury service. Supreme In accordance with Indiana Court. petit jurors that constitutes rule, Number of September the Indiana Su- this a panel for civil and criminal cases or approved statewide preme Court the first description in which of the uniform manner records, 4,503,032 a number that close- list of made. this determination ly corresponds to the State's 18-and-older (b) plan placed operation must be into population according the 2000 Indiana judges approval of the courts. after list, (4,506,089). *7 resulting The first Census judges The of the courts shall examine the by was created available for use complies plan to whether it with determine combining Vehicle Indiana Bureau of Motor chapter. plan If the is found not to this Department of Revenue records and Indiana jury comply, the court shall order the com- eliminating duplicates. With assistance necessary changes to missioner to make the University, Supreme Purdue Court from bring plan compliance. into Technology and Automation Commit- Judicial (c) may any plan time The be modified resulting by tee further filtered the list remov- according procedure specified under ing or un- individuals identified as deceased chapter. this deraged moved out of and those who had (d) plan jury The must be submitted to the against Finally, the was validated state. list judges to the commissioner courts. data, stan- U.S. Postal Service address judges approve The of the courts shall or addresses, the form of added dardized plan not later direct modification of the address, flagged county address- for each (60) sixty days receipt. The than after its resulting may The state- es that have errors. go approved plan must into effect not later jury wide was first made available list (60) sixty days approval by than after disc, recently by compact and more counties judges of the courts. becoming electronically over a available (e) plan public The is a document on file in Indiana Judicial extranet website. secure the office of the commissioner and Committee, Technology and Automation inspection must be available for at all rea- http://www.in. Jury Project, Statewide Pool sonable times. gov/judiciary/jtac/programs/jurypool.html was amended in 2007. P.L. 118- section (last 2009). Jan. 2007. visited appeal, On argues dire, voir the trial court's jury selection juror because a selection plan was neither process. He contends that the trial court prepared, approved by any Clay County (a) erred in failing to strike ten prospective judge, submitted to the jury commissioner, jurors cause, (b) by changing the nor filed a public document in the office method of questioning potential jurors of the Clay Court, Circuit the resulting about the death penalty from initially complete failure to abide the statutory speaking with juror one at a time to later requirement for a plan should be deemed discussing the issue with small groups of substantial non-compliance and preju- jurors. To support claims, the de dice presumed. should be fendant argues that he was forced to use his peremptory challenges on prospective Other than the lack of a formal written jurors who should have been removed for plan, and filed the defendant does not cause, thus compelling him to accept other claim any irregularities in the selection jurors who, though not challengeable for and composition of the petit jury venire in cause, held biases favorable to the death his case. In words, other he does not penalty for pleaded-to offenses and point any procedural detail that such a unfavorable to dispassionate consideration plan written might provide that is not al- of his mitigationevidence.7 ready covered the other statutory pro- visions or the Jury Indiana Rules. He Jury selection in this case arose under question does not that the venire pre- unconventional cireumstances. Guilt was pared in exact compliance with all other not at issue. The defendant pleaded guilty statutory provisions and the Indiana Jury to Murder8 and Rape,9 class A felonies. Rules, the specifics of which obviate and Under the plea agreement, the court supplant the function of the statutory re- would determine the sentence for the Rape quirement for a plan. written conviction, but the defendant reserved the right to a penalty phase jury trial on the

The defendant has not established sub- request State's for the death sentence. At stantial non-compliance with the require- the penalty phase trial, the State sought ments for the selection of petit the death penalty asserting venire. three statutory He is not entitled to relief on this issue. cireumstances: the defen dant committed the murder by intentional Jury Selection ly killing the victim while committing *8 (2) Apart from the preceding claim, rape,10 the defendant committed the the de- fendant presents two discrete claims of murder while on probation for committing trial court error regarding the conduct of a felony,11and the victim was mutilated 7. disputes The State the defendant's claimed the trial court's determination and treat the exhaustion of peremptory his strikes. It defendant's claim complete of exhaustion to concedes that the record reflects his exhaus- be accurate. tion of the peremptory two strikes allocated alternates, selecting for but asserts that the 35-42-1-1(1). § 8. Ind.Code record does not establish that the defendant twenty exhausted peremptory challenges § 9. 35-42-4-1(a)(1), (b)(2). Ind.Code selecting the regular twelve jurors. In his Brief, Reply the points defendant out that 10. 35-50-2-9(b)(1)(F). § Ind.Code the trial expressly court noted that the de- fense had exhausted peremptory its chal- 11. 35-50-2-9(b)(9).(C). § Ind.Code lenges regular as to the jurors. accept We

