51 Ind. App. 258 | Ind. Ct. App. | 1912
— This is a suit by the creditors of the “Evansville Implement and Farmers’ Supply Company”, a corporation, against the stockholders of such corporation, to enforce a statutory liability under §4051 Burns 1908, §3007 E. S. 1881.
The assignment of errors in this case in no way separates, specifies or identifies these separate independent rulings as being erroneous. This court in the case of Spitzer v. Miller (1905), 35 Ind. App. 116, 73 N. E. 833, in discussing this question, said at page 117: “The statute (§667 Burns 1901, §655 R. S. 1881) and rule four of this court require that an assignment of error shall be specific, and the rule expressly requires that each specification shall be complete in itself. Each supposed error must be specified; the specifications must be distinct. Each specification in itself alone must be sufficient to require the court on appeal to review some action of the court below, and it must not be addressed to a number of separate supposed errors(Our italics.) See, also, §696 Burns 1908, §655 R. S. 1881; Rule 4, Sup. and App. Court; Clear Creek Tp. v. Rittger (1895), 12 Ind. App. 355, 39 N. E. 1052; Baldwin v. Sutton (1897), 148 Ind. 591, 47 N. E. 629, 47 N. E. 1067; Elliott, App. Proc. §§299, 308, and authorities cited.
This court would hesitate to put upon the section of statute in question a construction that would make a stockholder who innocéntly receives an unearned dividend from a corporation, concerning the financial management and condition of which he generally knows little or nothing, liable for all the debts of such corporation. Such an interpretation and construction would seem so unjust and unreasonable that to justify the same such a meaning should be expressed in terms clear, certain and unambiguous in the section of.statute involved. To adopt such a construction of this section would be neither within its spirit nor letter. On the contrary, the express letter and words of §4051, supra, clearly limit its application to those corporations mentioned in the preceding section “whose charters shall expire by limitation, forfeiture, or otherwise. ’ ’
The complaint was bad on the theory on which it was predicated, and the demurrer thereto was properly sustained, for which reason the judgment below is affirmed.
Note. — Reported in. 99 N. E. 500. See, also, under (1) 2 Oyc. 987, 989; (2) 3 Oye. 185; (3) 10 Oye. 665. As to tlie effect of a statutory extension of the company’s existence, after the expiration of its charter life, for the maintaining and defending suits, see 134 Am. St. 312.