33 N.C. 145 | N.C. | 1850
As the amount of the costs, which the defendant agreed to pay and did pay, is not stated, and the opinion of the Court was given against the plaintiff without any reference to the amount, it must be understood, that the opinion rested exclusively upon the agreement, that the bond should be void or be delivered up, if or when the defendant should pay the costs, whether more or iess, and upon the fact, that he had paid them. That is clearly erroneous; for, it is, plainly, nothing less than annexing, upon parol evidence, a condition to a bond, which is absolute upon its face. If the agreement had been, that the plaintiff would accept a deed from the defendant for a tract of land, or any other collateral matter, in satisfaction of the money for which the bond was given, and the thing had been done and accepted accordingly, it is true the defendant would have been discharged, as there would then be an actual subsequent satisfaction, and it would be immaterial when the plaintiff first agreed that he Would accept such satisfaction. But in the present case the alleged agreement is, that the ■plaintiff would accept a less sum of money, whenever paid, in discharge of a bond for a larger sum: which is a thing that cannot be, unless the larger sum be regarded in the light of a penalty, to be saved on the condition of paying the smaller; and it is against fundamental principle to admit parol evidence to establish such a condition, in opposition to the tenor of the bond. If, indeed, the defendant paid tfoe costs in question or any part of
Pee Curiam Judgment reversed and venire de n&oa.