954 not, how- did The defense 87. Appellant's at alive.12 L.Ed.2d still while

or tortured jurors any the of for cause pen ever, challenge the before The issues at 1055. App'x 84, Id. at the case. actually decided who more one or whether were alty phase The at 87. 2276, 101 L.Ed.2d at 108 S.Ct. circumstances aggravating these of that claim any that found Ross Court doubt; so, if a reasonable beyond proven not on focus must partial jury was that circumstances mitigating any whether jurors "on the rather but juror, removed outweighed were exist at S.Ct. Id. at ultimately sat." who consider for appropriate cireumstances stat- The Court at L.Ed.2d a recommend to and, so, ation; if whether ed: or a parole, sentence, life without death required undoubtedly Petitioner was 35-50-2-9(e). § Ind.Code years. term of to challenge peremptory a exercise to Challenges But we (a) court's error. trial Defendant's cure the of Denial per- aof that the loss notion reject for Cause a violation challenge constitutes emptory that contends defendant The impartial to an right the constitutional of his for- grant failing erred court per- that recognized long haveWe jury. arguing jurors, ten as to challenges cause of constitu- are not challenges emptory a showed responses opinions that their means to are a They tional dimension. automatical death recommend tendency to jury. So impartial end of an achieve guilt. defendant's the fact ly upon impartial, that sits as long ineligible them rendered This, urges, he a had to use the defendant fact that due violating his constitutional jurors that re- achieve challenge to Claiming peremptory a fair trial.13 rights process Amend- the Sixth mean not sult does have cause should challenges for his that no conclude We ment was violated. argues defendant granted, been im- to an right petitioner's violation had he because thereby prejudiced he was jury occurred. partial challenges on peremptory his to use all ac at 101 L.Ed.2d thus "forced at and was 108 S.Ct. jurors at Id. chal- although omitted). jurors who The Court cept other (internal citations juror against failing to dismiss cause were biased concluded lengeable deprive error, "did not at 16. Appellant cause, ofBr. while evidence." any jury or impartial an petitioner ad Supreme Court States United Id. at by the State." provided interest in Ross v. Okla claim a similar dressed at 92. L.Ed.2d homa, irrelevant reasoning, it is of this light In in a (1988), appeal an also LEd.2d denying erred the trial court whether trial court After the trial. murder capital challenges for the defendant's any of challenge for-cause the defense's denied Ross's through properly Viewed cause. exercised the defense juror, prospective a ultimately using of whether lens, the issue challenge, peremptory *9 one or focus on jury must impartial had an challenges. peremptory allotted all of its actually sat jurors who of the 2276, more 101 83-84, at 108 S.Ct. at Id. claim for any independent establishing erwise 35-50-2-9(b)(11). § Ind.Code 12. therefore deem We statute. under the relief portions of recites brief The defendant's 13. be to of this statute violation any for claim 35-37-1-5, applies to § cause, Code Indiana defaulted. procedurally argu- presents no but he challenges for or oth- the statute the facts to applying ment

