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Walton v. District of Columbia
670 A.2d 1346
D.C.
1996
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*1 payment of the investigation, his with the whether “substantial need not decide We necessary to defend co- legal fees client’s enough to resist even compliance” would be her, against and the ab- lawsuit counsel’s neither the admonition because informal any prior disciplinary record. compli- sence substantial Board nor we have found arguably em- ance here: The document sanction, minimal that some It concluded requirements of the rule was bodying the admonition, imposed. We namely should be Accordingly, we to the client. never sent L.R., 640 court said in In re agree. As this did not err its conclude that the Board (D.C.1994): re- “[W]hether A.2d 1.5(e)(2). The Board’s interpretation of Rule somewhat was reckless or spondent’s conduct comports plain words interpretation with upon the statu- blameworthy, it trenched less of the rule. justifies the issu- tory in manner that ban According- admonition.” ance of an informal argu respondent’s turn next We “[directing] order ly, the Board’s we affirm punishment should have been ment that no an informal admoni- Bar issue Counsel him, including ad imposed on the informal tion, [directing] that further and.... accept the rec monition. We are bound many miti- reiterate informal admonition disposition of the Board “unless ommended in the Board’s or- gating discussed factors” tendency foster a toward to do so would der.5 comparable con dispositions for inconsistent So ordered. otherwise be unwarranted.” duct or would XI, 9(g)(1). This case is the R. D.C.Bar 1.5(e)(2). Hence,

first to arise under Rule compare is no other ease with which

there imposed respondent. punishment on

However, sanctions the Board did examine 1.5(b) regard

imposed respect to Rule charged fee to be

ing basis or rate of the so, doing the Board client. After WALTON, Appellant, that: concluded James date of the Rules the effective Since numerous Bar has issued Counsel Appellee. COLUMBIA, OF DISTRICT attorneys who admonitions to informal supply newly engaged clients the failed to No. 93-CV-1275. or rate of disclosure of basis written Appeals. Court District of Columbia 1.5(b). required Rule the fee Nonetheless, pun- respondent maintains that Argued Oct. because: “Identical

ishment is unwarranted 1, 1996. Decided Feb. analogous violations reveals sanctions existence, or char- nothing absence about aggravating circum- mitigating or

acter of that the Board did But it is clear

stances.” respon- mitigating factors

examine the case, cooperation including his full

dent’s distinguish comрliance. We helpful substantial because the court Ziemann is not In re Phillips ground. on this arrangement did at issue that the fee there found at 1235. 616 N.E.2d disci- 186 Ill.Dec. of fees under the not constitute division parties the same plinary since both shared rule Holstein, agree "for cases sub- distinguished with the Board that 5. We legal the court office. In decided before to the Board but not making Phillips mitted Phillips, clear that turned it 2, 1995], January [on went into effect new rules written communication the existence of a confiden- should remain admonition attorneys the informal tial,” were identified. clients in which both counsel, where, here, it is bar at least clearly stated: The cotut proceedings respondent, extends who Ab- not the occurred here. written consent No such consent, past date. no there can be such written sent *3 contraband, prohibiting possession ulatíons privileges. and abuse of filed an Columbia, against action the District Department Department and officials of the Hauhart, Washington, appel- Robert C. for (1979), under 42 and under U.S.C. lant. (a)(3)(C) ll-921(a)(2) §§ D.C.Code Wilson, Mary Corporаtion L. Assistant (1981) asserting Depart- violations of the Counsel, Pinkston, Jr., with whom Garland regulations,1 Regulations ment’s the Lorton Acting Corporation Counsel the time the [“LRAA”], Approval Act of 1982 28 DCMR filed, Reischel, Dep- brief was and Charles L. Chapter 5 The trial court remanded Counsel, brief, uty Corporation were on the the matter to the for a written appellee. *4 findings. considering statement of After the remand, response Department to its the FERREN, SCHWELB, Before and “complaint the trial court ruled Walton’s REID, Judges. Associate depriva- fails to state a claim of constitutional Opinion by Judge for the court Associate process rights,” tion of due and concluded REID. complied the “defendants have now with the pertinent provisions of the Ac- [LRAA].” Concurring opinion by Judge Associate cordingly, granted Depart- trial court p. FERREN at 1356. Summary Judgment. ment’s Motion for We Concurring opinion by Judge Associate ruling. see no trial court’s error p. at SCHWELB 1358.

