14 Utah 305 | Utah | 1896
On tbe 18tb day of December, 1893, plaintiff filed his complaint for tbe alleged conversion by tbe defendant of two certain promissory notes, made by John Beck, one for $5,000, and one for $1,000, both dated April 1, 1892, payable April 1,1893, and alleged that on tbe 16th day of December, 1893, be was tbe owner of said notes, and on that day defendant unlawfully disposed of and converted tbe same to its own use. Tbe defendant answered, denying plaintiff’s ownership of tbe notes, or its conversion of
In the course of argument, and in the briefs of counsel, the question as to the effect of the sale of the Beck notes to James T. Little, as an officer of the bank, is discussed to a considerable extent; but, upon an examination, we discover no finding that Little was an officer of the bank, or in any way connected with it at the time, and therefore refrain from passing upon the questions involved in that subject. The judgment must find its support in the actual state of facts ascertained and reported by the judge, or fail. No aid can be derived from facts not embodied in the findings. Brown v. McHugh, 36 Mich. 433.
The testimony offered on both sides left a question of fact, to be decided by the court. The court found the fact against the defendant.
Section 9 of article 8 of the constitution of Utah provides that- “ in equity cases the appeal may be on questions of both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on questions of law alone.” While we might be able to reach a different conclusion from the trial court upon the correctness of this finding, yet, as the appeal brings up the question of law alone,' and there is some evidence in the record tending to sustain the finding, we do not feel satisfied to disturb the finding on this subject.
The demand, refusal, and conversion are alleged to have been made December 16, 1893. The bank traded the notes June 16th. The defendant was limited in his proof of the market value of the notes and the insolvency of the maker to a period between the 16th day of June, and the 16th day of December, 1893, the date of the alleged conversion, and was precluded from showing their value or Beck’s insolvency in 1894. The plaintiff, in his rebutting case, called Mr. Little as his witness, and, under objection that the testimony was incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, was allowed to show that, after the suit was commenced, and after the alleged conversion, and on January 6,1894, he sold the judgment he obtained upon the notes in question to a syndicate of people who purchased it at its face value in order to protect their interests in the property levied upon; the property levied upon being Beck’s equity of redemption in the stock of a mine. Exception was taken to the admission of this' testimony; also, to the refusal of the court to permit the defendant to show, on cross-examination of the same
For the conversion of money securities the owner is, prima facie, entitled to their face value, — that is, their presumptive value, — and he will be entitled to recover their actual value if shown; but the defendant has the right to show, in reduction of damages, the payment in whole or in part, the inability of the maker to pay, a release, invalidity of the instrument, or any other matter which will legitimately affect or diminish its value, and the proper measure of damages is the value of such securities at the time of the conversion, with interest to the time of trial. 3 Suth. Dam. pp. 520-522; 1 Sedg. Dam. §§ 256,257; 5 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, p. 40; Stirling v. Garritee, 18 Md. 468; Insurance Co. v. Dalrymple, 25 Md. 244.
So it is held that the market value of the stock at the
In New York and several other states the old rule of assessing damages, in cases of conversion of stocks which have a fluctuating value, at the highest market price from the time of conversion to the time of trial, is held to be without reason; and the supreme court, in the case of Baker'v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211, has seen fit to change the rule, and hold that a fixed, unqualified rule, giving the plaintiff, in all cases of conversion of property, the highest market price from the time of the conversion to the time of trial, cannot be upheld upon any sound principle of reason or justice, and that such doctrine cannot be regarded as onet of those settled rules to which the principles of stare decisis should apply, and that the market price of stocks from the time of sale to a reasonable time after notice of sale affords a .complete indemnity, and is the proper measure of damages in such cases.