955 judge quickly recog- trial jurors. But the The United States the decision. rendered held, juror "A who will nized that has Supreme Court it going, the rate "[alt wel'lre in penalty months, the death automatically days, get vote for before we will be 528, faith to consid good fail in every jury picked," case will Tr. at and modified that mitigat er the evidence of day lunch recess on the first plan following re the instructions circumstances as ing explained of The court that voir dire. do," one and that even "only quire the individual voir dire "[ilf him to henceforth and the death juror empanelled such pretrial publicity" be on the issue of will the State is disen- imposed, sentence is "everybody else will be voir dired Morgan v. titled to execute the sentence." penalty questions." on the death together 2222, Illinois, 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. procedure imple- then Id. This new was (1992). 2229-30, 502-03 119 L.Ed.2d general ob- despite mented defense's not, however, assert The defendant does jection process grounds." Id. at "on due jurors any as to of the who this claim 529. phase trial. Of penalty served his general objection Other than his trial to serve, only to jurors who were selected however, format, judge's change the defen challenged one was cause any identify particular defendant does not dant, challenge denied and this objection during ensuing made voir defendant does not trial court.14 The asserting improper exposure pro- dire ruling appeal. this on question spective jurors prejudicial to statements. the defendant's re- therefore decline We any claim appeal He does not assert penalty of his death quest reversal jurors permitted to specific were fail- premised on the trial court's following a trial court failure to serve challenges to for cause with grant ure grant challenge arising a defense for cause by per- respect jurors he later removed any out of such incidents. emptory challenge. A trial court has broad discre (b) Changing From Individualized the form and tionary power regulate Group Dire Voir State, Kalady substance of voir dire. v. The defendant also contends (Ind.1984). Individ 462 N.E.2d 1307 by changing trial erred the mode court ually sequestered voir dire is not mandat group ques from individual to of voir dire law, Indiana includ any ed case under jurors. tioning prospective This cases, or ing capital highly absent unusual generally, "exposed change, he asserts circumstances. potentially damaging jury panels grossly members (Ind. State, v. Holmes Br. opinions and statements." prejudicial denied, 1996), cert. U.S. Appellant (1997), L.Ed.2d 85 Brown v. State, (Ind.1990); 563 N.E.2d 105-06 began, the trial days Two before Lowery that, in light counsel judge informed (Ind.1989), cert. U.S. publicity regarding of the broadcast un- (1990). 217, 112 L.Ed.2d 176 week," ques- identified "events of last may trial court structure voir dire to meet tioning prospective jurors regarding cireumstances, discrete but does not abuse publicity would be done death if prospective managing its discretion in voir dire individually, away from other *10 den to the defendant." challenged juror Tr. at 801. The trial 105 for 14. The defense challenge. cause, court denied this Id. at 803-04. asserting "shifts the bur- as its reason bring such discrete cireum- fails to defense doubt as the defendant's sentence and not require Holmes, would the sentence be court's attention. stances to the at 854. reversed. established re- has not The defendant argue The State does not in the trial court's modifica- versible error error, however, harmless and we elect al questioning potential tion of the format ternatively to address the defendant's jurors in this case. Appellate search and seizure claim. courts Evidence from 4. Admission of ruling de a trial review novo court's Defendant Search constitutionality of a search or seizure. contends that the trial Membres v. 889 N.E.2d admitting po evidence that court erred (Ind.2008), reh'g denied. The trial court's person following from his his lice collected determinations, however, factual will a search iss arrest but before warrant clearly be overturned unless erroneous. suppres trial court deniedhis ued.15 The Id. On appeal, reviewing court does not penalty phase sion motion before the reweigh the evidence and considers con began, objection during overruled flicting favorably evidence most to the trial trial, penalty phase and admitted the items Quirk, ruling. court's State v. appeal, the defendant ar evidence. On (Ind.2006). 334, 340 gues excep that the search fell within no against tion prohibition to the warrantless Responding young to a child's 911 searches, that he entitled to the reporting call that a home intruder was respect counsel to the advice from with sister, attacking her older law enforcement search. officials entered the home to find de holding fendant a knife and covered with initially challenged

We observe that the sweat, fifteen-year-old Stacy Payne only evidence relevant to the defendant's lying pool in a of blood on the kitchen guilt, Guilt not to his sentence. was not floor, down, nude from the issue, however, waist with because body." abdominal contents "outside her pleaded guilty, remaining and the sole is- Tr. placed 1811. Handcuffed and sue for trial was his sentence. The chal- car, in a police given the defendant was little, lenged any, evidence thus held if warnings, sign Miranda16 refused to any penalty phase relevance to issues. form," "rights and asked to talk with a But sought the State and obtained its ad- lawyer. photographing While the defen penalty phase, mission as evidence in the scene, police dant at the detective no appeal challenges and the defendant's its ticed a dark stain on the defendant's shirt admissibility grounds relevancy not on police and removed it from him. The took but as the fruits of an unconstitutional nearby search if its the defendant to a hospital and seizure. Even admission to col samples lect and there observed more erroneous, were to be found such error beyond clothing ap- would be harmless a reasonable stains on the defendant's items, (swab), challenged po- leg upper right 15. The identified # 112 # 113 lower left (swab), leg upper right numbering system, leg #114 back of lice are: #101 black (swab), shirt, chains, shoe, gold upper leg and #115 back of left #102 #103 left (swab). sock, shoe, Tr. at 147-48. right right # 104 # # left sock, shorts, underwear, # 107 black #108 leg, upper upper #109 hair from left #110 Arizona, 16. Miranda (swab), (swab), (1966). leg leg left #111 lower left 16 L.Ed.2d 694

