Walton v. State

WALTON, Patrick Defendant

Below, Appellant, Delaware,

STATE Plaintiff

Below, Appellee.

No.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted: Jan. April

Decided: Justice,

VEASEY, for the Chief Majority. degree

In we revisit the first appeal, this robbery requires the State statute which to doubt beyond establish reasonable (1) following elements: that the both robbery the crime of in defendant commits (2) in and the course degree; second thereof, what to be a “displays in- deadly present case weapon.” robbery volves a where the defen- bank teller passed dant to the bank a note money defendant demanded and attempt had a bomb. stated that he prove defendant “displayed” that the bomb, presented evidence State sisting of the teller made to statements she police in which mentioned detective that she and that the robber was scared pocket. had his in his Neither the hand teller could detective nor the elaborate explain how the the defendant’s conduct or pocket appeared defendant’s hand be a hold that rational fact- bomb. We beyond finder could not infer reasonable doubt from evidence the defen- this dant what “display[ed] deadly weapon.” Also, Superior no error in we find evidentiary ruling to ad- refusing Court’s inmit defendant’s offer of a hear- evidence say made the defendant to statement Dean, Esquire, of the Sandra W. Office nei- psychiatrist. Because Defender, Dover, for Appellant. Public psychia- ther treatment from the sought Williams, Esquire, John Department use psychia- trist nor did he seek to Dover, Justice, Appellee. for trial, opinion trist’s at the trial expert judge his discretion ex- did not abuse VEASEY, Justice, Before Chief cluding the statement. HOLLAND, WALSH, BERGER and STEELE, Justices, establishes the defen- evidence constituting the Court felony of second de- en dant committed Banc. therefrom, flight 832 of the Delaware Code crime or of immediate Title Section provides, part: person participant crime: or another in the (a) guilty person robbery in the first A (2) person the crime Displays when the commits when, robbery second in the weaponf] of the commission of the in the course alleged drug dealer owed gree robbery. Superior But the Court’s $500 his debt. money needed the settle in the first sentence the evidence did must be reversed because Court, Superior At trial beyond not establish a reasonable doubt testified that he committed necessary statutory element that the or dis- actually having a bomb but denied a “displays appears defendant what to be to be a anything appeared that playing com- deadly weapon,” in the course of his asserted an affirmative bomb. His counsel Ac- degree robbery. of second mission duress, that he was claiming defense cordingly, the matter is remanded to the bank, alleged fearing rob the forced to may so that the defendant Superior Court kill him if he did not might dealer drug robbery. be sentenced for second for repay his debt. Counsel money find not that could argued State Walton Facts degree robbery be- him of first convict 18, 2000, September Patrick Walton On have a bomb nor did he cause he did not walked into the West Dover branch of intended to any physical gesture make teller, Bank a Mellon and handed bank had, appeared that he or convince Parikh Parikh, read, “I a Gita a note that have have, a bomb. your money dye bomb. Give me all and no of first de- jury The convicted Walton pack.” gave Parikh in tracea- Walton $420 robbery. Superior The Court sen- gree money money.” ble “bait Walton took the This imprisonment.3 to life tenced Walton ran out the bank. direct appeal. is Walton’s police shortly arrived after the rob- Appeal bery occurred. Detective Eric Richardson Issues On the Dover Police interviewed Parikh. arguments appeal. raises two Walton According the detective’s notes from the argument is that the State principal His interview, Parikh that anything did not see a sufficient evidence for produce did be on the robber’s degree robbery. him of first jury to convict person. told the only She detective single placing reference to Walton the suspect pock- “did have his hand in his pocket, argues, hand in his he does not Significantly, et which scared” her.2 she amount to a of “what say pocket did not that the hand in the by the deadly weapon,” required be a as “appeared” or other bomb trial argues He also statute.4 weapon. by refusing to admit into evi- judge erred testimony psychiatrist who police fingerprint recovered a latent dence the fear that robbery. That have recounted Walton’s on the note used could him drug dealer would murder print fingerprint. alleged matched Walton’s The his According to repay Parikh if he did not his debt. police shortly arrested Walton after Walton, testimony permissible him in a photograph lineup. identified hearsay diagnosis under the videotaped began shortly interview that statement arrest, provided by Delaware exception confessed to com- treatment after his Walton 803(4). (“DRE”) explained He that he Rules of Evidence mitting robbery. 3, 2001). Del. offender. See 11 (July sentence as an habitual 2. Tr. trans. at 51 4214(b). §C. committing he was convicted of 3. Because occasions, felony Walton’s first on two 832(a)(2). Del. C. 4. 11 life degree robbery conviction warranted a inter- from the his notes Did tive read aloud The State Not Present Sufficient that, Parikh view, while Evidence To Find That Walton Dis- which mentioned played Appeared A suspect What To Be any weapons, “did did not see Deadly Weapon which scared” pocket in his have his hand no evidence the victim. But there was asks to over this Court “appeared to pocket the hand in the his first turn conviction deadly weapon.” remand his Superior case to the sentencing new for second Court the obvious case rarely confront Courts robbery. so, To do must find we “displays where a fact, that no rational trier viewing brandishing deadly weapon” by light evidence the most favorable to often involves Robbery toy gun. real or State, could beyond the have found a rea gestures the robber threat where subtle sonable doubt the essential elements of bulge hidden deadly weapon or a toward a first robbery: the elements of sec so that of the robber person on the ond ag and an additional beyond a reason- juror could find rational gravating factor. Walton concedes that “appeared to be bulge that the able doubt the evidence supports the elements of the weapon.”7 The boundaries deadly second robbery: the threatening first under the punishable conduct immediate use of force against another to by cases are marked robbery statute compel person that to surrender or deliv displayed the defendant where has up er property.5 The additional aggrava deadly weapon. a concealed appears to be ting factor that elevates the crime to first cases, To address these difficult degree robbery is that the defendant analysis two-part adopted a “displays what this Court has to be in Sec weapon.”6 “display” requirement apply 832(a)(2).8 First, must sub the victim tion The State difficulty had proving ag- weapo has a the defendant jectively believe gravating factor at trial. Parikh testified Second, threat must defendant’s n.9 that she money surrendered the to Walton objective manifesta by an accompanied be simply because the trained bank her to do objective manifes weapon.10 The tion of a so. She did testify not that Walton “dis- a broad attributes requirement tation played” anything other than note. To in order to “display” term meaning to the element, establish the the State toward gestures tried to the robber who rely punish on an earlier statement that Parikh a concealed made that officer, something to the investigating trial, person.11 Detective robber’s At on the deadly weapon Richardson. the detec- 831(a). § 5. 11 Del. C. 8. Id. 832(a)(2). 6. 11 Del. C. Smallwood, require- A.2d at 166. This 346 essential element with an ment is consistent example,

