157 Ga. 24 | Ga. | 1923
1. Tlie act of 1919 (Acts 1919, p. 821), which is an act to amend an act establishing a new charter for the City of Atlanta, approved Eebruarv 28, 1874, and the several acts amendatory thereof, and an ordinance passed by the mayor and general council of the City of Atlanta in pursuance thereof, authorizing- the paving of a certain street in said city, are not unconstitutional and void because, as contended, they are in conflict with paragraph 1 of section 4 of article 1 of the constitution of the State of Georgia (Civil Code of 1910, § 6391), in that the act of 1919 is a special law enacted in a case for which provision has been made by an existing general law, in § 870 of the Civil Code of 1910. Even if the act of 1919 could be held to be in conflict with § 870 of the Civil •Code, as contended by the plaintiff in error, it would not avail him anything in the present ease, inasmuch as the record discloses that there is no attempt to repave the street in question, but to pave it originally, while § 870 provides for repaving.
(a) An assignment of error to the effect that the act of 1919 is illegal, void, and unconstitutional, because it is in conflict, as contended, with paragraph 8 of section 7 of article 3 of the constitution of the State of
(6) The act of 1919 is not illegal, void, and unconstitutional because it is in conflict, as contended, with paragraph 17 of section 7 of article 3 of the constitution of the State of Georgia (Civil Code of 1910, § 6445), in that the act attempts to amend and repeal § 870 of the Civil Code of 1910 without distinctly describing the law to be amended or repealed, as well as the alteration to be made. There is no express attempt to amend or repeal the above section of the Civil Code, and the above provision of the constitution does not apply to repeals by implication. Nolan v. Central Ga. Power Co., 134 Ga. 201 (3) (67 S. E. 656); Towaliga Falls Power Co. v. Foster, 143 Ga. 688 (3) (85 S. E. 835); Aultman v. Hodge, 147 Ga. 626, 630 (95 S. E. 297).
(e) Nor is the act of 1919 “illegal and unjust,’1 as contended, in that it attempts to make the owners of abutting property liable for the total cost of such paving or repaving without giving them the exclusive control over such pavement and street; and in that while the general public and the City of Atlanta are benefited by such pavement, no provision is made by which the City of Atlanta or the general public is required to pay for such improvement in proportion to the benefit derived therefrom, and therefore that the act is discriminatory. City of Valdosta v. Harris, 156 Ga. 490 (119 S. E. 625).
(d) Nor is the act of 1919 illegal, void, and unconstitutional because it deprives the owner of property abutting on a paved street in the City of Atlanta of due process of law, as contended, in conflict with and in vio-
. lation of paragraph 3 of section 1 of article 1 of the constitution of the State of Georgia (Civil Code of 1910, § 6359), and is in conflict with and in violation of section 1 of the 14th amendment of the constitution of the United States (Civil Code of 1910, § 6700), in that said act provides no method by which the owner of property abutting on a paved street in the City of Atlanta may in law or in equity contest the amount and legality of an assessment against a property owner, made, by an ordinance of the City of Atlanta as provided in the act, to meet the total cost of paving the street; and in that the act deprives such owner of his right to a judicial investigation by due process of law as to the amount and legality of sucn assessment, and substitutes therefor, as an absolute finality, the action of the mayor and general council in fixing such assessment. City of Valdosta v. Harris, supra (2), (14); Horkan v. City of Moultrie, 154 Ga. 444 (2), 449 (114 S. E. 888).
(e) Nor is the act of 1919 illegal, void, and unconstitutional, because, as contended, it deprives the owner of property abutting on a paved street in the City of Atlanta of due process of law, in conflict with and in violation of the due-process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions, in that the act provides for the assessment of private property abutting on a paved street in the City of Atlanta according to its frontage, to meet the total cost of paving such street, without regard to the special benefits, if any, accruing by reason of such paving to the particu
(g) Nor is the act of 1919 illegal, void, and unconstitutional, as contended, because it is in conflict with and in violation of paragraph 1 of section 7 of article 7 of the constitution of the State of Georgia (Civil Code of 1910, § 6563), in that the act provides for the incurring of a new debt by the City of Atlanta without the assent of two thirds of the qualified voters of the City at an election called for that purpose. City of Valdosta V. Harris, supra, (5).
2. Under the pleadings and the evidence it was not error to revoke the restraining order and refuse an injunction.
Judgment affirmed.