Michael Walling, Administrator of the Estate of Raeann Walling, Deceased v. Ransford S. Brenya, M.D., et al.
Court of Appeals No. L-19-1264
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
January 8, 2021
[Cite as Walling v. Brenya, 2021-Ohio-29.]
PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
Trial Court No. CI0201502139
Decided: January 8, 2021
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Jeffrey T. Stewart and Robert M. Scott, for appellant.
James E. Brazeau and Kayla L. Henderson, for appellee.
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PIETRYKOWSKI, J.
{1} Appellant, Michael Walling as Administrator for the Estate of Raeann Walling, Deceased, appeals the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, granting summary judgment in favor of appellee, The Toledo Hospital, on appellant‘s claim for negligent credentialing. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{2} This matter arises from a medical malpractice claim brought by appellant against Dr. Ransford Brenya, Dr. Osama Al-Bawab, and The Toledo Clinic, Inc. Appellant alleged that Raeann Walling suffered a fatal pulmonary vein stenosis on April 26, 2014, as a consequence of Brenya‘s repeated and incompetent catheter ablation procedures in treating her catecholaminergic polymorphic ventricular tachycardia (CPVT)—a genetic condition characterized by a particular kind of atrial arrhythmia—and his negligent failure to recognize and address the stenosis.
{3} Based on information learned during discovery, appellant amended the complaint to include a negligent credentialing claim against appellee as an additional defendant. Upon the motion of appellee, the trial court bifurcated the negligent credentialing claim and stayed discovery pending the outcome of the underlying medical malpractice claim.
{4} The underlying claim proceeded to a multi-day jury trial commencing on January 28, 2019. During the trial, Brenya testified on cross-examination that he does not remember reviewing an x-ray taken of Raeann that showed a potential pulmonary venous obstruction. He agreed that not reviewing the records sent to him about a patient fell below the standard of care. Brenya further testified that had he seen the records, the reasonable standard of care would have been to order a CT scan, which he did not do. Moreover, because he did not order the CT scan, he did not discover the pulmonary vein stenosis, and consequently did not treat the pulmonary vein stenosis. Finally, Brenya
{5} Before the trial concluded, appellant entered into a settlement agreement with Brenya, Al-Bawab, and the Toledo Clinic.1 In the signed release, appellant acknowledged that the released parties “have denied, and continue to deny, any wrongdoing or liability,” but the released parties reciprocally acknowledged that appellant did not admit that the released parties were without fault. Furthermore, the release stated that nothing in it “shall be deemed to release or impair in any way the pending claims * * * against [appellee],” and that “This settlement and release is made in good faith specifically pursuant to
{6} Following the dismissal of the medical malpractice claims against Brenya, Al-Bawab, and the Toledo Clinic, appellee moved for summary judgment on appellant‘s claim of negligent credentialing. Appellee argued that to bring a negligent credentialing
{7} On October 9, 2019, the trial court entered its judgment finding that Brenya‘s “concession” on cross-examination did not constitute an adjudicated determination or stipulation that appellant‘s injuries were proximately caused by the doctor‘s negligence. Thus, the court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee, and dismissed appellant‘s claim with prejudice.
II. Assignments of Error
{8} Appellant has timely appealed the trial court‘s October 9, 2019 judgment, and now asserts one assignment of error for our review:
- The trial court erred when it granted Defendant-Appellee The Toledo Hospital‘s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff-Appellant‘s negligent credentialing claim where the defendant-doctor during trial in the underlying medical negligence case conceded on the record and under oath the essential elements of Plaintiff-Appellant‘s medical negligence claim and Plaintiff-Appellant subsequently settled his claim for medical negligence against the defendant-doctor prior to the jury‘s verdict.
{9} We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts., 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129, 572 N.E.2d 198 (9th Dist.1989); Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Under
{10} The question presented to us in this appeal is whether appellant can maintain a negligent credentialing claim against appellee where the defendant-doctor conceded on the record during the underlying trial the essential elements of a medical negligence claim,2 but where the plaintiff settled his claim for medical negligence against the defendant-doctor prior to the jury verdict, and the settlement agreement did not stipulate that the plaintiff‘s injury was caused by the defendant-doctor‘s negligence.