REID, Judge: Associate FACTUAL SUMMARY regarding disciplin- This case raises issues 19, 1992, Williams, January a On Officer ary punishment of a Lorton Correctional Fa- at Lorton correctional officer Correction- cility procedural rights gov- inmate and the Complex, coming a al detected a smell from erning disciplinary process. Appellant occupied by cell inmate Officer Walton. challenges James Walton a trial court deci- officer-in-eharge, Williams notified the Ser- affirming disciplinary ruling sion of the geant inspected Bonaparte, who turn Wal- Department Depart- of Corrections. The gallons liquid subjected ton’s cell and found of a sub- days ment fourteen adjustment segregation reg- plastic bag. for violations of stance in a The substance later (b) rights “Except provided § 1. 42 U.S.C. 1983 is a [refer- civil statute which in subsection jurisdiction ring jurisdiction to Federal and prohibits person acting any “under color during period the transition over civil actions statute, ordinance, custom, regulation, usage, or system], Superior to the new court then Territory State or or District of Colum- jurisdiction Court has civil action or depriving any rights, privi- bia” from another "of (at equity) brought in the other matter law or leges, or immunities secured the Constitution District of Columbia....” Monetary damages injunc- and laws_" 11-921(a)(6) provides Section that: may § tive relief be awarded under Wal- Immediately following expiration of the ll-921(a)(3)(C), per- § ton’s citation to D.C.Code period beginning thirty-month ef- [the on ... taining jurisdiction Family of the Division fective date of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Court, 1970], Superior probably of the was an inadver- the court has Act of Moreover, jurisdiction (regardless of the amount in con- tent error. he contends that his ac- matter, troversy) any civil action or other at brought required to be tion was neither nor equity, brought law or in in the ‍​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍District ll-921(a)(3)(A)(iii) brought § under D.C.Code Columbia. statute, corpus which refers habeas prisoner We do not need to decide whether a may rely § He cites D.C.Code D.C.Code 16-1901 ll-921(a) ll-921(a)(6) §§ or ll-921(a)(2). However, 921(a)(2) § § has 11— We conditions of his confinement. expired now and cannot serve as a basis for the bring properly could conclude later that Walton jurisdiction trial court’s over Walton. He did not corpus Superior Court as a habeas his case in proceeding ll-921(a) ll-921(a)(6) §§ cite D.C.Code or ll-921(a)(3)(A)(iii) § which under Superior statute, generally provide for the Court's corpus D.C.Code refers to the habeas § 11-921(a) general jurisdiction. Section states: 16-901. concerning charges juice pro- statement grapefruit was found to be juice him, fermenting. Tests on the re- “It against cess of as follows: was not seven of less than one vealed an alcohol content approx, gallons.” In gallons. It was two percent. addition, reflects the fact the memorandum “desire” to have that Walton asserted his Disciplinary Department’s A. The Action hearing, representation at the his “desire” and Procedures hearing Sergeant Bonaparte at the but have Disciplinary issued a Re- Disciplinary Report, his not the writer of the port day as the inci- to Walton on the same present, to have witnesses “desire” signed by Disciplinary Report, dent. The heard “wish” to be Williams, charges Officer contained three Hearing sig- of a Officer.6 Walton’s instead (1) major against possession of con- Walton: January appears nature bottom (a offense) traband Class I in violatiоn of 28 20,1992, memorandum. 502.11;2 possession DCMR of contra- (a offense) II in violation of 28 band Class hearing charges against A on the 503.10;3 privi- DCMR abuse January place on before took (a offense) leges Class III violation of (“the Board”); the Adjustment Board Chair 504.4.4 28 DCMR Under Till- Corporal Ernestine of the Board was *5 penalties one of the is authorized for hearing man.7 testified at the and I, II, “Assignment III Class and offenses is: Sergeant Bonaparte, two witnesses: called period adjustment segregation ... for a the odor was inspected who his cell after (28 days” ... not to exceed fourteen DCMR Williams, by Dr. reported Officer and John 505.2) § I II in the case of Class and offenses testi- Seipel, a medical officer at Lorton who III days in the case of a Class or seven juice fruit regarding the fermentation of fied (28 505.3(a)).5 January § offense DCMR On from the possibility of intoxication and the Department a sent Walton Depart- liquid in cell. The found Walton’s charges regarding the con-

memorandum Disciplinary Report, introduced the but ment Disciplinary Report. in The mem- tained (the author of did not call Officer Williаms Disciplinary Re- orandum summarized the addition, testify. the De- Report) to port approximate and advised Walton documentary evidence partment presented hearing charges of his on the contained date alcohol content of the revealed that the Disciplinary Report. in the It also included which adjustment segrega- § provides, pertinent part: § 5. 28 DCMR 505.4 defines 2. 28 DCMR 502.11 major possession of con- control cell without "[t]he Class I offense tion as: “confinement in a of (b) correspondence, ... Pos- traband shall be defined as follows: privileges, uncensored but with of, making, attempting any matter, to make session or reading religious legal and and access to intoxicating beverage....” (2) per hours week of out-of-cell at least two Provided, recreation; may re- that recreation be specifies pertinent part: § 3. 28 DCMR 503.10 extraordinary safety security and due to stricted possession contraband "The Class II offense of of risk.” (a) any following: of shall include the Possession institution, by the article that'has not been issued 509.1, §§ and an in- cаnteen, 6. Under 28 DCMR 508.2 specifically purchased or au- from the disciplinary Administrator; may action (b) to have his any mate choose by Use of thorized officer, single hearing or a three contrary or heard a manner to the intent article in issuance, provisions purchase, person Adjustment or authoriza- of Board. ..." tion. pursuant Adjustment convened The Board was 7. provides: III “[t]he Class 28 DCMR 504.4 specifies Section 509.2 that: to 28 DCMR 509. privileges shall include the offense of abuse of (3) Adjustment three Board shall consist of "The (a) willfully violating provisions of following: im- Corrections officials who are of dealing privi- any regulation with a institutional any way in partial have not been involved in and subsection, 'privi- lege. purposes For of this proceedings and the offense which caused any lege' conferred shall be defined as benefit investigation participated in the who have not regula- populace by upon institutional the inmate allegations." Corporal was sued in this Tillman tions; (b) serving taking or excess food from action, complaint against the was filed but no dining abusing dining рrivi- line in the hall or of the Board. other two members leges.” (2) possession of contraband.10 juice in less than band and grapefruit Walton’s cell was the definition percent. contended that under one tenth of one “intoxicating beverage” he could not have during only disagreement factual major guilty “possession of been found gal- hearing appeared to the number of be contraband”, testimony given of Dr. John liquid lons of found in Walton’s cell. The Moreover, he he maintained that Seipel. Report amount as Disciplinary calculated the contra- guilty “possession could be gallons.” “about seven Walton insisted given the he had been band” because gallons Dur- two were found his cell. Seipel Dr. juice by Department personnel, Bonaparte’s ing testimony, Sergeant his oral juice begins to ferment immedi- testified that ranged eight or to four- estimate from seven (3) the ately temperature, room De- thirty-four gallons.8 teen or fifteen partment failed to introduce evidence testimony all and evidence had been After juice altered distillation. had been received, Board deliberated. appeal on Stempson Mr. denied Walton’s “finding It stated its and recommendation” February no issue 1992.11 Walton raised “ ‘Guilty’ writing follows: based on docu- appeal Stempson, regarding the in his to Mr. days mentation. Recommend fourteen [Ad- decision or issuance of the Board’s written justment] segregation. to former Return receipt of that the timeliness of Walton’s [Adjustment] seg- completion status after decision.12 regation. appeal. Resident does wish to Re- turn ... Al- to former status after time.” Complaint Trial and the C. Walton’s though the Board recommended fourteen Proceedings Court’s days adjustment segregation, it did not July Superior suit in Court on Walton filed part all recommend “forfeiture of or 1992 under U.S.C. good earned time” under 28 [Walton’s] ll-921(a)(2) (a)(3)(C), see, §§ D.C.Code 505.2(a).9 informed The Board *6 supra, naming as Defendants the note orally, of him a its decision and sent Columbia, Department, and District of copy of the written statement. Ridley, Department, Walter Director of the Douglas Stempson and Ernestine Tillman Appeal to the B.Walton’s capacities. complaint His la- their official (1) 31, 1992, legal January categories: claims in two On Walton sent a letter beled his (2) Douglas Stempson, claims and constitutional violations and the Administrator Lorton, statutory respect to the Facility appealing Maximum violations. With Fourteenth findings respect category, first he invoked the the Board’s (1) major charges possession of: contra- Amendment13 to the United States Constitu- estimating provides § [Ad- problem 12. 28 DCMR 512.7 that: "The 8. Part of the the number writing gallons may justment] be traceable to the fact that shall issue a decision in found Board liquid plastic bag. stating findings involve- was in a its as to the resident's ment, upon which the the factual information 505.2(a), § 9. Under 28 DCMR an inmate found and, based, finding been if the resident has is offense) guilty (major could of a Class II violation guilty, penalty imposed to be and no- found part punished be with the "forfeiture of all or right appeal under tice of the resident’s good earned time.” provides § § 512.10 that: "The 513.” 28 DCMR copy deci- a of the written resident shall receive privileges 10. Walton never contested the abuse of (3) working days the hear- within three sion charge. ing.” denying appeal, Stempson Mr. wrote the Fourteenth Amendment 13. Walton invoked possession "Resident Walton was in of seven applica Amendment which is instead of the Fifth gallons juice with an alcoholic content of of fruit However, courts of Columbia. ble to District percent. approximately contention one Your process equal protection approach the due 'shoots’ were discover- [sic] seems be Amendments of the Fifth and Fourteenth clauses ed too soon. If we had waited the fermentation respect to certain is in a similar manner with the alcoholic content and would have increased Mayhew, v. 601 sues. See District Columbia when thus enable him to become intoxicated (D.C. 1991); totally unaccepta- Adarand Constructors your argument A.2d 43 drunk. I find — U.S. -, -, Pena, deny appeal.” v. this Inc. ble 1352 LRAA, §