7. For upheld this Court has “[rjequires the exis- Robbery of the offense. degree robbery convictions where the defen material victim as a a named human tence of “placed dant had jacket pocket a hand in his State, pointed 794 A.2d it element.” the direction one of the Coffield (Del.2002). appear victims as to possessed that the robber weapon,” Smallwood, State v. 346 A.2d (Del.1975), point and where a defendant Deshields, 706 A.2d at 10. See ed bulky to a object underneath shirt. Deshields v. Id. 1998). when “displayed” that Walton first contends not see both of the defen- subjective teller could prove that Parikh bank State did not hands, may may one which Parikh dant’s ly believed Walton was armed since in which the empty bag in an trial have been testified at that she handed Walton money. put the teller to her to robber wanted money because the bank trained any conduct that The teller could not recall procedure of routine part do so as bank Nevertheless, “objective physical man- to an circumstances. amounted under such weapon.14 The State coun- ifestation” of a Parikh told the detective that she was Parikh observed observing that jury could infer from Par ters scared.12 (i.e., the hand conduct subjectively physical some apprehension ikh’s she armed,13 subjective fear supported her satisfy pocket) thus believed Walton was armed, the teller was whereas ing subjective element of the State’s solely on inqui apprehension based her case. But that is not the end of the Word threatening note.15 The State ry. over the note handing tends that Walton’s argues Walton next that Parikh’s state- pocket his hand in consti- having Richardson, ment to Detective jury for a rational tuted a sufficient basis merely having his hand in refers Walton doubt beyond to conclude a reasonable elaboration, pocket, any his without cannot a the element of that this conduct satisfied “objective an manifes- physical constitute deadly appeared of to be a “display” “what support require- tation” sufficient to disagree. weapon.” We objective physical ment of an manifestation First, construed that this conduct cannot be “displays appears the defendant what 16 Second, in the hand deadly “display.” to be a as a weapon.” Walton relies on permissible in to a infer- pocket our decision v. where we cannot lead Word State weap- “appearance” deadly prove held that the State could not ence of an *2). McKamey, WL 45060 at jury permitted place greater (quoting 12. Id. was to weight contemporaneous not "read our on Parikh’s state We said in Word that we did testimony McKamey ment the detective than at summary to her that was entered order in State, trial. Word v. 801 A.2d 928 n. 4 opinion pre- as reliable before our Deshields (Del.2002) (quoting 11 Del. C. 'displays permit finding what cedent to of states, "(a) prosecution, In a criminal weapon’ deadly where the voluntary out-of-court statement of a perceive any display physi- did not or victim subject present who is to cross- witness weapon.” Id. We now cal manifestation of a may evi examination be used as affirmative McKamey be of cannot conclude that the facts independent dence with substantive testimo distinguished in substantially from the facts value”). nial case before us. Word or from the facts of the case, Therefore, en Banc we now over- in this State, Harrigan 13. See v. 447 A.2d McKamey it is inconsis- to the extent that rule (Del. 1982) (holding that "the circumstances holding holding in or the tent with the instant record, yielding money the threats and Word. beyond any ... show reasonable doubt display apprehension of the two victims to the Word, 801 A.2d at 932. defendant”). by the manifested State, Dictionary, According "dis- to Webster’s 801 A.2d at 930-31. Word cases, referred, spread the view: ex- among play” means "to before we other to a Word sight give evidence of." or mind: summary panel order of this Court in hibit to NEW INTERNATION- WEBSTER’S THIRD McKamey v. 1997 WL 45060 (8th ed.2000). always Word, We have AL DICT. 654 Supr.). 801 A.2d at 931. In McKa See "display” plain mean- its mey upheld accorded the word we a first convic 832(a)(2). See ing interpreting Section showing only that upon evidence tion Smallwood, (quoting the at 166 where the de defendant robbed a cab driver edition of from an earlier moving identical definition the driver in a fendant "sat behind Dictionary). gun.” Webster’s driver that he had cab and told the not that solitary suggest reference to does even Walton made on. The Walton’s objective object not pocket hand his is or other gesture bulge toward a that dis- physical manifestation person deadly to be “appeared his that played what a bomb. weapon.”18 apply objective us to man- State asks argument is tantamount to a State’s give limit- analysis ifestation contention that the mere verbal threat of a reading effectively permit that would less to the perhaps strapped robber’s bomb— conviction to stand body like a ter- by clothing hidden suicide displays nothing if the defendant