{11} “To prove a negligent-credentialing claim, a plaintiff injured by the negligence of a staff doctor must show that but for the lack of care in the selection or retention of the doctor, the doctor would not have been granted staff privileges, and the
{12} In Schelling, the Ohio Supreme Court was asked to answer “whether a plaintiff can proceed on a negligent-credentialing claim against a hospital without a prior finding, either by adjudication or stipulation, that the plaintiff‘s injury was caused by the physician‘s malpractice.” In Schelling, as here, the plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice claim against the defendant-doctor, and a negligent credentialing claim against the hospital. Id. at ¶ 5-6. Upon the motion of the hospital, the claims were bifurcated for trial. Id. at ¶ 7. Prior to trial, however, the defendant-doctor filed a petition for bankruptcy, and the case was stayed. Id. at ¶ 8. Thereafter, the plaintiffs dismissed the claim against the defendant-doctor without prejudice, acknowledging that a settlement was reached with the bankruptcy trustee. Id. The defendant-doctor was later granted a discharge in bankruptcy, thereby precluding any attempt by the plaintiffs to collect on the medical malpractice claim. Id. Notably, the bankruptcy court did not enter a finding that the defendant-doctor was negligent in his treatment of the plaintiff, and the defendant-doctor did not admit negligence. Id. at ¶ 9.
{14} In Boggia v. Wood Cty. Hosp., 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-09-091, 2010-Ohio-4932, this court had an opportunity to apply Schelling to a case with a fact pattern similar to the one before us. In Boggia, the plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice claim against the doctor, and a negligent credentialing claim against the hospital. Id. at ¶ 1. The claims were bifurcated. Id. at ¶ 2. The plaintiffs then settled the medical malpractice claim with the doctor “without obtaining any concession from the doctor as to her alleged negligence/liability.” Id. at ¶ 10. After the settlement, the hospital moved to dismiss the negligent credentialing claim. Id. at ¶ 4. Applying Schelling, the trial court granted the hospital‘s motion and dismissed the action. On appeal, we affirmed. We reasoned that
{15} In support of his assignment of error, appellant now attempts to distinguish the present case from the facts in Boggia. In so doing, appellant latches onto our use of the word “concession,” and argues that here, unlike in Boggia, the defendant-doctor conceded the essential elements of medical malpractice through his testimony on cross-examination. While Brenya‘s testimony did in fact address all of the elements of medical malpractice, we do not find that it constituted a “concession” as that term was used in Boggia.
{16} In Boggia, we used the word “concession” in the context of the plaintiffs’ settlement of their malpractice claim. We noted that the plaintiffs “settled their malpractice claim against [the doctor] without obtaining any concession from the doctor as to her alleged negligence/liability.” Id. at ¶ 10. In the next sentence, we remarked that “[t]o the contrary, in the release of all claims * * * [the doctor] ‘denies any liability of any sort.‘” Id. Thus, the type of concession being referred to in Boggia was a concession of liability as part of a settlement agreement, which is entirely consistent with the rule in Schelling that a plaintiff cannot maintain a negligent credentialing claim without a prior finding or determination, either by adjudication or stipulation, that the plaintiff‘s injury was proximately caused by the doctor‘s malpractice.
{18} Alternatively, appellant argues that the present case is distinguishable from Boggia because, here, the settlement agreement expressly relies on
{19} Finally, appellant argues that the facts and testimony provided in discovery and at trial present a likelihood of success on the merits. Notwithstanding the purported strength of appellant‘s case that appellee was negligent in providing credentials to Brenya, the rule set forth in Schelling requires that appellant “obtain a prior determination that a doctor committed medical malpractice and that the malpractice proximately caused the plaintiff‘s injury.” Schelling, 123 Ohio St.3d 387, 2009-Ohio-4175, 916 N.E.2d 1029, at ¶ 32. Appellant, through his own decision to settle his claims against the underlying defendants without a stipulation that their medical malpractice caused his injuries, has failed to obtain such a determination.
{20} Therefore, we find that this case is analogous to Boggia, and we hold that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee on appellant‘s claim of negligent credentialing where appellant failed to obtain a prior determination, whether through adjudication or stipulation, that Brenya‘s malpractice proximately caused appellant‘s injuries.
{21} Accordingly, appellant‘s assignment of error is not well-taken.
{22} For the foregoing reasons, we find that substantial justice has been done the party complaining, and the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Mark L. Pietrykowski, J.
JUDGE
Gene A. Zmuda, P.J.
David A. D‘Apolito, J.
CONCUR.
JUDGE
JUDGE
Judge David A. D‘Apolito, Seventh District Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio‘s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court‘s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.