57 Minn. 456 | Minn. | 1894
This was an action brought upon the stock subscription under consideration in the same plaintiff against Robbins, 56 Minn. 48, (57 N. W. 317;) the main difference being that the attempted recovery here was for the entire amount subscribed, less five per cent, paid on the first call, instead of for a single installment. We need not discuss all of the points made upon the appeal, which is from an order overruling a general demurrer to an amended complaint.
There is one allegation in this complaint which was not found in that considered in the Bobbins Case, namely that, after signing said agreement, the defendants delivered the same to plaintiff, and plaintiff then and there accepted said subscription agreement, and agreed to deliver said shares so subscribed for by defendants to -iii pm when paid for. It is contended that by this allegation the transaction set forth in the complaint was a purchase of the stock shares, as distinguished from a subscription for shares, and that the complaint is therefore defective and insufficient, because there is no allegation that plaintiff has tendered the shares, and none that it is able and willing so to do.
In Columbia Electric Co. v. Dixon, 46 Minn. 463, (49 N. W. 244,) the rule was laid down that it was no defense to an action on a subscription for stock shares to allege in the answer that the corporation had not delivered or tendered the certificate to which the subscriber was entitled. Citing that case, and also referring to the
It is claimed by defendants’ counsel that the complaint is defective, not only because it does not contain an averment of readiness and willingness to issue and deliver the stock shares, but because it fails to allege a tender thereof. A reasonable construction, it is said, must be put upon, and some effect attributed to, the language of the agreement, which was that plaintiff was “to deliver the said shares so subscribed for by defendants to them when paid for.” We think that this language cannot be ignored, for under it the right to enforce full payment cannot be regarded as distinct and independent from the ability and willingness to deliver the shares. The acts must be regarded as contemporaneous. The defendants were to pay and the plaintiff was to deliver at the same time. If the latter is not in position to comply with its part of the contract, there should be no enforcement as against the former. And we think that there should, at least, have been an allegation in the complaint that plaintiff was ready and willing to deliver the certificates of stock. An
As to the other alleged defects, we think the pleading is not open to the charge that it failed to state a cause of action. Order reversed.
(Opinion published 59 N. W. 532.)