tion and asserted two basic constitutional 28 DCMR 512.7.” As reasons for remand, challenges disciplinary to the Board’s action: the trial court included the fol- (1) Adjustment gave lowing no “[T]he written clause: satisfy require- statement the minimum appearing to the Ad- [I]t Court (2) process”; ments of constitutional due justment Board has not issued a written was an insufficient written “[T]here state- findings setting statement of forth the rea- upon ment as to the relied and the evidence disciplinary required sons for its action as disciplinary reasons for action Administra- § 112.6 DCMR of the Lor- [28 512.7] 4, 1992, Stempson’s February tor letter de- Regulations Approval Act of ton 1982 Hence, nying appeal.” his constitutional rested, indicated, complaint as his statement, The Board issued a revised which McDonnell, aspect on that Wolff 2,1993. July filed on the District of Columbia 2963, 2978, U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Subsequently, granted the trial court sum- (1974), requires a “written state- mary judgment in favor of the District of ment the fact as finders to the evidence 13,1993, August trial court’s Columbia. The disciplinary relied on and reasons for the part “[accepting all order concluded that: action.” true, plaintiffs allegations factual regard category With to the second of his complaint fails to state a claim of constitu- claims, complaint a Walton’s asserted viola- deprivation proсess rights tional and it of due pertaining tion of five sections of the LRAA [appears] court that further defen- (1) person sign to: who should the disci- complied pertinent dants have now with the (28 plinary report specifying DCMR 506.3 provisions ... Walton not- [LRAA].” accusing that: “the official who has investi- appeal. an ed gated alleged an offense shall fill out and (2) sign disciplinary report_”); the re- ANALYSIS (28 quirement report of a written appeal brief raises three issues requiring 512.7 that the decision state: “its (1) trial court erred for review: whether the involvement, findings as to the resident’s by remanding case to the upon finding factual information which the of the evi- Board for a written statement based, penalty im- and ... to be relied on fifteen months after the dence ...”); posed. the standard of review for disciplinary hearing; whether the Board’s (28 appeal requiring DCMR 513.2 *7 concluding trial court erred in that the com- upon a review based reasonable assessment plaint to state a claim of constitutional failed (4) presented); the insuffi- the evidence deprivation, factual accеpting plaintiffs all of ciency of evidence meet the definition of true; allegations as and whether the trial contraband, major as in 28 set forth DCMR by concluding court erred that defendants 502.11(b); insufficiency of the evi- complied pertinent provisions had of the possession to meet the definition of dence by submitting LRAA contraband as defined in 28 DCMR 503.10. 2, July Board’s written statement declaratory judgment sought a alleged of the He identifies the violations defendants violated his constitutional and complaint, LRAA as those in his dis- stated statutory rights. He also asked that summary. in the factual cussed above against disciplinary decision him be vacated any and that record of the matter be ex- I.

punged. 21,1993, April The trial court concluded that Wal In an order docketed on complaint a claim of trial court remanded the matter to the De- ton’s failed to state deprivation process partment’s Adjustment Board for issuance of constitutional of due findings pursuant rights, § 112.6 of the and that had corn- “written 2974-75, 2105-08, 539, 555-58, 2963, (1995); Bolling 41 132 L.Ed.2d 158 418 U.S. 497, 499, 693, 694, Sharpe, (1974). 74 v. 347 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 935 McDonnell, (1954); and v. 98 L.Ed. 884 Wolff

