186 Iowa 1108 | Iowa | 1919
In the year 1858, •William G. Meredith and Joseph B. Meredith, brothers, obtained title as tenants in common to 330 acres o.f land in Taylor County of this state. About the time of this purchase, they took possession of the land, but made their several homes and improvements upon different 80-acre tracts. William brought with him a wife and child, and Joseph soon married Naamah G. Ward, daughter of Jabez B. Ward. In 1861, Joseph B. Meredith died intestate, survived by his wife, Naamah G., and an infant son, Joseph B. Meredith, junior, his sole heir,‘who also died, a few months later. Under the statute of descent and distribution of intestate property, as it existed at the time in question, the share of the widow was limited to a life estate in a one-third part of her husband’s property. It follows that, subject to this life estate in his mother, the infant Joseph B. Meredith, Jr., succeeded to the fee of the entire undivided share which his father held in common with William G. Meredith. At the death of the infant Joseph B. Meredith, Jr., the descent of the property was controlled by another statute then existing, which provided that, upon the death, intestate, of a person leaving neither wife nor children, his estate should pass to his father and mother, if they survived, or the survivor of them, if either be dead; but if such survivor was the mother, she took a life estate only, and at her death, it should go to the children of her body had by her said deceased husband, and in the event there were no such children nor issue of such children, “then the intestate’s property shall be divided between the nearest heirs of the father and mother of the intestate, share and share alike.” Revision of 1860, Sections 2496, 2498. At
To this claim the defendants plead:
(1) That, under the law as it then stood, the title of the land of which the infant son died seized passed, upon his death, to his mother for life, with remainder over to the nearest surviving relatives of his father and mother; that this remainder on his mother’s side vested in Jabez Ward,
(2) That the decree in the partition mentioned established and confirmed the title in Naamah G. Meredith.
(3) That possession by the defendants under the conveyance from Naamah G. Meredith and from Jabez Ward, and under the decree of partition, ivas an adverse possession in good faith, under color of title and claim of right, for more than the statutory period, and is sufficient to entitle them to a decree dismissing the plaintiffs’ bill.
In a carefully prepared written opinion, the trial court reached the conclusion that the remainder provided by the statute in favor of the “nearest heirs” of the mother, Naamah G. Meredith, was purely contingent, and did not and could not vest in anyone until the death of the life tenant; that the conveyance by Jabez Ward to Naamah G. Meredith, and the decree in her favor in the partition proceedings, added nothing to her right or authority to convey the land; and that her deed to William G. Meredith conveyed no more than her life estate in the property; and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run in defendants' favor until the death of Naamah G. Meredith, in the year 1910.
Were this case to turn entirely upon the construction of the statute referred to, or upon the single question whether the remainder over to the “nearest heirs” of the father and mother of Joseph B. Meredith, junior, is to be regarded as vested or contingent, or whether it is in the nature of an executory interest, and not a remainder at all, its decision would be by no means free from difficulty. The chapter of the Revision of 1860 in which these sections are found is full of perplexities, and is well described by Judge Dillon in Meyer v. Meyer, 23 Iowa 359, 369, where he says that, “of all existing statutes in this state, none are, in many material respects, more obscure and uncertain than those which
“Without such statutory authority, a reversioner out of possession and with no right thereto could not maintain an action against one in possession as a life tenant, and it was undoubtedly the thought of the legislature that the welfare of those interested, as well as the public in general, would be best subserved by providing a means whereby apprehended litigation affecting the use and enjoyment of real property might be at once settled. * * * And indeed, the purpose and intent of the statute seems to us to reach further than this, and to imply that such questions must be settled within the statutory period. There can, at least, be no hardship in holding such to be the rule in cases where there is no disability, and where the facts upon which apprehended litigation will rest are fully known.”
The same question was again raised and argued in Crawford v. Meis, supra, and we were there asked to disapprove and overrule Murray v. Quigley. Befusing so to do, we said:
“It may be conceded that, as a general rule, the limitation statute does not begin to run against the remainder-man until the termination of the preceding estate. * * * But the rule presupposes an uninterrupted continuation of the relation of life tenant and remainderman. As in the case of cotenants, it does not apply where there has been an ouster and disseisin by the life tenant, or one claiming by or through him, and this under claim of right or color of title followed by adverse possession for the statutory period. In the recent case of Murray v. Quigley, 119 Iowa 6, we distinctly held that, especially in view of our statutes giving
In Garrett v. Olford, supra, the life tenant made a deed purporting to convey the entire fee; and it was held, upon the authority of the Murray case, that the parties occupying under this claim of right acquired a good title by adverse possession against the remainderman. So, also, in Wenger v. Thompson the testator devised the property to his wife for life, with remainder over at her death to be divided equally between all of his children “then living.” This remainder, under our precedents, was clearly contingent. The life tenant conveyed the land by warranty deed to her brother. After about 20 years (but within less than 10 years after the death of the life tenant), the children of the testator brought suit to establish their title as remainder-men. While some question was raised that the language of the will gave the widow a fee, instead of a life estate, and gave her full power to convey, we declined to decide that phase of the dispute, saying that, even if these claims should be overruled, and it be conceded that the appellants were entitled to the rights of remaindermen under the will, “the
We may also add that our sister state of Nebraska, having a statute substantially like our own, has given it the same construction, citing Murray v. Quigley approvingly, and First Nat. Bank v. Pilger, 78 Neb. 168 (110 N. W. 704).
In so far as any of our own decisions may be thought to state a different rule, -we think the inconsistency is apparent, rather than substantial, and that in none of them has there been any reference to the statute above mentioned which creates a right of action where one did not before exist; while in some there is an evident failure to discriminate between the right to maintain a possessory action and one to establish and protect a right which may ripen into a title.
It may also be noted that, if the remainder to the appellees herein is a contingent one, it is not of that class of contingencies where the remainderman is not in esse when the life tenancy is created, or where there is any possibility that the tenant for life may die before the designated remainderman comes into being, to receive the estate. On the contrary, the remainder is to the heirs of Naamah (}. Meredith, and, upon her death at any time, her heirs, as such, would at once come into the title, if the remaindc. had not been extinguished. It appears without dispute that. during this entire period, these plaintiffs and those whom they represent have constituted the entire number of her prospective heirs; and under the theory of their case, nothing but the life of this woman has ever stood between them
If their alleged right to the land were clearly established, either in law or in equity, the courts could not do otherwise than sustain it, even though the result to the ap
The decree appealed from is, therefore, reversed, and the plaintiffs’ bill will be dismissed. — Reversed.