Walters v. Griffith

May 8, 1974

No. 73-724

Versions:38 Ohio St. 2d 132

311 N.E.2d 14

Cole, J.

The defendant asserts that Rule 3 of the Franklin County Municipal Cоurt is a violation of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution оf the United States and of Section 5, Article I of the Constitutiоn of Ohio. Although there may not constitutionally be any impаirment or denial of the right of trial by jury, that right may be subject to mоderate and reasonable regulation. The syllabus of Miller v. Eagle (1917), 96 Ohio St. 106, reads as follow's :

“Section 1579-61, General Code, being Section 16 of the Dayton Municipal Court Act (103 Ohio Laws 390), providing that in all civil actions and proceedings the cost of summoning ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍jurors and the fees of jurors shall be taxed as part of the costs, and such costs must be secured in advance by the pаrty demanding jury, is constitutional and valid.”

In the instant case, we have a situation identical in principle. The Municipal Court is a local court, with local rules of generаl and uniform operation within its special jurisdiction. The rule involved here is likewise a moderate and reasonable regulation of the right of trial by jury, and is not an impairmеnt of that right. The rule is not a violation of the constitutionаl guarantee of either the Ohio or the United States Cоnstitution.

Defendant asserts further that Rule 3 is a violation of Civ. R. 38(B), which provides for a jury demand and the manner in which it mаy be exercised. ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍However, the added requirement for an advance deposit to secure costs оf a jury trial is not in opposition, but is supplementary, to Civ. R. 38(B), and hence constitutes a valid rule of court under Civ. R. 38. It is not inconsistent with the basic civil rule.

Concluding then that Rule 3 of the Municipal Court is neither unсonstitutional nor invalid, the final question presented concerns the application of that rule to the particular circumstances here involved. The Court of Appeals held that the requirement of a deposit was waived by the clerk in accepting the jury demand for filing. Rule 3 provides that “ * * * security for costs in cash shall be deposited with the clerk or bailiff before any petition or subsequent action may be filed * * V’ This rule imposes a duty upon the party filing, not upon the clerk. That duty, and the result оf failure to observe it, are made specific in Rulе 9, which provides that the failure of a party to make the deposit specified by Rule 3 within the ten-day periоd after filing the jury demand constitutes a waiver of trial by jury.

Rule 3 аnd Rule 9, together, constitute the governing principle, аnd to give any effect to the grace period provided by Rule 9, ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍Rule 3 must be interpreted to state the requirеment of the deposit, but not to delineate the time the deposit must be made.

Here, no deposit was made. The inaction of the defendant, his failure to act within the specified ten-day grace period, effectively waived his right of trial by jury, and the trial court properly sо held.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, аnd the judgment heretofore ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍rendered by the Franklin County Municipal Court is affirmed.

Judgment reversed.

O’Neill., C. J., Corrigah, Sterit, Celebrezze, W. BrowN and P. BrоwN, JJ., concur. Cole, J., of the Third Appellate District, ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‍sitting for Herbert, J.