1353 a statute. constitution or federal only catе the plied with the LRAA Not does Walton Toledo, 635, 640, 100 conclusions, 446 S.Ct. but he also as v. U.S. challenge these Gomez erroneously granted L.Ed.2d 572 Nonethe trial court 64 serts that the compan Summary Judg less, forth in the Department’s Motion for for the reasons set Roach, law, questions A.2d 801 ment. These are all of Abdullah v. 668 ion case (D.C.1995), Superior de novo. John therefore our review is See we conclude that Columbia, Department’s A.2d may properly v. District 579 son-El review Court (D.C.1990). reviewing motion for ‍​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍allegedly a violate disciplinary which decisions rec summary judgment, “we must assess the government asserts that LRAA The independently.... [and it] ord view as a should be construed action Walton’s party opposing light most favorable to the is corpus proceeding because “habeas habeas Georgetown v. Uni the motion.” See Colbert prisoner remedy for a state the exclusive (en (D.C.1994) versity, 641 A.2d did not take challenging his detention.” We bane). States, Vaughn position in v. United (D.C.1991), to do so and decline A.2d 425 II. now.14 “legal alleged claims and Walton’s A. alleged Jurisdiction

constitutional violations” and his “statutory turn violations” are related. We pro Although the LRAA does not “statutory first to his violations” or his asser disciplin judicial prison review of vide regarding Department’s alleged vio tions juris ary decision under the “contested ease” and the trial court’s lations the LRAA 1-1509, -1510, §§ arewe diction of D.C.Code alleged regarding rulings errors its on those challenge regulatory satisfied that Walton’s First, we determine the violations. must Superior properly could be raised Court Superior jurisdiction basis of the Court’s Following corpus. Ab petition for habeas challenge regarding over Walton’s (D.C.1995), dullah, A.2d 801 we supra, 668 application of the LRAA. refer Board’s We “not recognize corpus reaches that habeas “regulatory to this as Walton’s also the form of detention.” the fact but challenge.” jurisdiction un Walton asserts 668 A.2d at 809. ll-921(a)(3)(C) §§ der and 11- D.C.Code requirements of habeas One 921(a)(2), pres discussed in footnote 1. He jurisdiction the exhaustion of ad corpus arguments in this court ents no facts or Murray Stempson, remedies. ministrative suggest properly which the case was (D.C.1993). Here 633 A.2d § 11- the trial court under D.C.Code befоre 921(a)(3)(C) Department did not raise appeal to the gives Superior Court Adjust regarding issuance of the jurisdiction “brought chap under issue over cases matters, 16”, statement under 28 regarding family ment Board’s written ter 23 of title Moreover, appeal letter to juveniles. 512.7. Nor did his including detention of Stempson raise issue eon- jurisdiction 11- Administrator he cannot obtain under *8 921(a)(2) See, accusing to ceming of the official expired. supra, it the failure because has disciplinary report under bring regulatory sign fill out and the note 1. Nor can Walton government § The main they solely § DCMR 506.3.15 under as are based claims challenge the did not impli- that “Walton on District of Columbia law and do not tained (D.C.1991), Department’s determination of “no-further- Vaughn, supra, the 14. In 598 A.2d at 431 status, youth before the from offender benefit” we stated: § sentencing judge trader D.C.Code 24-805. corpus] as [habeas this court has not viewed may prisoner] However, challenge [a the exclusive means which the sufficien- Walton did regu- present "posses- guilty of the constitutional and cy his view to find him of the evidence latory disciplinary proceed- "possession major of con- deficiencies in the contraband” or sion of logical ings. between is a connection traband.” There fact, sufficiency Vaughn, permitted challenge the evi- an inmate to in we Walton's disciplinary guilty infrac- appeal him of a from a trial court decision which sus- dence to find However, requirement, 28 DCMR Department. set forth in tion and the tained a decision of the 512.7, issue, Adjustment issue a writ- regarding § the Vaughn, in the inmate raised his adequacy disciplinary argument of the board’s sion. The second written concerns the appeal in decision his internal to the adminis- legal adequacy factual and of the Board’s precluded trator and therefore should be adequacy second statement.17 The of the However, raising from the issue here.”16 he upon second statement insofar as it bears appeal did raise issue as to whether the trial court’s determination that sufficient evi- upon Administrator’s decision was “based order, support to dence existed the Board’s is pre- reasonable assessment of the evidence clearly appeal, regardless before us on sented”, required by § as 28 DCMR 513.2. initially whether exhausted his ad- Walton complaint After Walton filed his in on the first ministrative remedies written court, judge the trial the trial remanded the statement. trial court determined [ap matter because “it “complied the second written statement peared] to the court that provisions pertinent of the LRAA.” The Board has not issued a written statement of judge explain trial did not the basis for his findings setting forth the reasons for its dis conclusion, incorporated by but reference ciplinary § required by action as 112.6 [28 arguments reply in contained “the of the § Regulations 512.7] DCMR of the Lorton opposition plaintiff’s ... Mo- defendants Approval Act of 1982.” The remand was not Summary Judgment, tion For defendants’ error because in order to rule the reason complaint, Cross-motion Dismiss the appellate ableness of the administrative deci sion, trial response April court believed that it needed a defendant’s to the court’s clear written statement to assess the suffi 1993, order, points the memorandum of ciency Depart of the evidence. After the therefore, support and the authorities filed response ment filed its to the trial court’s entire record....” The Board’s second (1) remand, argued Walton that: the trial statement, although clarity, not the model of matter; in remanding court erred to have had noted that ‘Walton admitted inadequate Board’s second statement was shoots in his cell.”18 [sic] [homemade wine] factually legally, the Board’s was, therefore, The trial court correct signed second statement was two of concluding that statement the second written the three Board members violation finding contained the “Board’s as to the resi- § requires 512.9 which the three involvement”, and “the factual infor- dent’s sign, Board members to and was not issued based”, upon finding as mation working days within three of Walton’s hear required by 28 DCMR 512.7. ing, required by 28 DCMR 512.10. Legal Adequacy B. Factual and of the Assuming that all of Walton’s factual Board’s Second Statement true, allegations are the record reveals that gal having admitted to at least two defer consideration of

