This is the second appeal in this cause; former decision, Decatur Fertilizer Co. v. Walls,
Plea A on former appeal alleges:
“The product shipped was worthless and had no value as а fertilizer.”
Plea 2 of the present record alleges:
“ * * * That the consideration for said note has failed in this, the note was given for commercial fertilizer manufactured by plaintiff and sold to defеndant as suitable for raising crops, and defendant avers that said' fertilizer was worthless for the purpose for which it was manufactured and sold.”
This is admittedly a plea of failure of consideration. Without dispute, the fertilizer, the consideration for.the note sued upon, was sold by manufacturer to merсhant dealer, not for his own use, but for resale; it was resold and much of the sale prices collected. Clearly, it was not worthless to defendant.
The burden of proof was on defendant to sustain his plea that the fertilizеr was untagged at time of delivery. Ala. Nat. Bank v. Parker,
Appellant urges the rule should be different where delivery is made to a common carrier.
The viоlation of a positive statute is not presumed. The plea sets up an affirmative rather than a negative defense, the status of the bags as tаgged or untagged when passing from the possession of the seller to the buyer. The carrier selected by the buyer is his agent in effecting delivery.
The samе rule obtains as to the registration of the brand and guaranteed analysis with the commissioner of agriculture. This is a record open to both partiеs.' It is unlike the license to deal in fertilizers, an instrument in the keeping of the licensee. When put in issue, the burden is on him to produce it, make proof of its issuаnce. Edisto Phosphate Co. v. Stanford,
We are of opinion the place of delivery was at Decatur, the point of shipment. Whether the bags of fertilizer were tagged is to be determined as of the time and place they were delivered to the boat as a common carrier.
Thе rule that a delivery to the carrier is a delivery to the consignee rests upon the theory that the carrier is, in the absence of other agreement, the agent of the consignee in accepting delivery. Decatur Fert. Co. v. Walls,
That the seller had several orders for the same prоduct to be shipped by the same boat, and delivered to the carrier the required number of bags to fill all the orders, without marking or otherwise identifying each shipping unit, as destined to a particular consignee, and that the carrier received same, issued a bill of lading for each consignment, mаde no segregation of the bags of each consignee while in transit, but delivered to each the number of bags called for by his Bill of lading would not change the rule as to place of delivery. It would rather evidence an approval or ratification of this method of handling the consignment by thе carrier.
Defendant’s refused charges 1 and 2 read:
“(1) The court charges the jury that if, when this fertilizer sued for was delivered to the boat *428 at Decatur, a single bag of tbe fertilizer was not tagged, then your verdict must be for the defendant — and in that case, it would make no difference that it had once been tagged. If it had been tagged and was torn or lost off before it was placed on board the boat, and was then untagged, the note would be void, and your verdict should be for the defendant.
“(2) If any'part of the fertilizer covered by this note sued on was not tagged when delivered to the boat at Decatur, your verdict should be for the defendant, and it would make no difference that said fertilizer had been previously tagged.”
These charges are correct statements of the law as direсtly declared in Ala. Nat. Bank v. Parker,
The issue presented by these charges was raised by plea No. 5. As held on former appeal, evidencе that all or many of the sacks were nntagged at the time they reached Walls landing made it a jury question as to whether they were untagged at the time of loading on the boat. This necessarily made it a jury question, whether one or more were then untagged as required by law. The charges cannot therefore be condemned as abstract.
The point is made that these charges predicate a verdict for defendant on the existence of the facts stated, and fail to predicate a finding of such facts upon the evidence, and were properly refused as misleading.
In Hall v. Posey,
The court, through Chief Justice Stone, said:
“The oath administered to the jury required them to render a true verdict according to the evidence; and to suрpose they would entertain and act on any belief which was derived from sources other than the testimony, or the inferences naturally and reаsonably arising out of the facts proved, would be to impute to them a wicked disregard of their sworn duty, or great folly, which would show their unfitness for the trust confided to them. If counsel apprehended the jury would be misled by the instruction, it was a proper subject for an explanatory charge. O’Donnell v. Rodiger,
O’Donnell v. Rodiger, 76 Ala, 222,
“It is not a charge on the effect of the evidence, nor does it give the jury any direction as - to their verdict,”
—and concluding with the same suggestion of an explanatory charge if the adverse party supposed himself injured.
That the giving оf such charges is not error to reverse has been consistently followed : Mansfield v. Morgan,
In Barfield v. Evans,
In Jefferson County Sav. Bank v. Compton,
In the still later case of Sovereign Camp W. O. W. v. Craft,
To like effect is Nashville Broom & Supply Co. v. Alabama Broom & Mattress Co.,
Whether as an original proposition wе should consider such charges misleading in fact, it must be regarded as a settled rule of the court that, when a charge predicates a verdict uрon the existence of recited' facts, it should go further and limit the consideration of such facts to the evidence .and reasonable inferences deducible therefrom.
Without being predicated upon the -evidence, neither the giving nor the refusal of such charge will, as a rule, work a reversal. Affirmed.