957 peared to be blood. Reasonably concerned for one prompted by exigent circum- potential evidence could be lost or stances creating a reasonable police con- destroyed, police items, collected cern for the likely imminent destruction of as well as hair stuck to the evidence. No Fourth defendant's Amendment viola- body, tion and swabbed dark occurred. stain areas of the defendant's skin. This evidence was ob- In the defendant's sole argument assert tained without the defendant's consent. ing an independent basis under the Search 15, As noted in footnote the defendant and Seizure Clause of the Indiana Consti contests shirt, the collection of shorts, his tution, 1, 11, § Art. he argues that his shoes, socks, chain, gold underwear, loose request counsel, which occurred after hairs from leg, and swabs of suspected he was in custody, precluded police from bloodstains on his skin. searching him. The defendant cites Pirtle State, v. 16, 263 Ind. 323 N.E.2d 634 The defendant urges that the (1975), State, and Williams v. 611 N.E.2d search violated both the federal and state 649 (Ind.Ct.App.1993), trans. constitutions. Under federal Fourth Pirtle, support. In this Court reversed a Amendment jurisprudence, warrantless murder conviction in part because certain searches generally are prohibited unless admitted evidence resulted from a war- an exception exists. One recognized ex rantless search of the defendant's apart ception is for searches incident to a lawful ment after the defendant consented to the State, arrest. Edwards 626, N.E.2d search while custody. 323 N.E.2d at (Ind.2001). Moreover, a full search of 639-40. We held that the defendant was person after arrest "is not only an "entitled to the presence and advice of exception to the warrant requirement of prior counsel to making the decision Amendment, the Fourth but is also a 'rea whether to give such consent." 640; Id. at sonable' search under that Amendment." State, see also Sims v. 495, 274 Ind. Robinson, United States v. 218, U.S. 556, (1980), N.E.2d 558-59 overruled in 235, 467, 477, 38 L.Ed.2d 441 part on unrelated grounds by Wright v. (1973). And a search incident to lawful State, (Ind.1995). arrest under jurisprudence federal may In the present case, Pirtle, unlike "involve relatively exploration extensive by police search was not based upon the person." Id. at 94 S.Ct. at defendant's consent. This is not a case 38 L.Ed.2d at 436. Although a search where a defendant precluded from an incident to lawful arrest could be invali opportunity to consult with counsel before dated if it was "extreme or patently abu deciding whether to consent to the search. sive," id. at The defendant consented to nothing, and L.Ed.2d at the search of the defen police searched him incident to his person dant's in this case was neither. lawful upon arrest and independent proba- Another recognized exeeption to the war ble cause. We find no Pirtle violation. rant requirement presence is the of exi We reject the defendant's claims that gent circumstances, including the need to the admission of the evidence resulting prevent imminent destruction of evidence. from the search and seizure violated either Holder v. 847 936-37 the federal or state constitutions. (Ind.2006). The warrantless search and 5. Admission Photographs resulting admission of evidence was prop er in this case under exceptions both The defendant contends that for a search incident to lawful arrest and the trial court erred in admitting photo-