at even threat involving rorist —is distinct from a all. belongs in a deadly weapons other present not The State did evidence separate ipso facto estab- category prove a reasonable beyond doubt Wal- logical lishes a But the exten- “display.” threat, bomb,” “I ton his have a supported sion of would be to cre- such a contention physical accompanying with conduct statutory entirely category ate an new objectively could be viewed as “dis- by bomb that can be satisfied threats playing] abe merely a bomb. This claiming to have weapon.” presented The sole evidence and, legislative body there- Court not a conduct De- describe Walton’s consisted of fore, special category create such a cannot suspect any weapons?”17 have His notes bly, requiring “display” a of “what appears Parikh merely reveal that did not see a deadly weapon.”19 to be a anything a weapon hinges The on the degree first offense only that weapon, Walton had his hand statement, more, verbal20 accompanying This conduct the threat pocket. his without 788, 3, 214, 2001). (July pez, 73 N.Y.S.2d 535 17. Tr. trans. at 50 N.Y.2d 538 1328, (1989) (holding N.E.2d 1332 that the jurisdictions addressing 18. Other statutes degree robbery requires first statute the de- to Section 832 have also underscored similar actions, consciously "by fendant manifest objective necessity inquiry the of an because presence object victim the to the in such of requires degree the the first offense more than way reasonably perceives a that the victim deadly Hughes of force. See threat Bratz, gun”); that the has a In re defendant 40, 336, (1987) Ga.App. 363 S.E.2d 337 185 759, 662, (2000) Wash.App. 101 P.3d 765 5 physical a (requiring "Some manifestation of to, (adopting two-part inquiry identical and a robbery weapon” degree a first to sustain approach relying upon, the Delaware articu- conviction) omitted); (quotation People v. Par- Smallwood). lated in Deshields and 556, 455, ker, 417 Mich. 339 N.W.2d 459 (1983) (reasoning that the fact finder must Cephas, 19. See 28 State v. determine that the defendant was “armed” ("It 1994) Assembly and is the General the an article that leads victim to believe with prerogative legis this has the to Court which possessed deadly weapon); the existing is to construe late. This Court’s role Fortune, (La.1992) 608 So.2d State v. legislation.”). (stating that the first statute prove "requires to the state that the offender dictionary the We word “verbal” in use the subjective induced a belief in the victim that encompass written oral sense to both and dangerous weapon, he was armed with a the threat. See WEB- objectively communications of victim’s belief was reason- that the circumstances”); People STER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL the v. Lo- able under deadly weapon during a language carrying the» from of force rather than the of greater punish- robbery.23 By holding out “display” is the con- threat itself.21 who, peril, at ment the robber additional, establishing aggrava- duct the victim that leads to engages conduct ting degree element that elevates second however, armed, is Sec- believe robber serious, degree the more first 832(a)(2) an additional deter- provides tion 832(a)(2) initially offense. was Section of possibility holding rent out only those punish drafted to defendants armed but for victing the defendant who is prove could were armed State posses- prove whom the State cannot deadly weapon.22 with deterrent 1447. This charge ad- sion under Section of value version of Section be if ditional deterrent value would lost was the extent diminished to the State are convicted of defendants like Walton could not convict defendant because the physical no degree robbery, when weapon could not be recovered for trial. supports deadly threat. conduct amended punish When the statute was itself, cannot, A threat verbal deadly “display to be a of “appears of what weapon,” aggravating the focus of the fac- so, If were the elevation weapon.”24 tor to the victim’s perception, shifted to first from second rob which burden proof eased State’s bery sensitivity on the depend would range punishable broadened the solely to a particular each victim verbal conduct. noted that a We have different threat, nothing to the and would add ele offense, prohibits which Section felony of the of second rob ments possession deadly weapon of a com- during admittedly bery guilty felony, mission be deters the defendant and will sentenced.25 (8th ed.2000) (defining necessarily DICT. mind” references the defendant’s verbal as Thus, words”). "relating display to the mind conduct. refers physically to situations the defendant where Johnson, ("While 21. See 1991 WL 28889 at *2 gestures per on his concealed |of agree appearance we physical that a mere displayed “deadly weapon” is not son. suffice, weapon] there will must be more sight, victim’s rather to the but victim’s than the victim’s belief in the existence reasonably by forcing mind the victim infer weapon.”). presence