Ward v. New England Screw Co.

1 Cliff. 565 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Rhode Island | 1860

CLIFFORD, Circuit Justice.

To solve the matter in dispute, it becomes necessary to attend with some care to the language both of the act of assembly and of the deed. Both parties concede that Martha Field was the duly constituted guardian of George and Mary Field, and it is not questioned by either that she petitioned for authority to sell a portion of the estate of her wards. By the preamble to the act of assembly. it appears that she represented in her petition that a committee appointed by the town to procure a place to erect a small-pox house, for the use of the town, had made choice of a remote corner of the estate of her wards, and had applied to her to sell the same to the town. She also represented that the part applied for was barren, and of little consequence: and being desirous of accommodating the town, she prayed that she might be empowered to sell the same to the town for that purpose. After reciting these facts in the preamble, the act of assembly, among other things, provides that the said Martha Field be, and she is hereby, authorized to make sale of the said two acres and a half of land for the said pulpóse; and that a deed thereof, made and executed pursuant to this act, shall vest in the purchaser all the right, title, and interest of the said Isaac Field in and to the same: and it also provides that the money arising therefrom be appropriated to the use of the said heirs, and that the sale be made under the direction of the town council of Providence, with the usual provision, requiring the guardian to account with the said council for the appropriation of the money. On the face of the act, it is apparent that the legislative assembly intended to exercise the power of granting a license for the sale of that portion of the minors’ real estate. That conclusion rests, not only upon the fact that the legislative act is based upon the petition of the administratrix of the estate and the guardian of the minors, but upon the express declaration that a deed made and executed in pursuance of the authority granted should vest in the purchaser all the interest which descended to the minors at the decease of their father. Most of the states have general laws making provision for the sale of estates of minors by their guardians, either for their support or education, or to pay their just debts, or for the purpose of changing the investment. Such laws generally require a license from some court of record; and the license is not usually granted, except on petition of the guardian, and after public notice to all interested. No one probably at this day would question the validity of such a general law to provide for the granting of licenses to authorize the sale of such estates, whether the authority was conferred upon a court of general jurisdiction, or a district or county court, or even upon the court of probate. Assuming that the legislature may confer such power upon the courts of a state, for the sale of a minor’s real estate, and for the investment of the proceeds, it is difficult to see any reason why the legislature may not exercise the power directly by special act. Clearly, the character of the act in question is remedial, and in point of fact it has no other characteristic; and we think it cannot be distinguished in principle from a general law upon the same subject. Authority is given to sell the land and invest the proceeds, but a sale is not ordered or directed; nor is there a word in the act to control the legal discretion vested in the guardian. She was left to fix the terms of sale without restraint, and to sell or not. as she might thereafter determine to be best for the interest of her wards. But it is insisted by the plaintiffs, that the act in question is not one where the legislature attempted to exercise its tutelary power over the estates of minors or other persons incapable of disposing of the same. On the contrary, it is insisted that it was the exercise, on the part of the legislature, of the power of eminent domain. Looking at the whole act, however, there does not appear to be any foundation for the proposition; and sufficient has already been remarked, we think, to demonstrate its fallacy. Whatever is said respecting the use to which the land was to be applied by the town was mere inducement to the legislative assembly to grant the prayer of the petition; and that remark applies with equal force to every one of the phrases in the recitals of the preamble, on which the theory of the plaintiffs is based. Universal experience teaches that the tribunals intrusted -with the ultimate power of granting licenses in cases of this description find it necessary, as it is their duty, to examine each particular ai plication with scrutiny, and to exercise a careful supervision over the rights of those interested in the estate. Consequently the petitioner is required to assign solid reasons for the application, and oftentimes finds it prudent to introduce defensive allegations against the inference of interested motives. Allusion was accordingly made in this case to the promotion of the public health, to guard against any such suspicion, and to show that the petitioner did not originate the suggestion.