958 Fentress, N.E.2d 702 (citing at 627 N.E.2d preju- victim, that arguing the

graphs 722). gruesomeness to their at attributable dice probative their outweighed

substantially challenges the admission defendant The cumulative were value, photos that some Exhibits photographs-State's of four were photos that some and duplicitous, and at trial objections 47-over his 44, 45, and to save intervention gaping 42 medical Exhibit shows after taken .17 State's life, autopsy. or after abdomen, victim's her the with the victim's wound the on Apparent organs visible. internal photographs admission resulting marks are suture photograph an abuse appeal on reviewed is life. the victim's to save effort from the State, N.E.2d 834 Pruitt v. discretion. that the wound contends The defendant denied, (Ind.2005), 548 U.S. cert. 117 be gruesome so appeared have may (2006); L.Ed.2d 962 165 126 S.Ct. Appel Br. of intervention. medical fore State, 1047, 1049-50 N.E.2d 685 Ealy v. the Exhibit 44 shows at 82. State's lant admitting (Ind.1997). error No claimed abdominal wound the continuation a sub "unless permitted is photographs back, and State's the victim's around to is affected." party of the right stantial from a same wound the 45 shows Exhibit Pruitt, 834 103(a), see R. Evid. Ind. ob the defendant angle. Again, different State, 764 117; v. Corbett at N.E.2d photographs the grounds jected (Ind.2002). an "Whether 628 N.E.2d State's cumulative. and gruesome were are affected rights substantial appellant's the portion of the excised 47 shows Exhibit examining 'probable the determined aby left marks displaying spine, victim's jury." the upon evidence of that impact urges that this also knife. Corbett, (quoting Pruitt, N.E.2d at 117 834 the permitted possibly photograph 628). Generally, photo- N.E.2d 764 in for the responsible defendant hold the injuries or depict a victim's graphs And the defendant autopsy. dignity of are testimony of a witness demonstrate lacked pictures argues that further Corbett, N.E.2d at 627 764 admissible. already he had because value probative State, N.E.2d Fentress (citing and, not at guilt was since guilty pleaded 401, 402. (Ind.1998)); R. Ind. Evid. trial, were phase issue have been autopsy photographs Though jury. to inflame and used cumulative risk to avoid the inadmissible to be found photo- that two to his claim As mistakenly infer fact-finder could that the 45) (State's are Exhibits graphs autopsy inflicted another, disagree. we to one cumulative incisions, Allen v. ab- showing the same photographs, These (Ind.1997), cert. had angles, two from laceration dominal (1999), 807, 142 L.Ed.2d 667 in demon- value probative independent necessary if is not photos of such exclusion severity of the the extent strating testimony to ex they accompanied are injury. body, thus to the had been done plain what gruesome, pictures is of the four Each for confusion minimizing potential by the testimo- accompanied each was out but value probative showing that explaining Corbett, pathologist forensic ny of the effect, weighed prejudicial 44, 45, depicts speci- Exhibit 48 and 47. State's Although brief the defendant in his abdomen; victim's (State's portion of the upper objected which he pictures to fies six on the depicts bloodstains Exhibit State's 47, 48, 77), 42, 44, 45, only he Exhibits home. the victim's floor of Exhibits arguments for State's fully develops

Q59 procedures per- 7(B), nature of the medical revision under Rule but we will nev- describing formed on the victim and separately ertheless address each argu- *13 photograph. relevance of each As Fen- ment. tress, testimony mitigate this served The defendant also a cursory includes jury's an drawing impermissible inference assertion "this Court is required at a responsibility that the defendant bore minimum to consider whether a death sen- Further, autopsy incisions. notwith- appellant's tenced sentence is erroneous." standing guilt the fact that was established Br. of Appellant at 48 (citing Ind.Code by guilty pleas, pho- the defendant's these 35-50-2-9()(8)(B)). § This statutory pro- tographs probative remained and relevant that a vision states death sentence "is sub- charged to the mutilation and torture ject to automatic by review" this Court Proving circumstances. pursuant to our rules must take into nature and extent a gruesome crime (1) consideration all claims that the convic- usually requires gruesome evidence. The tion or sentence violated the federal or relevant, challenged photographs were (2) constitutions, state the sentencing court probative outweighed their value their po- lacked jurisdiction impose sentence, prejudice. tential The trial court did not (3) the sentence "exceeds the maxi- by admitting abuse its discretion mum sentence by authorized law" or is photographs into evidence. § otherwise erroneous. Ind.Code 85-50- Appellate Review for Sentence 2-9). Our consideration of the issues Appropriateness presented in this appeal-including the de- seeks relief under ancillary claims, fendant's which arguably 7(B), Indiana Rule Appellate urging that fall within claims of unconstitutionality un- the death inappropriate light der and "otherwise erroneous" under of his character and the nature of the (38)-satisfies the statutory requirement of addition, offense. In the defendant incor- review this Court.