the conduct the of from defendant’s Smallwood, weapon. at a 346 A.2d See 832(a)(2) ("A (1973) § 22. See per- 11 Del. C. (“[O]ne by who to feel the sense of is made guilty robbery son is in the of first gun presence apparent may of an touch when robbery he commits the crime of in the recognition it his never see but there is second [i]s and ... armed with a just as mind and manifestation is effec ”); deadly weapon ... See also Del.Crim.Code view.”). plain putting ... as a in tive (1973) ("Rob- Commentary, with Section 832 bery very in the first is a serious (requiring that crimi- 25.See Del. C. crime, felony punishment, carrying class B justice "promote nal statutes be construed deter because it seems desirable to the use of the law as in purposes and effect the of stated dangerous deadly weapons, and if even sim- title”); 201(4) §C. § 201 of and 11 Del. this ple occasionally happen.”). robbery must purposes (prescribing of the of the as one upon rea- criminal code that it "differentiate LeCompte 23. See 903-04 grounds and between serious minor sonable ( 1986). Del. penal- proportionate prescribe and offenses therefor....”). analyzing a similar 24. A is not sufficient sustain a ties verbal threat statute, Supreme Court not- has Louisiana conviction because such defendant’s con- inquiry ed that an into the "display" a be seen as a to the threat cannot panic reactions unreasonable this Court duct “excludes victim's “mind.” While continues allows vic- by the otherwise "display” as an to the victim but to define exhibition mind,” subjective to determine whether "sight display tim's beliefs we believe "to the or Properly The Trial Court Excluded The psychiatrist statement made to a A Hearsay 803(4).27 Made To Statement Walton may DRE be admissible under Psychiatrist Retained To Eval- To admit the statement, Walton re was Competence uate Mental (1) Walton’s quired to show that his motive mak ing the statement consistent with the was Walton contends that the trial purpose of treatment that he and was judge by refusing erred to admit in evi diagnosis depended aware that the on the hearsay dence the offer Walton of (2) statement; accuracy of the psychiatrist statement he made to a who psychiatrist reasonably relied on this kind competence evaluated Walton’s to stand diagnosis.28 of his reaching information evaluation, During trial. Walton told satisfied, requirements If these were psychiatrist shortly before the DRE judge trial would conduct a 403 anal drug alleged Walton’s dealer held ysis probative to ensure that the value of a gun to Walton’s head and threatened to substantially the statement is not out kill him if he did not his debt. repay $500 weighed by danger prejud of unfair Although presented videotaped the State ice.29 jury confession to the in which Walton recounted an identical statement to the Walton did not make his statement police, argues Walton that the exclusion of “with treat- purpose promoting prejudiced right the statement to a fair relayed to ment.” Walton’s statement was trial testify because Walton was forced to court-appointed psychiatrist on the eve present order to these statements to the circumstances, trial. Under some jury. testimony permitted Walton’s hearsay' may statement be admissible impeach credibility by State to intro psychiatrist anticipation when made to ducing dishonesty into evidence his crimes. litigation, judge the trial did not but by excluding abuse his discretion Walton’s 803(4), relies DRE counsel did not statement because defense permits hearsay admission of plan psychiatrist expert to use the as an purposes statements “made for of medical witness at trial. diagnosis describing or treatment 803(4) recognize that DRE While we history, past present symp medical or or the distinction between state- abolishes inception general toms ... or the char treating physician and ments made to a acter of the cause or external course statements made to a hired in reasonably pertinent physician thereof insofar as anticipation litigation,30 departure this diagnosis or treatment.” We review for justified only from the judge’s of discretion the trial common law is as abuse hearsay practical acknowledgment jury may refusal to admit the statement.26 that a decision, reaching judge degree the trial the offender has committed first rob- Id. 29. bery simple present applying or the lesser offense of rob- in the case was mindful that Fortune, 803(4) bery. psychiatrist ...” 608 at 149. statements to a So.2d to made carefully must be scrutinized to ensure that State, (Del. proponent using of the statement is not Capano 586 v. 781 A.2d 26. 