We Lorton, argument juncture juice in grapefruit first at this of our deci- lons of his cell at ministration, (D.C.1993). findings, including ten statement of its the factu- 633 A.2d 20-21 findings Even if there where exhaustion is al on which the are are instances information based. required which the logical for a civil action over There is also a connection between the jurisdiction §11- trial court has trader D.C.Code sufficiency evidence and that, 921(a), given compre- we are satisfied requirement, set forth in 28 DCMR 513.2 LRAA, hensive administrative scheme under the appeal upon be decision ‘Rased rea- remedy Walton’s failure to exhaust his for an presented.” sonable assessment of the evidence alleged litiga- bars violation of 28 DCMR 506.3 appeal argues the administrative that issue in court. tion of could not have been based on a reasonable as- *9 presented sessment of the evidence because the support evidence was not sufficient to the deci- first 17. We do not decide whether the Board’s sion. inadequate, written statement was or whether particular respect to form is essential required by the written statement 28 DCMR 16.Arguably, may bring Walton have been able § 512.7. 11-921(a). supra § his D.C.Code case under See However, principle in he still would have n. 1. had to exhaust his administrative remedies. But 18. Walton also contests the truth of this state- ment, Group Ad- which we address below. see District Columbia v. Insurance us. question need not detain This that the sub- in a container.19 He denied suffi wine, deny whether Walton did not need not decide stance was homemade but We Although cell. remedies ciently that there was a smell his his administrative exhausted case, juice found to the alcoholic content of the was this or particular facts of light of the percent, circumstances, one 28 DCMR 502.11 be less than whether, he should under major “possession of contraband” defines Superior in the to raise issues permitted be of, making, attempting “possession or include argued agency, which were not Court beverage.” In any intoxicating addi- to make contentions if his substantive because even tion, “possession 503.10 defines us, they fail on the mer properly before are article contraband” to include “use argument simply has no third its. Walton’s contrary provi- in a manner to the intent or signa explanation for two merit. The issuance, purchase or authoriza- sions of statement is the second Walton tures on upon admission tion....” Based Walton’s signature has the absence of one clear and grapefruit gallons that there were two Walton, any prejudice to or not resulted his failure juice in a container in his cell and justice. The third mem any miscarriage of cell, deny the smell in his the Board Department Board had left the ber of the reasonably conclude that the trial court could was written statement the time second gallons of prisoner accumulates two who Moreover, statement is the second released. grapefruit juice in a in his cell and container remarkably from the documents different deny that there was a smell who fails to one, except with comprised the first cell, intoxicating attempted his to make an Furthermore, only rea respect form. respect charge beverаge. “abuse With more was issued son the second statement privileges” in of 28 DCMR violation hearing is days after Walton’s than three 504.4, conceded that he retained Walton sufficiency challenge to the of the juice permission. the fruit in his cell without guilty. him the facts to find On evidence Hence, ample was factual evidence there us, to con it be unreasonable before would LRAA, charged. Ac- violated the Walton disciplinary decision that the Board’s clude cordingly, neither the Board’s second written ground. Ac on such a should be reversed 13, statement, August nor the trial court’s reject regulato cordingly, Walton’s third we 1993, factually legally inade- order was or the trial court’s ry argument, and affirm quate. complied with its ruling regulations. Signatures of the C. Board and Issuance Second Statement regulatory turn next to Walton’s third

We III. argument regarding the Board’s second regulatory chal Since Walton’s statement, July con- filed on 1993. He fails, his constitutional lenge turn next to we fatally defective tends that this statement § 1983. Unlike 42 U.S.C. under hearing only two board because it contains re challenge, is not regulatory Walton three; signatures, instead member of adminis exhaustion quired to demonstrate three work- it was not issued within because § 1983 respect to his remedies with trative hearing.20 days January ing of his However, to be for his claim challenge.21 question as to whether There is a threshold prove must cognizable under applies doctrine the exhaustion of remedies deprived him of person has that: some he argument, third or whether to Walton’s person right, federally protected generated properly raised two new issues has right acted deprived him of a federal who by the Board’s second statement. simply re- requested juice one. The was Walton Department indicated that the 19. The bag, fragments plastic contained found in a written statement its first wrote and re-issued fruit, wrapped in his mattress and was whole regulatory guilty violations. finding cover and blanket. Regents, U.S. Patsy v. Board 21.See hearing re- after was no administrative 20. There mand, 73 L.Ed.2d does not indicate and the record *10 under color of state or ciently territorial law. Go- exhausted ‍​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍his administrative remе- Toledo, 640, mez supra, v. 446 U.S. at 100 dies.” Ante at 1355. S.Ct. at 1923. federally Walton claims a analysis clear, As of the record makes protected right to receive a “written state- case, under the unusual circumstances of this by ment the fact finders as to the evidence had no Walton administrative remedies to