The supreme court of the United States, in Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, a case appealed from the supreme court of Utah, reported in 3 Utah 54, hold, with New York, that, in trover for the conversion of stocks having a fluctuating value, the proper rule for damages is the highest intermediate value between the time of conversion and a reasonable time after the owner has received notice of it, to enable him to replace the stock. The court further says: “ Other goods wrongfully converted are generally supposed to have a fixed market value at which they can be replaced at any time, and hence, with regard to them, the ordinary measure of damages is their value at the time of the conversion, or, in case of sale and purchase, at the time fixed for their delivery. But the
A plaintiff’s right of recovery must be deemed fixed at some time, and he should not be permitted to wait for an indefinite period, and speculate upon the changes in the market, while taking upon himself none of the risks of a decline in the value of the article converted. This would put him in a better position than if he had the property in possession. If the plaintiff had not lost his title to the property, he had the option of following and recovering it. But by bringing this action of trover he seeks to recover damages for the conversion. By the conversion he was deprived of the property, and a claim for the value of it took its place. Consequently, that value at the time of the conversion, with interest, should be the limit of his recovery. If the property, or the probability of collection of the judgment obtained upon the notes, had been increased because of the extra efforts, care, research, and expense bestowed by the purchaser of the notes, or his paid attorneys, in uncovering concealed or hypothecated property of the maker, so as to make the collection possible six months after the conversion, after the commencement of this suit, and after the purchaser had tendered the property back to the plaintiff, this increased value should not inure to the benefit of the plaintiff. 2 Sedg. Dam. § 499. It would be almost impossible to review and reconcile the many conflicting opinions that have been delivered upon this subject. We are inclined to adopt the rule that the measure of damages, in cases of this character, is the value of the property at the time of the conversion, with interest thereon to the time of the trial. It will be remembered that the bank' sold and traded the collateral notes to Little on June 16, 1893, and that the plaintiff had notice of the sale at that
The next question to be considered is the question of damages arising from the alleged conversion of the Beck notes, and the errors assigned upon the admission and rejection of testimony with reference to Beck’s solvency. At the trial the court limited the defendant’s proof as to the value of Beck’s notes and the solvency of Beck to a period between the 16th day of June, 1893, the day of the sale of the notes by the bank to Little, and the 16th day of December, 1893, the time of the alleged conversion, tender, and demand of the Beck notes by the plaintiff.-
The fact that Beck kept his property concealed or covered up in the name of other parties, where it could not be found or reached by execution, if shown, would tend. to affect the value of his paper, was proper testimony, and should have been admitted. So the proper return of executions nulla dona, issued upon a valid judgment against Beck, were prima facie evidence of his insolvency at the time. Phillips v. Webster, 85 Ill. 146; Brown v. Brooks, 25 Pa. St. 210.
The appellant also contends that there is no evidence to support the finding that the defendant converted the notes to his own use on December 16, 1893, that being
If defendant had not the actual or constructive possession of the property at the time of the demand, and therefore could not deliver it, his liability would not be affected by the demand and refusal; for, if he had been guilty of the conversion before, no demand was necessary, and, if he had not been, a failure to do what, for any reason, he was unable to do, could not render him so.
Appellant contends that tbe findings of tbe court are inconsistent and contradictory in this: ■ That in general finding No. 3 tbe court found that on tbe 16th day of December, 1S93, tbe defendant unlawfully disposed of and converted to its own use tbe two Beck notes, to tbe damage of tbe plaintiff in tbe sum of $6,435, this sum being tbe value of said, notes on that date; that in special finding No. 8 tbe court found that there was no market value to said Beck notes on tbe said 16th day of December, 1898, that being tbe day on which tbe alleged conversion took place, and in special finding No. 6 tbe court found that there was no market value to Beck’s notes on tbe 16 th day of June, 1893; that tbe special findings control, and that those findings do not support tbe judgment, but are contradictory and inconsistent with it; and that special finding* No. 8 is contrary to tbe evidence, and is not supported by it. The value of the notes on December 16,1893, is fixed at their full face and interest, while they are beld to have no market value on that date. Tbe court permitted tbe defendant to show that-tbe notes bad a market value, and that sucb'market value was from 1 to 16 cents on tbe dollar between Juñe 16 and December 16, 1893, and that Beck was insolvent, as bearing upon tbe value of tbe notes, but declined to allow defendant to show such value after these dates, as too remote
The testimony given bore upon the value of the notes, and tended to fix such value. The object and purpose of such testimony was to inform the court what the value of the notes was, so that the court could render a judgment for that value. When the value was found, and judgment rendered, the parties had a right to know, from the findings, what the ultimate facts were upon which the judgment was rendered. Such findings should be consistent, and support the judgment, and leave nothing to conjecture. The court found, in its general findings, that the value of the notes on December 16, 1893, was $6,435, and afterwards made its special findings that such notes had no market value on December 16, 1893. The evidence on the part of the defendant tended to show the market value of the notes to be from 1 to 16 cents on the dollar at this time, and no evidence of the market value was offered by the plaintiff. Special findings control the general findings on the same subject, where there is a conflict between them. Hidden v. Jordan, 28 Cal. 302; Reese v. Corcoran, 52 Cal. 495; Sloss v. Allman, 64 Cal.
The cash market value oí an article having a market value is usually the test of its value. This test, however, may not in all cases apply to commercial paper. In some cases such paper may be comparatively worthless in the market, and still have its intrinsic face value; while in other cases it may have its face market value, but be of no intrinsic value. The value in either case may be shown, as fixing the true value. We are of the opinión that the findings should have been more explicit, and have left less room for apparent contradiction and conjecture. The finding that the notes had no market value was against the evidence, and was not supported by it.1 Facts of an equivocal import cannot well be reduced to a certainty by conjecture. A finding should afford the means for its own interpretation, and for fixing its own sense, and should be sufficiently distinct and definite to enable the court to decide upon the judgment. Brown v. McHugh, 36 Mich. 435.
The judgment of the district court is set aside and reversed, with costs, and a new trial granted.