Wand v. BeckWand v. Beck
—In an action to recover damages for legal malpractice, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Davis, J.), dated January 20, 1998, which denied the motion of the plaintiffs’ decedent for summary judgment and granted the defendants’ cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The appellants’ decedent held a second mortgage on property sold at auction in a foreclosure sale. While represented by the defendants, the appellants’ decedent obtained a deficiency judgment against the mortgagors upon their default. The mortgagors’ subsequent motion to vacate the default was granted on the ground that they had not been personally served as required by statute (see, RPAPL 1371 [2]). The appellants’ decedent was thereafter precluded from commencing a new action as the statutory 90-day limit had passed.
The Supreme Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants as the appellants’ decedent would not have been successful in the underlying action (see, Volpe v Canfield,
In light of the foregoing, the appellants’ remaining contention is academic. Mangano, P. J., Sullivan, Goldstein and Mc-Ginity, JJ., concur.