Another allegation in the petition is. that the land was barren, and of little consequence; and that representation was doubtless made, not only to show that the residue of the estate would not be injured by the sale, but also to show that a change of investment would be beneficial to the minors. Unconditional provision was made in the act that the money should be appropriated to the use of the heirs; and it was expressly provided that the sale should be made under the direction of the town council. At that period in the history of the sta'te the town council, so called, exercised all the ordinary powers of a court of probate; and it was also provided, in effect, that the guardian should account to the town council for the proceeds of the sale. Without entering more into detail, suffice it to say, that we are of the opinion that, by the true construction of the act of assembly, it must be understood as conferring a license upon Martha Field, guardian of George and Mary Field, to sell such portion of the real estate of her wards as was therein described, and to invest the proceeds of the sale for their benefit, under the direction of the town council of Providence; and she was not only authorized to sell the land, but to make and execute a sufficient deed to vest in the purchaser all the right, title, and interest in and to the same which descended to her wards from their father.

Having ascertained the trae nature and extent of the authority conferred upon the guardian, it only remains to consider and determine in what manner that authority was exercised. As described in the deed, the parcel of land sold and conveyed contained two acres and thirty poles; and it was sold, as appears from the consideration recited in the deed, for the sum of one hundred and nine and three eighths Spanish milled dollars. Nothing, therefore, can be inferred in favor of the theory of the plaintiffs from any supposed inadequacy of consideration, as fifty dollars an acre, at that period of time, for barren land, situated in a remote corner of the town of Providence, may well be assumed as its fair value. Among other things, the deed shows that the conveyance was made to the town treasurer, or his successors in office, forever, in trust for the town; and in the granting clause it purports to be a full, free, and absolute conveyance of the land, without condition or limitation. But the introductory part of the instrument, preceding the granting clause, refers to the authority to sell and convey, as derived from the act of assembly, and in that connection recites the purpose the town had in view in making the purchase. Considering, however, that the same recital was inserted in the act of assembly, which, nevertheless, authorized an absolute conveyance of all the right, title, and interest of the minors in the premises, we are of the opinion that the words “for the purpose of erecting a pest-house upon” are merely descriptive of the use to which it was the intention of the town, at the time of the purchase, to apply the land, and that they were not inserted as a condition in the grant, or as a limitation or qualification to the estate conveyed. They would scarcely have that effect even if taken separately, but when considered in connection with the words of the granting clause it is quite obvious, we think, that the parties never intended to give them any such signification. When considered in connection with the other parts of the instrument, it is much more reasonable to suppose that they were inserted for the benefit of the purchaser. Undoubtedly it was the intention of the town to erect a small-pox house on the land purchased; and it may well be that the recital was inserted in the deed to foreclose all future complaint against such an appropriation of the premises. Be that as it may, it must, nevertheless, be assumed that if the grantor had intended to create any such condition or limitation to the estate as is supposed by the plaintiffs, she would have employed, either in the granting clause or the habendum of the deed, some fit and proper language to signify such an intention. Nothing of the kind is pretended by the plaintiffs, so far as respects the granting clause, but reliance is placed upon the concluding phrase of the habendum, as tending to support that theory. As given in the instrument, the habendum reads as follows: “To have and to hold the said granted and bargained premises, with all the privileges and appurtenances thereto belonging or in any wise appertaining. . . . for the use aforesaid, forever.” Conditions in a conveyance are either precedent or subsequent; and as there are no technical words to distinguish them, it follows that whether they be the one or the other is a matter of construction, and depends upon the intention of the party creating the estate. Hotham v. East India Co., 1 Term R. 645; Finlay v. King's Lessee, 3 Pet. [28 U. S.] 374. Precedent conditions are such as must take place before the estate can vest, and must be literally performed. Subsequent conditions are those which operate upon estates already created and vested, and render them liable to be defeated or forfeited. 4 Kent, Comm. (9th Ed.) 125. Most of the estates upon condition in law are of the latter kind, and are liable to be defeated upon breach of the condition, as on failure to pay rent, or the non-performance of other services annexed to the estate. Where a devise of lands was made to a town for a school-house, provided it should be built within a hundred rods of a given place, the proviso was held to be valid, as a condition subsequent, and that the estate was forfeited by a neglect to fulfil the condition for a period of twenty years. Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. 539. Unquestionably a breach of the condition authorizes the heir to enter; and if he make good his claim, he may hold the land, although it was vested for a time in the grantee or devisee. Shep. Touch. 450; 2 Bl. Comm., by Shars. 155. Conditions subsequent, says Chancellor Kent, are not favored in law, and are to be construed strictly, because they tend to destroy estates; but whether so or not, it is clear that they are not to be implied, unless it appear from the language employed in the instrument that such was the intention of the parties. Merrifield v. Cobleigh, 4 Cush. 178; Catlin v. Springfield Fire Ins. Co. [Case No. 2,522]; Doe v. Bancks, 4 Barn. & Ald. 401; Co. Litt. 205b; 4 Kent, Comm. (9th Ed.) 146. Certain words and phrases, it is said, make an estate conditional, of themselves, without expressly giving the power of entry; and examples to that effect are given in several standard treatises upon the subject of conditional estates. Co. Litt. 203a, 203b; Litt. Ten. (by Toml.) 374 ; 2 Greenl. Cruise, 3; 2 Bac. Abr. (by Bouv.) tit. “Condition,” a, h, 280, 287. None of the words, however, put by the elementary writers as examples of what will create a condition in a deed of conveyance, are to be found in the deed in this case, nor any other which, properly understood, falls within the same category. Deeds, as well as other written instruments, ought in general to receive a liberal construction so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties. ' Effect ought to be given, if reasonably practicable, to every part of the instrument; and in order to accomplish that object, it is indispensably necessary to compare one part with another, and apply the whole to the subject-matter described in the instniment.

