174 A. 897 | Pa. | 1934
John A. Wallace died in 1915; by his will his estate was divided equally among his four children; his only son, Frank, whom he designated an executor, was given an option to purchase his interest in the Chester Times, a newspaper published in Chester. Six months after his father's death, Frank exercised the option and purchased that interest, representing 550 shares of stock, his mother, his three sisters and the coexecutor joining in the conveyance. Under the agreement of sale, all dividends issued on the stock were distributed to the estate until the purchase price was paid in full. Subsequently, Frank bought part of the stock of a retiring shareholder. Frank died in January, 1927, without issue, leaving his entire estate to his wife who died intestate *150
three days later. At Frank's death, he held 745 shares of the stock in the company operating the newspaper, and several months later his sisters, the present appellants, instituted an action in the federal court for the eastern district of Pennsylvania against his estate and that of his wife, asking for a reconveyance of their share of the stock which Frank had purchased from his father's estate in 1915. The bill was drawn upon the theory that Frank took the stock as trustee, either expressly or constructively, for himself and his three sisters. The district court dismissed the bill (Kitts v. Hanna,
The sisters of Frank Wallace are here making their third effort — begun nearly two and one-half years after the failure of the second — to secure a division of the shares of stock standing in their brother's name. The proceeding took the form of a petition for a citation on the administrators of Frank's estate to file an account, and to enjoin a transfer of the securities involved. An oral trust was averred. The orphans' court dismissed the petition for the reasons: first, it did not sufficiently aver a trust; second, the claim is barred by laches; and, third, the claim has been adjudicated in the prior proceedings.
Appellants' petition does not disclose, with the precision the law requires, sufficient averments of fact to establish a parol trust in personal property. It must *151
be remembered that when Frank Wallace, the alleged donor, died, he had not only title but possession of the trust res. These he had continually kept. To impose a trust on personal property the law requires explicit and direct averments which show conclusively that a trust had been created. More particularly should this be true under circumstances like the present. The law is most exacting in this respect; otherwise a trust could easily be fraudulently imposed on the property of decedents' estates. It is, therefore, required that the averments showing the existence of a trust be clear and specific. In Bair v. Snyder County State Bank,
Apart from this consideration, it is now too late for appellants to maintain successfully that when Frank died he held his stock in the Chester Times as trustee. The question presented in all three proceedings which appellants have instituted has been substantially the same. All proceedings were subsequent to the death of Frank, and the facts upon which any proceeding could be based were known or should have been known by appellants. In the federal court, the basis of the action was that when Frank died he held all the stock as atrustee. At that time appellants set up an express parol trust or resulting trust because he purchased from himself as executor. In the present proceeding the same relation is predicated, to wit, that when Frank died he held all the stock as trustee. Trusteeship was the gist of both proceedings.
Appellants' second attempt, in the orphans' court, was founded on the same reason. There the litigation was based on the same theory as the proceeding in the federal court — that Frank took and held this stock as constructive trustee. In the federal courts, the principal parties to the suit were the same as in the instant case. As the questions now raised are the same as those presented there, the decision of that court upon those questions *153 must be considered res judicata in this action between the same parties.
Broadly stated, the rule of res judicata is that when a court of competent jurisdiction has determined a litigated cause on its merits, the judgment entered, until reversed, is, forever and under all circumstances, final and conclusive as between the parties to the suit and their privies, in respect to every fact which might properly be considered in reaching a judicial determination of the controversy, and in respect to all points of law there adjudged, as those points relate directly to the cause of action in litigation and affect the fund or other subject-matter then before the court. As we said in Hochman v. Mortgage Finance Corp.,
Appellants seek in this proceeding, as well as in the prior federal and state actions, to establish the existence of an express or constructive trust in their favor of three-fourths of the shares of stock standing in their *154 brother's name. The district court considered that matter quite fully; while the proceedings were dismissed on demurrer, the court reviewed all the facts set forth in the bill and held that even if true they presented no cause of action. In so far as these facts were stated it was, therefore, a decision of the case on the merits, for it was a direct holding based on all the relevant facts that could then be asserted, that Frank was not a trustee. It follows that when appellants, without amending or asking for an amendment to their bill in order to assert new facts, took their case to the circuit court of appeals where it was affirmed, their action must be taken to be conclusive that they did notave any additional facts on which to state a better cause of action.
Appellants assert, however, that the prior proceedings are not determinative of the instant case because they now admit that when Frank bought from the estate he took the stock as an absolute owner, and because they now claim that the stock he later bought, as well as that secured from the estate, is subject to a trust created not in 1915 but 1920. These distinctions are immaterial so far as the applicability of the principle of res judicata is concerned, for the differences to which appellants point are matters of proof rather than of issue. The fact that new or different evidence was or may be offered in each of the suits to sustain the particular theory relied on is of no moment (Rauwolf v. Glass,
Decree affirmed at appellants' cost.
Mr. Justice SCHAFFER took no part in the decision of this case.