relied on and reasons for disciplinary exhaust on the two issues embraced his McDonnell, 539, action.” v. 418 U.S. Wolff argument: third Adjustment whether the 2963, 2978-79, 94 S.Ct. 41 L.Ed.2d 935 fatally Board’s second written statement “is ordered, The trial court and the defective it remand, because contains two hear- supplied after a new written essence, ing signatures, statement. In board Walton member instead of asserts that three”; could never “cure” origi- whether that statement also nal failure required to issue the written is defective “because it was not issued within violating liberty statement without his inter- working days January three of his est under the [Fourteenth] Fifth Amend- (footnote omitted). hearing.” Ante at 1355 disagree ment. We and hold that whatever court, therefore, properly The trial consid- liberty kinds of protect- interest are dеemed merits, ered these issues on their as do we. Supreme ed Court after Sandin v. happened. Here is what Walton was Conner, -, 515 U.S. charged violating regulations prison that (1995), process L.Ed.2d 418 afforded essentially making, forbid an inmate’s or at- Walton, given the interest and sanction at make, tempting beverages. alcoholic here, He comported issue requirements with the ground defended on the the evidence of the Constitution. support was insufficient to claimed viola- Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is Adjustment prison tions. A three-member Affirmed. guilty charged Board found Walton appealed prison infractions. He Ad- FERREN, Judge, concurring: Associate pursuant ministrator to 28 DCMR 513.9. essentially repeated appeal Walton his I in Judge opinion concur REID’s but contention that the evidence was insufficient. II.C., separately write I because believe Part appeal, The Administrator denied the discussing “whether the exhaustion of reme- accordingly Superior suit filed applies dies argu- doctrine to Walton’s third complaint, alleged Court. ment,” 1355, requires ante at furthеr elabo- original written statement violated a ration: regulations, number including 28 DCMR question plaintiff whether has ex- 512.7, requires a written statement hausted administrative remedies before com- “findings of the Board’s as to the resident’s ing jurisdictional to court is not inquiry, involvement, [and] the factual information since “exhaustion remedies is a ‘flexible upon finding which the is based.” Walton subject doctrine’ to ‘a number of interrelated ” repeated evidentiary also sufficiency ar- exceptions.’ Group District Columbia v. guments alleged he had in his administrative Administration, Insurance 633 A.2d appeal. judge The trial found that Ad- “the (D.C.1993) (citation omitted); see Tenants of justment Board has not issued a written Avenue, Hampshire 1255 New N.W. Dis- findings setting statement of forth the rea- Housing trict Columbia Rental Commis- disciplinary required by sons for its action as sion, (D.C.1994). 647 A.2d Nonethe- [28 512.7]” therefore remanded less, in a case such as this where we have the matter to the Board “to issue required stressed that exhaustion is before findings pursuant its written to [§ 512.7].” issue, the trial court can consider an see ante The trial court further ordered that “all oth- 16,1 [1353-54] & n. am reluсtant to reach abeyance er motions are held until defen- merely by assuming the merits exception comply explanation applies or some other dants with the remand or- such Court’s “[w]e need not decide whether Walton suffi- der.”

1357 Avenue, Hampshire New apparently trial re- Tenants Although judge the “[tjhere (after Adjustment remand, N.W., matter to Board manded the the at 76 647 A.2d original did the statement because 'written ruling Adminis by the Rent no adverse was 512.7, satisfy alleged— § had not Walton appeal could from which the tenants tration lawsuit, it is also the first time —in his for Commission”). to the judge trial he could clear that the believed out, state- written it turned the second As evidentiary adequately review for suffi- not required only three contained two of a more ment ciency without detailed statement 512.9, findings See § Board’s and conclusions. so Walton signatures, the see DCMR saying, in judge at 1352-53. The was ante the court that the statement complained to effect, could for sufficien- that he not review It was procedural regulation.2 violated that adequate explanation cy an without written issue entirely proper for to raise this why happened Wal- on of what had and of instance, since court in first with the trial the charged disciplin- conduct violated the ton’s proceeding did not create the remand himself ary regulations. Although Walton remedy of opportunity for administrative Admin- appeal contended on to the had never alleged of 512.9. See Board’s violation the regula- that the written statement istrator signatures, the challenge A number of id. tion, 512.7, violated, judge had the been frivolous, moreover, necessarily for is not effectively no rea- ruled —and this court sees required there is signatures all the without doubting evidentiary sufficien- son for —that represents the assurance that statement no cy case without could not be resolved this members.3 considered views of all Board the statement, had not been a written which meeting provided, requirements the argue Theoretically, I could suppose, one § 512.7. challenge the Board’s failure that Walton’s reconvened, prepared a more The Board initially ap- statement when he first written statement, and sent detailed written Administra- pealed ruling the Board’s directly judge, as re- statement the trial all claims means that Walton has waived tor quested. go the Because statement did issuing the irregularity in of administrative Administrator, through judge Wal- the ruling second one written Board’s —even remedy ton had no to exhaust administrative requested. argu- judge But that the trial respect practical pur- to it.1 For all trial court has ment would fail. Once the in the poses, Walton received the statement effect, ruled, prisoner’s that the evidentia- July delivery transmitted the same sufficiency claim resolved with- ry cannot be judge. Upon receipt the trial statement to statement, comprehensive more written out a statement, written the court sua the revised must be prisoner entitled sponte of the remain- resumed consideration adequacy of on that statement 13,1993, and, ing pending August motions otherwise, regulations ground permit; summary judg- denied Walton’s motion for might again supply a defective Board granted the cross-mo- ment and defendant’s by the this unreviewed document —in сase summary judgment. tion for Because effectively frustrates Administrator —that therefore, case, employed procedures in this state- that the court’s need assurance effectively only place that could substantively provides procedurally See challenge the statement was in court. ment That is frivolous By ordering the Board. contention that the submit the revised fore court, directly com- statement to the trial that Walton had never written of the fact view apparently ruling court’s order also circumvented been had plained that the first Board safeguard procedural by 28 DCMR ensured obviously regulation was untimely 513.1, (or requires the Administrator period, during case which the at the not directed designee) all deci- to "review Administrator's ruling. appellate the Board’s review of is on Board or rendered sions hearing officers.” 3.Indeed, accompanied signature one had if statement, support a substan- that fact would complained vio- also that the statement 2. Walton did argument on its face statement tial not been because it hаd lated 28 DCMR 512.10 majority. days hearing the views of a Board be- not reflect three of Walton’s issued within *12 adequate an reviewing record for sufficiency objected have persuad- statement and of the evidence. change ed the others to it in respect. some statement, therefore, The written does not difficulty here could have been avoid- appear to be tainted the lack of a third if judge ed the trial had followed the usual words, signature. In other there is no basis path, remanding the record —or the case—to arguing for signa- omission of the third Administrator, the responsible who would be protest ture reflected against some kind of transmitting for request the to the Board. the substance the written statement that The Board would then have issued its written required the trial court was to take into Administrator, statement who would account. adequacy have ruled on its sending before along statement to the court. Presum- say All this tois that I believe this court ably, part proce- of that standard remand correctly reaches the merits of Walton’s two dure, Walton, prisоner, would have had arguments applying §§ technical 512.9 and an opportunity argue to to the Administrator 512.10, to the second written statement. adequacy about the of the second written There was no to failure exhaust administra- statement; i.e., prisoner would have had because, above, tive remedies as elaborated remedy administrative during exhaust remedy no administrative was available. But remand, before the court pro- resumed the regulations, 512.10, §§ because the 512.9 and ceeding. approach But that was not taken did not afford Walton basis for relief on By dealing directly Board, here. with the case, agree facts of this I affirming with judge prison trial cut the Administrator the trial court’s decision. out of process precluded and seeking from remedy an administrative be- SCHWELB, Judge, concurring Associate judge fore up took the merits of Walton’s in the result: remaining light claims in the of the new join my I colleagues voting in to affirm the written statement. decision, Department’s agree and I that, I circumstances, believe in some much Judge of what Reid has written. I prisoner whеn brings a a 512.9 issue to the however, separately, my write because as- court, the trial court will have to remand for differs, sessment of several of the issues required signatures, in order to be sure emphasis, substance or in from the treatment that the statement reflected the considered in majority opinion. those issues findings and conclusions of the entire Board. applicable regulations, Under see ante at I. 6, prisoner right note a has the to select single between a hearing officer and a three- JURISDICTION Adjustment Board, member and thus My colleagues’ jurisdictional analysis ap- choosing prisoner right the latter the a has pears predicated assumption to be on the participation every count on the mem- against that Walton’s action case, the District and however, In particular ber. this I be- really its corpus proceed- officials is a habeas proffered lieve that the reason the Board ing, though They effect not in name. concerning missing signature court conclude, relying upon recent decision in enough preclude was our the need for a second Roach, (D.C.1995), Abdullah v. 668 A.2d 801 remand. properly Superi- case was before the dispute why There is no about there were pursuant or Court to D.C.Code 11- two, three, signatures: not one of the Board 921(a)(3)(A)(iii)(1995), expressly con- longer employed by members no was jurisdiction fers on that court over habeas prison system thus, presumably, could corpus proceedings against persons other participate not proceeding. the remand employees. than federal officers or argued Walton has never that the statement findings however, did not my opinion, reflect the and conclusions of signifi- this case is majority cantly the Board or that there is different from Abdullah. Unlike the case, reason to petitioner believe the absent member would in did not file a (D.C.1991) McKean, 262 (quoting corpus. did Carlin petition for a writ habeas He 620, legality U.S.App.D.C. 823 F.2d directly his de- denied, tention, (1987)), U.S. nor did he seek relief from confine- cert. “[0]nly upon a adjustment L.Ed.2d 870 segregation.

