Lead Opinion
Via indictment, Jason William Walsh, Shayne Anthony Courson, Ronnie Jack Beasley, Jr., and Angela E. Crosby were charged with malice murder, armed robbery and theft by taking a motor vehicle, in connection with the death of Olin Miller. The State sought the death penalty against Beasley and Crosby and they were tried separately. Walsh and Courson were tried jointly, and both were convicted and sentenced for felony murder, predicated on the underlying felony of armed robbery, and theft by taking a motor vehicle.
The prosecution sufficiently proved that the victim’s death was a homicide — the result of blunt force trauma to the head and asphyxiation — and that his truck was stolen. The only question is whether Walsh was a party to the crimes.
No one testified that Walsh, Courson, Beasley or Crosby committed the crimes, or that they were even seen together on the day in question. In a statement he gave the police, Beasley implicated all four of the defendants, saying that each played a role in the commission of the crimes. Beasley’s statement was introduced without objection. However, Beasley, did not testify. It follows that his statement was hearsay and without probative value. Germany v. State,
Walsh also gave a statement to the police, in which he said the following: Walsh and Courson were living with Walsh’s aunt. When Walsh’s aunt tossed them out of her house, they called Courson’s sister, Angela Crosby, and asked her for a ride to Columbus. Crosby told them that she and her boyfriend, Beasley, were leaving town and that Walsh and Courson should meet them at the trailer where she lived with Beasley. When Walsh and Courson arrived, Crosby was alone. She started talking about a movie called “Natural Born Killers” and said that she and Beasley were planning to kill Olin Miller, and take his money and his truck. At first, Walsh thought Crosby was “just blowing hot air,” but when Beasley arrived, the conversation continued and Walsh “started to get worried.” Crosby called Miller and lured him to the trailer. Walsh was “ready to leave,” but decided to stay. He hid in a bedroom with Beasley and Courson as Miller approached the trailer. When Miller came in, Courson threw a blanket over him and Beasley “tried to break his neck.” Courson held Miller down while Beasley hit him over the head with a beer mug. Blood began to seep through the blanket, but Miller was still breathing so Beasley held Miller’s nose and mouth until he suffocated. Beasley and Crosby went through Miller’s pockets and took $31. They then wrapped him in garbage bags, loaded him in his truck, and threw their luggage on top of him. Walsh, Courson, Crosby and Beasley “got in the truck and drove off.” They stopped at a store where they bought beer and gas for the truck.
Walsh added the following “P.S.” to his statement: In the midst of the struggle, Walsh left the room, picked up a “broom that was leaning on the counter and put it up.”
Mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to show participation in the crime. O’Neal v. State,
Here Walsh’s statement shows that before, during, and after the commission of the crimes, Walsh was present and shared
The State cannot rely solely on Walsh’s statement to prove its case. If Walsh’s statement is an admission, the State must present additional direct or circumstantial evidence of his guilt of felony murder. Turner v. State,
An admission differs from a confession in that a confession acknowledges all of the essential elements of the crime. Johnson v. State,
Since Walsh confessed that he was a party to the underlying felonies, the mere fact that he denied actively participating in the murder is of no consequence. Walsh’s conviction for felony murder depends only upon the existence of additional evidence which corroborates his confession in any particular. Sands v. State, supra at 367 (1). A review of the record shows that sufficient corroboration of Walsh’s confession exists in the form of additional evidence regarding the manner in which the victim was killed and his body was disposed. Id.; Barnes v. State,
The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Walsh committed the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia,
2. We cannot consider Walsh’s assertion that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a change of venue because, although Courson sought a venue change, Walsh did not. Barnes v. State,
3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the trial to be televised. Harris v. State,
4. Walsh contends his statement was induced by hope of benefit and, therefore, inadmissible because, when the police read Walsh his Miranda rights, they informed him that they were investigating the disappearance, rather than the murder, of Miller. This contention is without merit. It is clear that Walsh knew from the outset that the police were investigating the disappearance and murder of Miller. More importantly, there is no evidence whatsoever that Walsh’s statement was induced by the hope of a lighter sentence. Arline v. State,
5. The trial court did not err in permitting Walsh’s statement to be read to the jury without submitting the actual statement to the jury. Ordinarily, a written confession should not be sent out with the jury during deliberations. Walker v. State,
6. Contrary to Walsh’s contention, the trial court distinctly instructed the jury that the conviction of one defendant did not necessarily require the conviction of the other. See generally George v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes were committed in Toombs County on March 18, 1995, and defendant was indicted on April 24,1995. The case was tried on April 21-23,1997, and the jury returned its verdict on April 23,1997. Defendant was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and 15 years in prison for motor vehicle theft. Defendant’s timely filed motion for a new trial was denied on September 29, 1997, and he filed a notice of appeal on October 24, 1997. The case was docketed in this Court on December 2, 1997, and submitted for a decision on briefs on January 26, 1997.