803(4) against to "circumvent the rule hear- 2001). say.” See at 625. id. 803(4) Although may Id. at 624. be used 27. admit statements Strong, in some circumstances to ON EV 30. See John W. McCORMICK (5th ed.) ("Courts psychiatrist, noted that § made to we have IDENCE 278 were hesi always will "or even usu- statements not tant admit made to doctors con such statements ally” be admissible. Id. only diagnosis when the sulted for because anticipate declarant does not that the effec Shell, depends upon the accu (citing v. Iron 633 tiveness of treatment Id. United States 28. statement, (8th Cir.1980)). racy his or her the traditional F.2d 83-84 conflicts interpretation new tion. This the distinction between parse be unable to pre- precedents and of our with several truth and a statement for its admitting many serious prosecution vents merely as basis admitting the statement Assembly level the General crimes at the Because expert’s opinion.31 for an re- need to take the I see no intended. psychi- from the sought neither treatment adopted by now strictive construction did he wish to introduce atrist nor and, therefore, dissent. majority expert’s a basis for the statement as clusions, judge properly the trial excluded Delaware years, than 25 For more admission would the statement because its the decision in State have relied on courts of DRE purpose far from the stray too a de- deciding whether v. Smallwood32 803(4). not an abuse of discre- This was what “displays fendant deny we re- Accordingly, tion. Walton’s explained Smallwood deadly weapon.” quest for a new trial. means “exhibit that the word mind,”33 and held sight Conclusion is satisfied of 832 “display” requirement for first rob- sentence Walton’s any is “manifested if the reversed, is bery and this matter re- case, In that defendant victim’s senses.”34 for a new Superior manded to Court jacket pocket in his hand had his sentencing degree robbery. for second holding if the victim as pointed it at 18, the Supreme Court Rule Pursuant robbery con- weapon. Other reargument which a motion for time within 1) sustained where: have been victions may be filed in this matter is shortened a coat and hand inside had one defendant Opinion. days seven from the date of this 2) threat; had defendant a verbal made at the together pointed clasped his hands BERGER, Justice, dissenting. right “Hold it told her to victim and 3) majority opinion significantly there;”36 tapped bulge modi- defendant threat;37 meaning phrase “displays made a verbal fies the his waistline and 4) into his coat reached deadly weapon” Ap- the victims.38 threatening pocket while purposes of a first convic- (citing New Interna- Webster’s exception 33. Id. at 166 underlying rationale for the self-—a (1964)). exist.”). Dictionary Merriam tional ish treatment interest —does not Id. at 167. 34. 803(4) corresponding Fed- 31. DRE tracks the Advisory Notes to eral Rule of Evidence. State, Harrigan 447 A.2d 1191 803(4) Federal Rule states: (Defendant 1982) to shoot one threatened State, victims); WL 317409 Wright v. excluded from Conventional doctrine has said, (Defendant (Del.Supr.) ‘‘Don’t at *1 hearsay exception ... to a statements this.”). make me use only purpose of physician for the consulted testify. enabling While these state- him to State, Williams v. admissible as substantive ments were not (Del.1985). evidence, expert to state was allowed including opinion, state- the basis of his at *1 1986 WL 17411 Mercado v. thus ments of this kind. distinction (Defendant victim he (Del.Supr.) told the unlikely to be made was one most called for piece” victim did ‘‘pull this if the would rejects accordingly the by juries. State, The rule 706 money.); v. Deshields over the hand limitation. (Del.1998). A.2d 502 803(4). Comm. Note to Fed.R.Evid. Adv. (Del. State, WL 71442 DeShields v. 38. (Del.1975). Supr.). 32. 346 A.2d Smallwood, case, v. In that plying upheld McKamey this Court also a dent State.42 first conviction who where the victim was cab driver never saw defendant, victim could not see the and the anything purported weapon. only weapon “manifestation” of a was the The defendant was seated him and behind defendant’s verbal threat.39 he simply gun. told driver that had a upheld This Court his conviction of first Thus, year, until last re- Smallwood, degree robbery, citing Harri quirement only could be satisfied based on Deshields, gan, and prop Mercado pos- victim’s belief that defendant osition that a person displays deadly weapon objec- sessed a and some “intimi weapon when he weapon. tive In most manifestation manifesting dates ... [the victim] cases, objective manifestation involved presence weapon though of such a even it claiming weapon to have a while is not seen the victim.”43 The Word concealing hand under cloth- piece ignored McKamey, calling court it unrelia In ing. the one case where a conviction was precedent.44 ble overturned, there was no verbal threat or weapon. manifestation of a Defendant Now, follow-up we have Word holdup,” said “This is a but he never and, make it again, majority tries to weapon claimed to have a and the victim it simply applying seem that is settled never saw defendant’s hands to know as announced in Smallwood. In principles concealing whether he Smallwood, however, expressly the Court something.40’ recognized that weapon “displayed” if a victim the is exhibited to the

