104 Wis. 251 | Wis. | 1899
• This action was commenced March 28, 1898, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff Hovember 1, 1897, about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, by reason of his team becoming frightened and run-ning away east on Second street in the city of Hastings, Minnesota, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant in failing to give any notice or warning of the approach of the engine and cars, and in failing to have present at the time the customary flagman, and by running defendant’s engine and cars faster than eight miles an hour, contrary to the ordinance of the city. Issue being joined and trial had, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and assessed his damages at $5,000. From the judgment entered thereon for that amount of damages and costs the defendant brings this appeal.
It is undisputed that the Mississippi river, at Hastings, runs in an easterly direction along the north side of the city; that the defendant’s main track runs north and south through the city on what was once Bailey street, but which has been vacated, and across the river; that Second street mentioned runs east and west across Bailey street, in which defendant’s main track was so located; that Bailey street was ninety-nine feet wide; that the defendant’s depot was on Bailey street, and extended a few feet east of the center of that street, and was on the west side of the defendant’s main track, and about fifty feet south of the south line ,of Second street; that Second street was ninety-nine feet wide; that about 280 feet north of the north line of Second street was a switch from which started the track running southerly to Stillwater, and across Second street very nearly on
The ahoye plat taken from the map referred to in the opinion shows the relative situation of the tracks at the crossing. The levee track is the one spoken of by the witnesses as the switch track. — Eep.
The plaintiff’s version of the accident is to the effect that about 3 o’clock in the morning of ^November 1,1897, he and one Arnold, a teamster for Larson Bros., each started with a team and a load of lumber for that firm from Beldenville, "Wisconsin, and to haul the same to Hastings; that they crossed' the Mississippi, and drove west through Hastings along on Second street, and across the tracks in question, about 1 o’clock in the afternoon of that day, and saw the flagman at his shanty just east of the main track and a few feet south of the north line of Second street; that after unloading their lumber in the western part of the city, and feeding their teams, and getting their dinner, they started for home about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, traveling along east on Second street,— Arnold, with his team, being ahead -7 that, as they -approached the railroad crossing, they saw wood and slabs piled sis or eight feet high on the lot immediately north of Second street and west of the railroad tracks, and such piles terminated about fifteen feet west of the switch track; that the plaintiff had no bos on his wagon and was sitting on the hind hounds of his wagon; that he held up his horses between a walk and a trot; that he looked ahead, to see if anything was in the way, and for the flagman, but saw nothing,— no flagman, no car, no engine; that after arriving at the crossing Arnold, who was about twenty feet ahead, motioned back for him to come on; that he was then on the Stillwater track, his horses being between that track and the switch track; that just then his horses saw the train, and started and jumped suddenly, and ran away; that he heard nothing until he looked around and saw the train coming down the levee track right at him,-and then.
The plaintiff’s witness Arnold, who was driving just ahead of him, testified to the effect that the piles of slabs mentioned were piled on the north side of Second street, and about one and one-half rods from the center of the traveled track, and reached to within twelve or fifteen feet of the Stillwater track, and were from six to eight feet high; that he saw the train coming up when he was on the main track; that the engine was blowing off steam; that at that time the engine was six or eight rods from the crossing; that he then beckoned to the plaintiff to come on, and that his team then started up quick; that he did not remember whether the car or the engine was ahead; that he saw the flagman come
Erom the evidence on the part of the plaintiff thus summarized it conclusively appears that the plaintiff did not look north, nor in the' direction of the coming car and engine, until his horses became frightened and were in the act of running away. True,- in one part of his testimony he gives as a reason for not looking that the pile of slabs would have prevented him from seeing had he looked. But that could only be trué before he had passed the east end of the slab pile. It is undisputed that the slab pile terminated fifteen feet west of the switch track, and was upon lower ground than the traveled portion of Second street. The map in evidence, made by the county surveyor of the county in which Hastings is situated, shows the streets and railway tracks in question, and was made upon a regular scale, and gives the distances. Its -accuracy is conceded. Erom that map and the evidence in the record it conclusively appears that before the plaintiff reached the Stillwater track he could have seen down the levee track a distance of 170 feet from the center of Second street in that track; and that, as he moved east on that street, the distance he could see down that track gradually increased. By such failure to look the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and hence a verdict should have been directed in favor of the defendant. The reasons for such rule have been stated so frequently by this court as not to require repetition. Schneider v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 99 Wis. 385, 386, and cases there cited; Cawley v. La Crosse City R. Co. 101 Wis. 145.
But there is a still more serious objection to allowing this verdict to stand. It is undisputed that the injury to the plaintiff was the result of his team becoming frightened and
These facts raise the question whether negligence of the' defendant can be predicated on the failure of its flagman to stop the plaintiff and Arnold from crossing, or notify and warn them that a switch engine and car were coming on the levee track but were going to stop before crossing Second street. In other words, Is it incumbent upon railroads to notify travelers at street crossings whenever- there is a switch engine operating in the vicinity ? This, court held ten years ago “ that it was error to refuse to instruct the jury that there was no evidence of negligence in the- operation of defendant’s locomotive, which was engaged in switching cars near a street crossing, and that the same was. not attended by unusual and unnecessary noises, when the plaintiff’s team became frightened and ran away, causing the injuries complained of.” Abbot v. Kalbus, 74 Wis. 504. As stated by Mr. Justice WiNslow in a later case: “The-right to operate a railroad includes the right to- make the-usual noises incident to the movement of its engines, and trains, and it is matter of common knowledge that the exhausting of steam from the cylinder cocks is one of the noises very frequently accompanying the movement of engines.” Cahoon v. C. & N. W. R. Co. 85 Wis. 572. Such rulings have been sanctioned in still later cases. Bishop v. Belle City St. R. Co. 92 Wis. 144, 145; Flaherty v. Harrison, 98 Wis. 559; Dewey v. C., M. & St. P. R. Co. 99 Wis.. 457, 458. A prominent text writer states the rule thus: “ A railroad company is not liable for injuries resulting from horses becoming frightened upon a highway at the mere-
There is no reliable evidence that the engine was running faster than eight miles an hour; and, even if there had been, that was not the proximate cause of the injury. The proximate cause of the injury was, manifestly, the fright of the team. As a verdict should have been directed in favor of the defendant, it is unnecessary to determine whether it was error to refuse the instructions requested.
By the Court.— The judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.