Courson’s original appeal, Case No. S98A0405, was dismissed for want of appellate jurisdiction because his notice of appeal was untimely filed. The trial court granted his request for an out-of-time appeal, which is currently pending in this Court. (Case No. S98A0881.)
As Walsh put it, “We all went to the store and got gas and beer.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Walsh admitted covering Miller’s body with rocks. However, we do not base our conclusion that he was a party to the crimes on that admission because it contains an exculpatory component — coercion. See OCGA § 16-3-26. Ordinarily, the jury would have been authorized to believe the inculpatory part of this portion of Walsh’s statement — that he participated in covering up the crime, and disbelieve the exculpatory part —■ that he acted out of fear for his life. See Davis v. State,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
Having carefully reviewed the record in this case, I am compelled to conclude (and I do so reluctantly) that the admissible facts cannot, under the law of this State, support Walsh’s convictions for felony murder and theft by taking. In reaching this conclusion, I acknowledge that the hearsay statement of Ronnie Jack Beasley, discussed at p. 428 of the majority opinion, may be construed as some evidence of Walsh’s guilt. However, as the majority correctly holds, Beasley’s statement is inadmissible hearsay, and therefore cannot be considered by this Court in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support Walsh’s convictions.
The majority opinion relies exclusively on Walsh’s statement to the police to conclude that he was a party to the crimes in question. An examination of Walsh’s statement, however, reveals that it is insufficient to support his convictions on the theory that he was a party to the crimes. In his statement, Walsh admitted being present at the crime scene, but he stated that he did not directly participate in the actual murder and armed robbery of the victim or in the theft of the victim’s car. Moreover, he never stated that he encouraged or aided another person to commit the crimes. In fact, the strongest inference that can be drawn from Walsh’s statement is that he did not encourage or aid anyone in the murder and armed robbery of the victim or in the theft of the victim’s automobile. Supporting such an inference are Walsh’s statements that he thought Beasley and Crosby were “just blowing hot air” about their plans for the victim, but that, as Beasley’s and Crosby’s talk continued, Walsh “started to get worried.” Such statements are not indicative of someone actively participating in, encouraging, or aiding criminal activity. In addition, the State offered no physical, forensic, or testimonial evidence that was inconsistent with Walsh’s statement that he did not directly participate in the murder and robbery of the victim, or with the inference that can be drawn from Walsh’s testimony that he did not encourage or aid anyone in committing the crimes in question. In this regard, although Walsh stated that he
Because the majority affirms Walsh’s conviction on the ground he was a party to the crimes, and because only circumstantial evidence supports that theory,
In affirming Walsh’s convictions, the majority has overlooked the foregoing shortcomings with the State’s evidence. From evidence (Walsh’s statement) that establishes a neutral or negative proposition — that Walsh was present and did nothing to stop the crimes —, the majority draws the weak positive inference that Walsh actively participated in the crimes or actively encouraged or aided others in committing the crimes. The majority goes so far as to conclude that Walsh’s statement amounts to an “acknowledgment of all the essential elements of his guilt as a party to the underlying felonies of armed robbery and the theft by taking of the victim’s truck.” This is simply an incorrect representation of Walsh’s statement; Walsh did not make such an acknowledgment. Moreover, even if credence is given to the majority’s reasoning, it does not negate the fact that the evidence supports the equally reasonable, if not more reasonable, hypothesis that Walsh did not directly participate in the crimes or encourage or aid others in committing the crimes.
Because the record in this case simply does not support the majority’s holding that the evidence is sufficient to support Walsh’s convictions for felony murder and for theft by taking of the victim’s motor vehicle, and because “[t]he constitutional necessity of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not confined to those defendants who are morally blameless,”
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins in this dissent.
Majority opinion, p. 428.
Jackson v. Virginia,
The Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. 2, p. 11, defines circumstantial evidence as follows:
Evidence may also be used to prove a fact by inference. And this is referred to as circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is the proof of facts or circumstances by direct evidence from which you may infer other related or connected facts which are reasonable and justified in the light of your experience.
Accord Terrell v. State,
Mims v. State,
Jackson v. Virginia,