porates argument into this unrelated claims, including assertions that the sen- (a) Adequacy Sentencing of the Order tencing order was that miti- inadequate, The defendant claims that the trial gating considered, cireumstances were not judge's sentencing statement fails to satis- aggravator the torture and mutilation fy the specificity requirements of Harrison should have been dismissed as unconstitu- v. regime State. This applied to sentences overbroad, tionally and that in- there was of death and life parole without under the sufficient support jury's evidence to statutory framework existing before the finding aggravator. this appellate re- substantial statutory changes in 2002. view authorized Rule 7 allows revision Prior law had placed final sentencing re- of an proper upon otherwise find- sponsibility in judge's hands, the trial fol- ing that "inappropriate the sentence is lowing receipt jury's of the advisory-only light of the nature of the offense and the recommendation, judge which the was not character of the Ind.App. offender." R. obligated contrast, to follow. In the exist- 7(B). But claims court error asso- ing post-2002 procedure places the sen- sentencing ciated with its decision are con- tencing jury. Now, function with the after ceptually distinet claims and are part not receiving jury's sentencing recommen- appellate review-and-revise function. dation, the trial ancillary judge The defendant's are is directed to claims thus "sen- encompassed not in or relevant to his tence the defendant accordingly." Ind. claim for appellate sentence review and Code 35-50-2-9(e). § The trial judge is (2007). Quarterman involved But recom- jury's to follow "obligated