ment or from Rath- er, injunctive convincing showing ‘clear and evidence’ prayed declaratory ‍​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍he relief, contrary legislative should the courts asked the court to vacate the intent he *13 review,” judicial Abbott finding prison regula- to that he violated two restrict access Gardner, 136, 141, expunge or from file Labs. 387 U.S. tions and to remove his v. (1967) (citations challenged relating pro- 18 L.Ed.2d 681 the documents Abdullah, omitted), no ceeding. expressly recog- in majority As the and we held States, nizes, respect Vaughn such exists with to we held in v. United evidence 425, (D.C.1991), that 598 A.2d 431 habeas LRAA. corpus is which a not the exclusive means authority grant of to from The courts relief may challenge legality of disci- prisoner agency existed at common unlawful action plinary proceedings against him. instituted (and law, not merely it was reinforced and circumstances, I am reluctant to Under these created) by the federal Administrative Proce- Rather, I recast Walton’s suit for him. dure Act and similar local enactments. See exactly being it would treat the case as what Labs., 140, supra, at Abbott 387 U.S. S.Ct. appears to action relief from ad- be—an Club, 1511; supra, at 670A.2d at 358- Sierra agency allegedly and action.

verse unlawful reviewability is presumption of “The law; it Superior may product not of enacted is common We have held Court pursuant Davis, entertain claims for such relief to law.” 5 Kenneth C. Administrative 921(a)(6) (1995), 28:1, The at 254 D.C.Code which vests Law Treatise 11— juris- jurisdiction “any Superior that court with over civil Court thus had “civil action” matter, complaint, in there is equity, action or other at law or diction over Walton’s See, brought complaint petition in the District of no to treat that as a Columbia.” need Club, e.g., corpus District Columbia v. 670 for such a characteriza- Sierra habeas when of (D.C. 354, ], 1996); contrary pleader’s [ A.2d 358-360 Jan. tion intent. is Speyer Barry, v. 588 A.2d 1159-60

(D.C.1991) omitted). (citations Abdullah, II. ll-921(a)(6) recognized that we Section THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT jurisdictional served as an alternative basis majority agree I with the that there was by prisoner alleged for a suit a had that who guilt two evidence” of the “some Walton’s legal rights disciplinary were in violated disciplinary charges, Superintendent v. see proceedings against instituted him correc- Hill, 445, 454-55, 105 472 U.S. S.Ct. analysis applies tional authorities.1 That (1985), but I find 86 L.Ed.2d 356 full force to сase. Walton’s troubling than perhaps case more closer Contrary position, to the District’s there is my colleagues do. nothing Supe- recognition in our of the novel charges against of the Walton The essence jurisdiction legal- rior Court’s to consider part on his to be alleged attempt is an ity agency alleged action to be unlawful. brief, prison bootlegger. In his small-scale liberty of citizen is Even where the argues part as follows: pertinent issue, government agencies “the actions 502.11(b) subject respect there normally presumed judi- to Section are to be to With showings: appellant requisite that legislature] pre- are two [the cial review unless has of, making or at “possession or a have no law was cluded review court would “intoxicating an bev legality tempting to make” apply agency’s to to test the “making, or regard to the erage.” With Simpson actions.” District Columbia is attempting phrases, [no] there Rights, A.2d make” Human Office of statute, I, thereby ex- corpus excused from suggest, do beas 1. Abdullah does not and neither prisoner asserting pursuant jurisdiction hausting that a remedies. his administrative ll-921(a)(6), rather than under the ha- Section report, any fact, in the or disciplinary evidence If I were if I nostril. the trier of hearing, other document introduced at the provided enlighten- were not with further Sgt. Bonaparte’s testimony subject, or might own that ment on I have considera- type showed there was difficulty concluding evidence this ble that this evidence activity Thus, part. proved trying there is was become report no indication in disciplinary amateur manufacturer wine. any winemaking “paraphernalia” is, reality though, that I am not found in [were] the course of the shake Presumably, trier of offi- fact. the Lorton there or filtering down: were no funnels great cials who heard the evidence know a devices, sugar or fruit and further fer running prison deal about than more mentation, grapefruit or evidence that the partA judges superior knowl- do.