Then, decision, panel a 2002 this through any victim’s mind of the victim’s long precedents Court modified the line of long-standing defini- Using senses.45 State,41 reviewed above. Word v. defen tion, display requirement would be sat- gave dant a bank teller a note that de saying isfied here. The victim saw note stated, “I money manded am armed.” bomb, defendant has a and also saw defen- Defendant’s hand was inside a concealed pocket. dant’s hand concealed bag that he placed the counter after objective threat note contained the passing the teller his note. The Word manifestation of that threat was the con- Court held that these facts were insuffi hand, cealed which could have been hold- cient support a first detonator, ing grenade, explo- or small conviction the teller’s belief that because law, sive device. Under settled these facts defendant had a was based on his note a conviction of support are sufficient to and not on the fact that his hand was degree robbery. bag. concealed majority suggests upholding The Word Court made no effort to rec holding prece oncile its with the recent this conviction would trivialize the statuto- State, (Del. acknowledges McKamey majority that Word 39. v. 1997 WL 45060 44. The now not, Supr.) majority McKamey. does overruled however, explain happened how it that our 1991 WL 28889 Johnson precedent recent was overruled without Supr.). by the Court See: Inter- sideration en banc. VI(6), mandating Operating Procedure en nal (Del.2002). 41. 801 A.2d 927 overruling banc consideration before this decision of Court. (Del.Supr.). WL 45060 45. 346 A.2d at 165. Id. at *2. ry elements of the crime of first full effect to the intent of the General so, robbery. If “display” that is then the Assembly protection public. and full to the element has been years. trivialized for 25 I would affirm defendant’s conviction of always This Court has required a verbal degree robbery. Accordingly, I dis- objective threat and some manifestation of sent. case, every threat. In almost