thus giving jury impaired from a was in three situations whether except mendation" mitigation evi- meaningful consideration case. Pittman in this presented (Ind.2008). In 1253-54 dence; it not involve an evaluation did pro- mitigation consideration post-2002 jury's a under whether operating cases final sen- At issue was cedure, sufficiently meaningful. a makes a "When was "{atal- determination, Harrison-style sentencing process was tencing whether the at 1254. place." per- Id. "not would be out because the ly order flawed" *14 a meaningful effect or 'rea- give to mitted sentencing format established The new a defendant's response' moral to soned to the death 2002 amendments with the it is forbid- mitigating evidence-because occur- to a conviction apply statute penalty a by judicial statute or doing den from so 20, 2002, a "entered as after March ring at a statute." Id. interpretation of of person, regardless of a of a retrial result at 608 at 167 L.Ed.2d 80-2002, P.L. the offense occurred." when added). here (emphasis July committed on § 2. The crime was jury penalty phase claim that his makes no 2001; penalty guilt phase initial statute, judicial interpre- forbidden was 2002. in October phase trials occurred instruction, tation, or from otherwise jury and the Following reversal and remand to his meaningful full consideration giving pleas, penalty phase guilty defendant's evidence, pro- so Abdul-Kabir mitigation 9, 2007, May and he beginning retried vides no recourse. penal- on June 2007. His was sentenced retrial and conviction are there- ty phase leg that the methodology The procedure. governed by post-2002 fore adopted in 2002 entrusts islature claim that the reject the defendant's We in cases sentencing determination jury the inade- sentencing trial court order was parole. As involving death or life without failing comport speci- with the quate statutory determining role of wheth to its ficity requirements Harrison. outweigh circumstances er (and implicit mitigating circumstances (b) of Miti- Trial Court Consideration and to necessary questions of whether gating Circumstances mitigating cireumstances ex extent what The defendant asserts that "the record ist), essentially discretionary this "is mitigating indicates that the cireumstances consider jury function as to which the has Br. outlined above were not considered." Pittman, 885 N.E.2d at leeway." able argument at 55. His on this Appellant legislature give intended to 1253. "[The of the evi- summary consists of his point in the trial court on jury the final word proved he claims that he suffered dence under Indiana's death sentencing from exhibitionism and "the severe mental Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 121. "Ju statute." psychopathogy," poor defect of received pro traditionally required are ries discipline training in his formative for their determinations." vide reasons was immature and never self-suffi- years, Pittman, Here, 1254. cient, safely in the and could be housed regarding extensively instructed jury was system. prison mitigating nature of cireumstances and See, jury's determination. meaningful jury their role argues part He mitigation 14, 15, 18, evidence is re- consideration e.g., Final Instructions 1008, 1012, 1018, 1014. Quarterman, App'x at Appellant's quired Abdul-Kabir a unanimous verdict returned 167 L.Ed.2d specifically finding "that any aggravating statutory death-penalty procedure, we held cireumstance or cireumstances that it "adequately exist structures and channels outweigh the mitigating discretion of the jury circumstances and the court." Id. herein." Appellant's Rejecting App'x at claim, We defendant's we concluded that must assume the legislative that the jury decision considered the designate the aggravator presented evidence the trial. indicative of appreciably greater culpability is neither In any event, given the confidentiality arbitrary nor illogical. Id. at 1183-84. and finality deliberations, the de- analysis Our in Baird applies equally to fendant's claim that his evidence of miti- the challenged aggravators in this case. gating cireumstances was "not considered" The trial court instructed the jury as to is virtually nonjusticiable. note, We how- the meaning of the terms "torture" and ever, such evidence may be appropriately "mutilation": considered during our appellate review of Torture is an appreciable period of pain sentence appropriateness in light of the *15 punishment or intentionally inflicted and nature of the offense the character of the designed either to coerce the victim or offender, which the defendant request- has for the torturer's sadistic indulgence. ed. Put another way, torture is gratu- itous infliction of substantial pain or suf- (c) Overbreadth of the Torture and Mu- fering in excess of that associated with Aggravator tilation the commission of the charged crime. contends that Mutilation means to cut off perma- or Indiana law is constitutionally deficient in nently destroy an part essential of a failing to provide clear and objective stan body or to cut up or alter radically so as dards and guidance detailed regarding the to make imperfect. In order for mutila- aggravating circumstance for mutilation or tion to be found as an aggravating cir- torture. The statute expresses this aggra cumstance, there must be mutilation of vating circumstance as follows: "The de the victim that goes beyond the act of burned, fendant mutilated, or tortured the killing. victim while the victim was alive." Ind. Final Instructions No. 21 and Appel § 85-50-2-9(b)(11). Code case, In this lant's App'x at 1004-05. The instruction penalty phase jury charged was with de defining "torture" is taken verbatim from termining whether the State proven had this Court's definition State, Leone v. beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen 747 (Ind.2003), and Ni dant "tortured the victim while the victim State, cholson v. (Ind. N.E.2d was still alive the [dJefendant and/or muti 2002). The legislature's use of the term lated the victim while the victim was still "mutiliation" is well understood without live." Appellant's App'x at 1001. explication. further Neither "torture" nor "mutilation," particularly as defined for We confronted a similar contention in jury, this present any substantial risk that Baird in which the defendant will fail to apply a consistent stan Jurors claimed that a multiple murder aggravator dard in determining whether the defen based on "knowing" murders fails to nar dant is death-penalty eligible. row the class of death eligible murders and (d) Sufficiency was overbroad vague. and Evidence Prove (Ind.1992), Torture cert. and Mutilation U.S. 126 L.Ed.2d 208 The defendant contends that in (1993). Remarking on the structure of our sufficient evidence supports the torture had sus- she that revealed also autopsy ac- While aggravator. mutilation and and injuries force blunt eighteen rap- tained guilty pleaded he that knowledging right and left shin on her defen- marks victim, the ligature murdering ing and that showed evidence no that argues dant forearm. sexual to coerce the victim