juice had been altered or enhanced extends, edge doubtless or at least should way. *14 extend, try prisoners to the manner in which Further, guilty the standard for a find- to or from mаke “shoots” other intoxicants ing possession of of under contraband Sec- (one hopes) the limited raw materials avail- 502.11(b) tion is that the substance consti- Our proceed- able to them. review of such Here, “intoxicating beverage.” tute an ings, although apparently by the authorized too, Department the no evi- introduced LRAA, very should therefore be deferential at the hearing dence standard, agree indeed. Under that I that grapefruit juice the pos- that in Walton’s reject position we must this is- on capable “intoxicating.” session was of In sue. fact, hearing the evidence at the testimony Seipel’s this issue was Dr. that a III. of solution “less than 1%” could not alcohol THE REMEDY (Emphasis a normal in intoxicate adult. original.) judge Ad- The trial concluded that response The District’s contention to this justment in Board’s initial written decision point: and to is brief legally was He Walton’s case insufficient. case, Department remanded the case to the The bottom line in this when it is stripped comprehensive Corrections for more complex of the written constitutiоnal is- sues, findings. remedy is it Walton contends that this undisputed that is that Walton was and gallons juice inadequate, that he is entitled bag wrapped had of fruit in a cover, expungement findings the adverse and of in a blanket and and mattress that My prison logical colleagues related documentation. dis- officials made the and and, agree emphatically, so do I. permissible inference that was at- Walton tempting “shoots,” to make or homemade requirement The in the LRAA that correc wine, juice and used the in a manner con- provide adequate tional must officials written trary to the intent of This its issuance. findings prison disciplinary proceedings amply finding supported evidence grounded Supreme pro in the Court’s due guilty he was I II contra- the class and McDonnell, analysis. cess See v. 418 Wolff offenses. band 2963, 2979, 41 94 U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d me, (1974). this, question emerg- judge recognized the decisive The trial To 935 es from these contentions is Wal- and whether ordered Corrections possession apparent appropriate findings. ton’s and de concealment make more large be, imрroperly acquired findings amount of fect in initial thus could and juice been, grapefruit is “some evidence” that he indeed has corrected. In a case such one, attempted My to make homemade wine. as this in which the substantive determi colleagues sustained, emphasize guilt did not has been Walton nation of it would deny altogether incongruous that there his cell. I as was a smell in be treat Walton think, however, effect, and, large should if exonerated that such he had been juice grapefruit expunge proceedings amount of non-alcoholic result of from earth, might simply also be educated discernable to the the face of because

1361 extent, any, if that the draconian did not write the case To the correctional authorities remedy may be first time around. viewed up in sufficient detail the demanded appel- supportable under certain federal agency to make has failed suffi Where I precedents,3 and do believe late other remedy findings, appropriate is to cient with precedents can be reconciled that those be remand directions that the omission Supreme approach to such issues Court’s adequate be findings corrected and that Real, Con- supra, and Sandin v. Ponte v. See, e.g., v. Colum made. Mack District of — ner, -, 115 132 U.S. S.Ct. ‍​​‌‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌‍Servs., Dep’t Employment 651 A.2d bia (1995). Accordingly, my I cast L.Ed.2d (D.C.1994). my opinion, was against import- proportionality vote here, judge proper remedy the trial ing law’s into our correctional facilities the reasonably adopting it. To award acted continuing preoccupation with but dubious than that would constitute a Walton more imperfections preju- no scrivening that cause windfall, than vio rather a correction not affect the merits. dice do rights. Carey Piphus, lation Cf. 1042, 1050,55 L.Ed.2d U.S. points requires out that the LRAA a written statement of the Board’s decision hearing. days

within three 28 DCMR *15 Obviously, findings

§ 512.10. the revised the trial were

which followed court’s remand period. not within that time So far as issued MURPHY, Appellant, Hampton R. discern, however, I can there is no claim that v. prejudiced by delay, this was judicial was was inevitable once review STATES, Appellee. UNITED hold, sought.2 We are nevertheless аsked to No. 94-CF-989. any prejudice, the absence of regulations prison inmate who has violated Appeals. Court of District Columbia consequences be relieved of the of his must 19, Argued Sept. 1995. findings transgression because errors 8, Decided Feb. 1996. days. were corrected within three But opinion- officers correctional are not trained Real,

writers, 491, v. 497- Ponte 471 U.S. cf. 85 L.Ed.2d 553 S.Ct.

(1985), and the rule for which con- would, my opinion, provide a “reme-

tends

dy” proportion of all It out violation. wholly

would also serious and unneces- cause

sary prison for ad- difficulties conscientious

ministrators, al- compelled who would be go unpunished

low violations inmates to guilt

for or innocence. reasons unrelated I note that in recognize 79 L.Ed.2d 2. Board's deci- S.Ct. I have unfavorable collateral conse- Redding sion can held that it was the function of the court inmate, e.g., quences in relation to his for an judge to balance the interests the trial Wolff, prospects parole. supra, 418 U.S. at determining parties to exercise discretion in inadequate find- 94 S.Ct. at 2979. Where "expunction” appropriate. 717 F.2d whether subsequent pro- ings have affected the result of Assuming, arguendo, that it would at 1118-19. ceedings, proceedings those should be revisited. judge discretion of the trial have been within the aware, however, claim on I am not such expunction grant and the other this case to Walton’s behalf. Walton, sought by so was his refusal do relief not an abuse of that discretion. Fairman, See, e.g., Redding 717 F.2d 1105 denied, Cir.1983), (7th cert. 465 U.S.

Case Details

Case Name: Walton v. District of Columbia
Court Name: District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Date Published: Feb 1, 1996
Citation: 670 A.2d 1346
Docket Number: 93-CV-1275
Court Abbreviation: D.C.
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