Wang v. WangWang v. Wang
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Ordered that the order is modified, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, (1) by deleting the provision thereof denying those branсhes of the plaintiffs’ motion which were pursuant to
In March 2000, Kuei Chen Tsao (hereinafter the decedent) transferred real property in Flushing (hereinafter the premisеs), which she held solely in her name, to the defendant, who is one of her daughters. The decedent died in September 2002. In 2006, the defendant allegedly signed an agreement (hereinafter the agreement) to transfer five-sixths ownership of the premises to her father and four of her siblings. No transfer took place. In April 2009, the defendant commenсed a holdover proceeding in the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, seeking to evict two of her siblings from the premises. A month later, in May 2009, four of the defendant‘s siblings and hеr father commenced an action in the Supreme Court, Queens County (hereinafter action No. 1). The complaint contained two causes of action, both of which sought to impose a constructive trust on the premises. The first cause of action alleged that a constructive trust arose from the transfer of the prеmises in 2000 and the second cause of action alleged that a constructive trust arose from the agreement. By order dated October 15, 2009, the Supreme Court grantеd the defendant‘s motion to dismiss action No. 1, concluding that the first cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations and the second cause of action failed to state a cause of action. The plaintiffs did not appeal from that order.
In 2010, three of the plaintiffs in action No. 1 (the defendant‘s father and two of hеr siblings) commenced the instant action. In the first two causes of action, the defendant‘s father sought damages arising from the allegedly wrongful transfer of the premises in 2000. In the third cause of action, all of the
“Under the doctrine of res judicata, a party may not litigate a claim where a judgment on the merits exists from a prior action between the same parties involving the same subject matter. The rule applies not only to claims actually litigated but also to claims that could have been raised in the prior litigation” (Matter of Hunter, 4 NY3d 260, 269 [2005]). The rationale for the doctrine is that a party who has been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim should not be allowed to do so again; allowing relitigation would undermine the interest of the community and the litigants in finality (see Ryan v New York Tel. Co., 62 NY2d 494, 500 [1984]). Relitigation of claims alsо inhibits judicial economy (see Matter of Reilly v Reid, 45 NY2d 24, 28 [1978]). The dismissal of a claim on the ground that the statute of limitations has run is a determination on the merits for res judicata purposes (see Smith v Russell Sage Coll., 54 NY2d 185, 194 [1981]; Sosa v JP Morgan Chase Bank, 33 AD3d 609, 611 [2006]; Cоld Spring Harbor Area Civic Assn. v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Huntington, 305 AD2d 444, 445 [2003]). Here, the plaintiffs could have raised, in action No. 1, their current causes of action arising оut of the transfer of the premises in 2000. The causes of action arose from the same operative facts and concern the same property. Thus, the dismissаl in action No. 1 of the causes of action arising from the 2000 transfer as barred by the statute of limitations, is res judicata as to the plaintiffs’ current causes of action arising out of that transfer (see Cold Spring Harbor Area Civic Assn. v Board of Zoning Appeals of Town of Huntington, 305 AD2d at 445). Consequently, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of the defendant‘s cross motion which was to dismiss the first and second causes of action.
However, the Supreme Court should not have granted that
Additionally, the Supreme Court should not have granted that branch of the defendant‘s cross motion which was to dismiss the fourth cause of action, which alleged unjust enrichment. That cause of action was not asserted in action No. 1, and it pertained to personal property, rather than the premises. The complaint adequately alleged a cause of action to recover for unjust enrichment (see Matter of Haberman v Zoning Bd. of Appeals of City of Long Beach, 94 AD3d at 997; East Hampton Union Free School Dist. v Sandpebble Bldrs., Inc., 66 AD3d at 125; Anesthesia Assoc. of Mount Kisco, LLP v Northern Westchester Hosp. Ctr., 59 AD3d 473, 481 [2009]).
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit. Skelos, J.P., Balkin, Leventhal and Roman, JJ., concur.