he tortured evidence, reasonable this In view inflicted intentionally he intercourse, that be- mutilation torture find could punish- or pain period appreciable an doubt. reasonable yond a went injuries her that her, or ment on kill- act of to the those attendant beyond Ap- for Sentence (e) Review Appellate ing. propriateness and, differently the evidence viewWe 7, Rule Appellate Invoking torture the evidence indeed, that find review we that requests overwhelming. defendant mutilation Emphasizing 911 dur- sentence. sister, called his death who revise young victim's cireumstances mitigating observed that she attack, testified his belief ing proceed victim top of the considered the defendant were at- "[when with pleaded argues screamed ings, victim stop," are stop, please "please circumstances tacker quiet." be better "you circum responded, mitigating he against weighed officers enforcement Law at 1271. Tr. [his] clear stances, it *16 the waist from naked Appel the victim found Br. of than death." less be should outside contents down, her abdominal with at 55. lant legs and and her arms flailing body, her however, Rule under review Appellate had The defendant speak. trying weighing such necessarily entail not does her throat, severing the victim's slashed circum mitigating and of vein, jugular internal right and windpipe directs Rather, generally the rule stances. awith abdomen her open cut had and court the trial whether evaluate that we her around long slash inch twenty-four na based on inappropriate is sentence the victim's exposed This wound waist. of the the character and offense ture from concluded One doctor backbone. of case, the nature In this offender.18 had cut defendant that the injuries ac horrendous, expressly as is offense and abdomen of her front through Appel Br. of the defense. knowledged her way through knife all driven then, issue, is whether The at 54. lant The victim spine. her and into midsection the defendant's about something is there attack, during this during alive remained to conclude us persuades that character during care, and EMT on-the-scene inappropriate. is death that the local and care transport ber on this only argument The defendant's of the hand squeezed she hospital, where consider favorably should that we is point if asked nurse when room emergency an from exhibi he suffered that his evidence treated She was understand. could she of defect mental "the severe and tionism then air- and minutes forty-six there discipline poor received psychopathogy," Hospi- Louisville University of to the lifted years, formative in his training and dead. pronounced tal, she was where decision, the sen- finds the Court appeal his a defendant court's permits This rule nature of light in inappropriate is tence review- and authorizes criminal the offender." the character and authorized the offense "revise a sentence ing court to 7(B). Ind.App. R. if, the trial consideration after due statute defendant, character in the self-sufficient, we decline to immature and never safely prison sys- could be housed jury's intervene in the determination argues that his men- tem. the death appropriate sentence is defect, under the laws of Indiana for this defen- tal he him asserts makes incapable pain, genetic, of emotions or ... dant. choice, acquired through conscious and Id. at 766. We conclude likewise in the in impulsiveness

that it results which sub- present case. stantially impaired ability to conform his conduct to the he law when committed Conclusion this murder. We affirm the trial judgment court's In response, argues part the State ordering the death sentence for the defen- that the evidence undermines the reliabili- dant. ty expert opinion of the defense's that the from psychopathy, suffered SULLIVAN, BOEHM, RUCKER, legitimacy significance psychopathy JJ., concur. diagnosis, reliability as a and the scientific SHEPARD, C.J., concurs, continuing to of the defense's claim that the defendant's justification believe that there is less mental alleged necessarily pre- condition appellate alteration of sentence than there controlling vented him from his behavior. (rather was when judges juries) than were experts Tr. at 1958-61. Other did not the final deciders of sentence. See Baer v. diagnosis. reach the same The defen- (Ind.2007) expert acknowledged dant's witness C.J., (Shepard, concurring). "psychopath" "psychopathy" are listed diagnoses neither the nor in DSM-IV its subsequent revision. Id. at 1950-51.

And the evidence revealed other instances *17 defendant was able to control

his violent behavior. conflicting reports,

Given these the de

fendant's mental-health evidence is less compelling. paren

than And his claims of Jeffrey GRAHAM, Appellant A. inadequacies tal during years his formative (Defendant below), particularly significant. are not See Rit chie, 809 N.E.2d at 274. These and his arguments pale other shadow Indiana, Appellee STATE

nature of this offense. In Baer v. (Plaintiff below). (Ind.2007), 866 N.E.2d 752 cert. No. 03S04-0809-CR-00507. - -, U.S. (2008), rejected L.Ed.2d 750 we a defen Supreme Court Indiana. request appellate dant's sentence revi April sion, concluding: Giving due consideration to the trial decision,

court's na- light

ture of the offense the defen- shown ...,

dant's brutal savage slaying

and the lack of demonstrated virtuous

Case Details

Case Name: Ward v. State
Court Name: Indiana Supreme Court
Date Published: Apr 7, 2009
Citation: 903 N.E.2d 946
Docket Number: 74S00-0707-DP-263
Court Abbreviation: Ind.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.