Applying these rules to the present case, it is quite obvious that the words of the habendum, “for the use aforesaid, forever,” cannot possibly be construed as a condition in the grant, or as a limitation to the estate. Those words must be taken in connection with the words of the granting clause, which clearly show that it was the intention both of the grantor and grantee to convey an absolute- unconditional estate; and they must also be weighed and interpreted in connection with what follows in the same instrument. Contrary to what is usual in conveyances of this description, the grantor not only covenants that she has good right and lawful authority to sell and convey the described parcel of land, but also covenants that the grantee shall quietly and peaceably enjoy the premises in manner aforesaid, and that she will forever warrant ard defend the same against the lawful claims and demands of all persons. Comparing one part of the instrument with- another, and the whole with the act of assembly authorizing the sale, not a doubt is entertained by the court that it was the intention of the grantor to convey to the town of Providence all the right, title, and interest which her wards acquired in the premises by descent at the decease of their father. Two theories are -suggested as to the precise signification of the particular words under consideration, either of which appears to be more reasonable, and more in consonance with the general tenor and scope of the instrument, and consequently to be preferred to that suggested by the plaintiffs. One is, that they must be regarded as a substitute for the words “in trust for said town,” which are contained in the granting clause of the instrument, and that they were inserted to exclude the conclusion that the conveyance was made for the individual benefit of the grantee named in the deed. Another is, that they were employed merely as descriptive of the purpose which the town had in view iri making the purchase; but whether the one or the other, it is nevertheless obvious that they were not employed as creating a condition in the conveyance, or as a limitation to the estate. Such a construction would be a forced one, even if the words were separately considered; but when the phrase is compared with the other parts of the instrument, and the act of assembly authorizing the sale, it is clear that it cannot be sustained. Neither the act of assembly nor the deed affords any evidence that the town had agreed with the grantor to make the contemplated erection on the premises, or that she thought it of consequence to stipulate that the land should be appropriated to that use; and in the absence of any such stipulation or agreement, it can hardly be inferred that the adjacent proprietors are damaged by its discontinuance. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that the demurrer of the defendants to the plaintiffs’ special replication must be sustained, and judgment must be entered accordingly.