12 Colo. App. 151 | Colo. Ct. App. | 1898
N. S. Walpole was the county assessor of Pueblo county, which is a county of the second class under the statute. From January, 1893, to January, 1894, he officially designated on the records of his office the taxable property within the corporate limits of the city of Pueblo in that county. He
It is quite possible the case might be disposed of on a technical ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action even on the statute under which he claims compensation. By the terms of the act concerning towns and cities, being section 3353 of the General Statutes of 1883, the council or board of trustees are undoubtedly thereby constituted a giiasz'-judicial body, to which is intrusted, aud on which is imposed the duty to determine the allowance which the assessor shall receive for doing the work prescribed by the revenue act, and which is, and was essential to facilitate the collection of city taxes and enable the municipality to determine the property which was liable to taxation and the amounts collectible by the city. Since this is true, it is quite difficult to see how the plaintiff stated a cause of action in his complaint. He alleged that ex officio he performed this duty for the city. This is in no sense accurate because he was not the representative of the city at all, but performed the work prescribed by the revenue act and laid on him as a duty by the General Statutes prescribing the duties of assessors. While the labor inured to the benefit of the city, it was done as cbunty assessor and not otherwise, and the assessor in no manner occupied a dual position, or held two offices, or any office within the gift of the municipality or controllable by it, nor was he entitled to any compensation as the holder of a city office. The legislature evidently intended to provide that his compensation should come partly from the city and partly from the county, leaving it to the municipal authorities to determine the value of the work which the assessor
In those two cases the court, speaking by the present president judge decided that the act of 1891 prescribed the compensation of the sheriff and the county clerk; that it provided a salary for both of these officers, and that the salary prescribed was a total compensation and that it was payable out of the fund made up by the fees collected by those officers under the provisions of the salary act of 1891. According to that act nearly all of the feed officers of the state remain feed officers, in that they are entitled and required to charge certain specific fees for definite services which cover all the official duties of the officers named in the act. These fees are paid into the county treasury, designated as a fee fund, and out of the fees collected the officers receive the compensation provided.- It was held in the Henderson case that the county clerk, upon whom the statute laid certain duties, and of whom it required certain services, was required to do whatever the statute specified, whether it be the filing of instruments or rendering services as clerk to the board of county commissioners, and that although the act laid on him both duties, he was entitled to one compensation, to wit,
We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the act of 1891 prescribes the salary of the assessor, and that this salary is
The judgment sustaining the demurrer is right, and will accordingly be affirmed.
Affirmed.