95 Ga. 103 | Ga. | 1894
Mrs. Ward applied to the superior court for a rule directing the sheriff to deliver to her certain personal property which had been set apart to her for a year’s support. The answer of the sheriff averred that the property was held by him under a fi. fa. issued under proceedings to foreclose a mortgage on the property in question made by Mrs. Ward’s deceased husband; that he had paid expenses of storage of the same, for which he claimed a lien upon the property, and declined to deliver the property until the amount of such claim should be paid. The court below sustained this position of the sheriff and refused to order delivery without payment by Mrs. Ward of the storage fees, which ruling is now assigned as ei’ror.
The record shows that in the lifetime of Mr. Ward proceedings were taken in Muscogee superior court to foreclose a chattel mortgage on the goods in question made by Mr. Ward, in which a fi. fa. was issued to the sheriff of Fulton county, who took possession of the goods, and that they have since continued in the possession of said sheriff. He caused them to be stored, and at the date of said petition had paid storage fees amounting to upwards of one hundred and twenty dollars. That illegality to the foreclosure was filed on behalf of Mr. Ward, and that the case thereby made being called in its regular order, the levy was dismissed for want of prosecution. That prior to such dismissal, Mr. Ward having died, this plaintiff' in error, his widow, took proceedings for a year’s support, wherein it appearing that the property in question comprised all the estate of said.
No question of fact is involved here; the sole question for determination of this court being whether or not, upon the facts herein stated and as found by the court below, the alleged lien of the sheriff for storage fees is or is not superior to the claim of title of the plaintiff in error by virtue of the assignment to her as a year’s support.
Upon this state of facts, the proposition has been pressed upon this court with great earnestness, that the sheriff, being without interest in the litigation, and with respect to the property seized he occupying the position of an involuntary depositary incurring expense in its keeping, is entitled to a lien thereon as bailee, which attaches to the thing bailed without respect to its ownership. In the first place, we cannot agree to the proposition that the sheriff’ is an involuntary bailee. He assumes a highly honorable and greatly responsible trust when he accepts at the hands of the public his official position, and along with its honors and emoluments'the law imposes upon him duties and responsibilities of no mean degree. Among these is the duty to faithfully execute all the processes of the courts which may be placed in his hands, and safely to keep and preserve all property which, by virtue of such process, is committed to his care. For these good offices the law provides compensation not, in its strict commercial sense, adequate in all cases it is true, but such, supplemented by the honors of public preferment, as is at least satisfactory to him, else he had declined the honor. He is the depositary chosen of the law, the voluntary repository of its trust, and for the payment of his service the law provides he must look to the party cast in the suit. In- the second