37 Tenn. 282 | Tenn. | 1857
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The complainant brings this bill to set aside a deed of gift for two hundred acres of land, and fifteen slaves, which was executed by the complainant, E. S, Walton, to the defendant, on the 28th day of January, 1854, on the alleged ground that at the time of its execution, from mental imbecility, the complainant was incapable of making the same. That he reposed in the defendant, who was his grandson, the most unlimited confidence; he was then about seventy-four years of age, had within a few days lost his third wife, was in very feeble health, and laboring at the time under great mental distress, and that defendant took advantage of his infirmities, and by the exertion of undue influence over his weakness, obtained the deed in question. Defendant had induced him to believe that a lady in the neighborhood was about to institute an action of slander against him, which would probably take from him his entire estate, unless prevented by the proposed conveyance, which defendant
Defendant asserts, that so far from his having procured the execution of the deed, the complainant, immediately upon the death of his wife, importuned defendant with great earnestness to abandon the pursuit of the practice of law, in which he had recently engaged, and go out and live upon the farm; that he had long intended that at his death, defendant should have his property, hut now, as he was left alone, he desired
From the proof, we think it is very clear that, for several years, it had been a settled purpose with complainant, so to secure this property to the defendant as to take effect after his death. For this purpose he had, prior to the making of the deed, executed his will. And we think it is equally clear that, after the death of complainant’s wife, he became anxious that defendant, who was his favorite, should abandon his profession, and go out, and live with him upon the plantation; and to induce him to do so, he proposed that instead of giving him his estate by will, as he had previously intended, he would convey it by deed, and put him at once in possession of it, and would live with him the balance of his life. The testimony establishes this fact beyond all question. The proof shows that defendant was reluctant to abandon his profession, and that complainant procured his friends to use their influence to prevail upon him to do so: he reasoned upon the subject, and put such arguments in their mouths, as are wholly incompatible with the idea that he was then laboring under any considerable mental imbecility; at least not such as wmuld render him wholly incapable of making a valid contract. He compared the pecuniary situation he could at once place his grandson in, with the circumstances of the most eminent and distinguished members of the profession in that portion of the State, who had, in his own language, grown gray in their professional labors, and whose emi
The proof shows that after the defendant had yielded to his wishes, had given up his professional pursuits, and gone to the country to live with him, the complainant, with his own hand, wrote and executed the deed, and then proposed to submit it to his experienced legal advisers, Henry & Shackleford, to get their opinion as to its sufficiency to effect the purposes contemplated. All this takes place before we hear any thing of the threatened slander suit.
Now, if this deed had been procured through the undue influence or false and fraudulent representations of the defendant, practiced upon an imbecile old man, who was incapable of taking care of himself, is it not probable that the same influences would have prevented him from presenting his imbecility and the deed to the scrutinizing eye of Henry & Shackleford, where his whole scheme would be so liable to be upset and defeated? In addition to this, in the absence of the defendant, complainant was asked if he was fully apprised of the effect and consequences of his act — that he was surrendering up in prcesenti, all right to the property conveyed, not even retaining to himself a life-estate. He said he did understand it. That he had formerly intended to give it to defendant, by will, but now he preferred to give it by deed; so that they might not be litigating over his will,
Without further pursuing this vast volume of proof, in detail, it is sufficient to say that we have been unable to find any proof in this whole record, upon wbicb we can satisfactorily rest tbe conclusion that this conveyance was procured either by fraud or undue influence. Conveyances of this character should be rigidly scrutinized, and when there is evidence to ryarrant the conclusion that they have been obtained from persons of great weakness of mind, so as to be unable to guard themselves against imposition, or resist importunity, or undue influence, and that such influences have been brought to bear upon them in procuring such conveyances, they should be set aside. However, we have seen that there is nothing to warrant such a decree in this case; and if there were nothing more in. tbe record, we should feel constrained to affirm tbe decree of tbe Chancellor, dismissing tbe bill; but, as tbe defendant in bis