objective manifestation was a hand con- clothing. general-

cealed under The victim

ly did see the or even the gun-shaped object

outline of a in the de-

fendant’s concealed hand. All the victim Here, too,

saw was the concealed hand.

the victim saw a concealed hand —the

same “conduct” satisfied this Court JACKSON, Michael Defendant past. Below, Appellant, Finally, I majority’s dissent because the construction of the preventing statute is

important category of serious from crimes Delaware, Plaintiff STATE being prosecuted to the extent intended Below, Appellee. Assembly. General A person who robs No. a bank or other business establishment presents grave threat employees its Supreme Court of Delaware. any general members of the public who happen during to be there the rob- March Submitted: bery. If the robber threatens the victim April Decided: by saying he has a or a bomb while concealing his hand in a pocket bag,

under majority opinion, he will not be

subject prosecution for first rob-

bery. Indeed, if alleged weapon is a

bomb, it is unclear from majority opin-

ion anything whether waving short of plain

device in sight would suffice as a of what

weapon. potential Yet the presence of a

deadly weapon greatly increases the risk

of harm all present, who are since the

victim, and well-meaning bystanders, may

react attempting to “disarm” the rob- through

ber weapons. force or with sum,

In I modify would not our long line precedents on the meaning of the “dis-

play” element of first degree robbery.

Our interpretation statutory of the settled,

language was readily clear and by prosecutors

understood and defense

lawyers. view, my precedent gave notes tective Richardson’s which Parikh for bomb over or knife threats. threats suspect that the “had hand mentioned are We limitations constrained pocket which scared” Parikh. Rich- statute, may ignore and we testified that ardson Parikh’s statement statutory elements express trivialize the question, to the response was a “Did that are the General Assem- mandated

Case Details

Case Name: Walton v. State

Court Name: Supreme Court of Delaware

Date Published: Apr 25, 2003

Citation: 821 A.2d 871

Docket Number: 59, 2002

Court Abbreviation: Del.