16 F.2d 309 | W.D. Wash. | 1926
(after stating the facts as above). The testimony does not disclose negligence on the part of the libelant. He exercised due care and caution under the circumstances. The conduct of the painters in the arrangement of the scaffolding, and in changing and moving the same without notice to the libelant of the changing condition, did not show reasonable care and caution. The libelant was not required to exercise care to discover extraordinary dangers arising from the acts of the owner’s employees or of the contractor, but had a right to assume that proper care would be taken for his protection until advised. Ches. & O. Ry. Co. v. De Atley, 241 U. S. 310, 36 S. Ct. 564, 60 L. Ed. 1016; Ches. & O. Ry. Co. v. Proffitt, 241 U. S. 462, 36 S. Ct. 620, 60 L. Ed. 1102. He had a right to assume that due diligence would be used to guard him against danger in the employment in which he was engaged (Choctaw O. & G. R. R. Co. v. McDade, 191 U. S. 64, 24 S. Ct. 24, 48 L. Ed. 96), and was only charged with defects known or plainly observable (Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Archibald, 170 U. S. 665, 18 S. Ct. 777, 42 L. Ed. 1188), and appreciated by him under the circumstances (Ches. & O. Ry. Co. v. Proffitt, supra; Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U. S. 94, 34 S. Ct. 229, 58 L. Ed. 521; McPherson v. Twin Harbor Stev. & T. Co. [Wash.] 245 P. 747, Port of N. Y. Stev. Co. v. Castagna [C. C. A.] 280 F. 618; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. Busse [C. C. A.] 263 F. 516; Barney v. Anderson, 116 Wash. 352, 199 P. 452; Lahti v. Rothschild, 60 Wash. 438, 111 P. 451).
The hazard created by the owner in the construction, arrangement and movement of the scaffolding in the manner shown, in view of what was done by the libelant and the owner, cannot be regarded as of the ordinary risk of the employment assumed by the libelant (George v. Clark [C. C. A.] 85 F. 608); nor was libelant, under the circumstances shown, charged with knowledge. General Lighterage Co. v. Hansen (C. C. A.) 228 F. 497. The libelant had a right to assume, in the absence of a notice, that danger would not be increased, and that reasonably safe appliances would be used in carrying forward the work, and was not required to be constantly on the look
It was the owner’s duty to see that the plank and “horses” used as a scaffold were suitable and substantial, and should be held liable for the falling of the plank from the loosely arranged structure. Rohde v. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. (D. C.) 263 F. 204; Wash. & G. R. Co. v. McDade, 135 U. S. 554, 10 S. Ct. 1044, 34 L. Ed. 235; Rutherford v. Jethou (D. C.) 2 F.(2d) 286, 1925 A. M. C. 118; The Spokane (C. C. A.) 294 F. 242, 1924 A. M. C. 56. Upon the pleadings and the proof, negligence on the part of the employees or owner is fully sustained; and it also appears that the employees were unskilled and inexperienced, and incompetent in building and moving or changing scaffolding, and that such negligence and incompetence is the proximate cause of libelant’s injury. No confirmation is needed by application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur.
For eases under this rule, see 8 Enc. of United States Supreme Court Reports, p. 889; In re Reichert Towing Line (C. C. A.) 251 F. 214, 216, 217; The Marschall (C. C. A. 2) 294 F. 824, 1924 A. M. C. 144; American Shipbuilding Co. v. Lorenski (C. C. A.) 204 F. 39; Chambers v. American Tin Plate Co., 129 F. 561, 64 C. C. A. 129; Atlas Powder Co. v. Benson (C. C. A.) 287 F. 797; 1 Thomp. Negl. § 15; 20 R. C. L. 187; San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89, 99, 32 S. Ct. 399, 56 L. Ed. 680; The Zulia (D. C.) 235 F. 433, 436, 438, 439; Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U. S. 233, 33, S. Ct. 416, 57 L. Ed. 815, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 905; Sorenson v. Alaska S. S. Co. (D. C.) 243 F. 280, 282; Graaf v. Vulcan Iron Works, 59 Wash. 325, 327, 109 P. 1016; Griffin v. Boston & Albany R. Co., 148 Mass. 145, 19 N. E. 166, 1 L. R. A. 698, 12 Am. St. Rep. 526; Lucid v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. (C. C. A.) 199 F. 377, 380, L. R. A. 1917E, 182; Delaware & H. Co. v. Dix (C. C. A.) 188 F. 901, 904; Anderson v. McCarthy Dry Goods Co., 49 Wash. 398, 95 P. 325, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 931, 126 Am. St. Rep. 870; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law (2d Ed.) 512; 6 Thompson, Com. on Law of Negligence, §§ 7635, 7636; Uggla v. Brokaw, 117 App. Div. 586, 102 N. Y. S. 857; Kaples v. Orth, 61 Wis. 531, 21 N. W. 633; Morris v. Strobel & Wilken Co., 81 Hun, 1, 30 N. Y. S. 571; The Joseph B. Thomas (D. C.) 81 F. 578; Taylor v. Peckham, 8 R. I. 349, 91 Am. Dec. 235, 5 Am. Rep. 578; Volkmar v. Manhattan R. Co., 134 N. Y. 418, 31 N. E. 870, 30 Am. St. Rep. 678; Salisbury v. Herchenroder, 106 Mass. 458, 8 Am. Rep. 354; Scheider v. American Bridge Co., 78 App. Div. 163, 79 N. Y. S. 634; Mentz v. Schieren, 36 Misc. Rep. 813, 74 N. Y. S. 889; McCauley v. Norcross, 155 Mass. 584, 30 N. E. 464; Weller v. McCormick, 52 N. J. Law, 470, 19 A. 1101, 8 L. R. A. 798; Schnizer v. Phillips, 108 App. Div. 17, 95 N. Y. S. 478; Hammarberg v. St. Paul & T. Lumber Co., 19 Wash. 537, 53 P. 727; Inland & Sea Board Coasting Co. v. Tolson, 139 U. S. 551, 11 S. Ct. 653, 35 L. Ed. 270; Adams v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453; Connolly v. Des Moines Inv. Co., 130 Iowa, 633, 105 N. W. 400; Weber v. Lieberman, 47 Misc. Rep. 593, 94 N. Y. S. 460; Lubelsky v. Silverman, 49 Misc. Rep. 133, 96 N. Y. S. 1056; 6 Current Law, 772; Williams v. Spokane Falls & N. R. Co., 39 Wash. 77, 80 P. 1100; 3 Thompson’s Com. on Law of Negligence, § 2754; La Bee v. Sultan Logging Co., 47 Wash. 57, 60, 91 P. 560, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 405; Id., 51 Wash. 81, 82, 97 P. 1104; Cleary v. General Contracting Co., 53 Wash. 254, 101 P. 888; Wodnik v. Luna Park Amusement Co., 69 Wash. 638, 641, 125 P. 941, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1070; 1 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (5th Ed.) § 59; Russell v. Seattle, Renton, etc., R. Co., 47 Wash. 500, 92 P. 288; Connell v. Seattle, Renton, etc., R. Co., 47 Wash. 510, 92 P. 377; Walters v. Seattle, Renton, etc., R. Co., 48 Wash. 233, 93 P. 419, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 788; Pate v. Columbia & P. S. R. Co., 52 Wash. 166, 100 P. 324; Harris v. Puget Sound E. Co., 52 Wash. 289, 100 P. 838; Southern R. Co. v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, 34 S. Ct. 566, 58 L. Ed. 860; Stair v. Kane (C. C. A.) 156 F. 100; Wabash Screen Door Co. v. Black (C. C. A.) 126 F. 721; Central R. Co. v. Peluso (C. C. A.) 286 F. 661; Firebaugh v. Seattle E. Co., 40 Wash. 658, 82 P. 995, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 836, 111 Am. St. Rep. 990; Briglio v. Holt & Jeffery, 85 Wash. 155 (9), 147 P. 877; Tubb v. City of Seattle, 136 Wash. 332, 239 P. 1009; St. Germain v. Potlatch L. Co., 76 Wash. 102, 135 P. 804; Frescoln v. Puget Sound Traction, L. & P. Co., 90 Wash. 59, 155 P. 395.
The libelant, while in the employ of the-contractor, had a cause of action against the-owner, as well as the contractor. The Thomas P. Beal (D. C.) 295 F. 877; West Ison-Grays Harbor Stevedore Co. v. Fountain (C. C. A.) 5 F.(2d) 385, 1925 A. M. C. 961; Hamburg A. P. A. G. v. Gye (C. C. A.) 207 F. 247, Munsey, 5 F.(2d) 58, 1925 A. M. C. 656; The Marshall (Pleckaitis v. Henrik Ostervolze Docking Co. [C. C. A.]) 294 F. 824, 1924 A. M. C. 144; McEachern v. Rothschild & Co.,
It is clear from what has been said that judgment must go in favor of the libelant. Is the contractor liable to the owner? The contract in evidence provides, among other things: “The contractor is to fully protect the ship' and owners against any and all claims for injury to workmen engaged by him * ■ *' in carrying out work on the vessel.”
The provisions of the contract do not specifically indemnify the owner against his ■own negligence. Indemnity contracts are not construed against the negligence of the indemnitee unless it clearly so appears. 5 Elliott on Contracts, See. 4007. Such contracts should be strictly construed (C. J. 43), the intention being to provide against loss occasioned by the party’s own conduct, over which the indemnified has no control, and not acts of negligence of the indemnitee, who has sole control of his own actions and of his agents or employees. North American Ry. Const. Co. v. Cincinnati Traction Co. (C. C. A.) 172 F. 214. See Perry v. Payne, 217 Pa. 252, 66 A. 553, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1173, 10 Ann. Cas. 589. And the amount of the contract ($20,404) should be considered, and fair results, and not harsh and unreasonable, should be presumed. The contractor had no authority or control over the servants of the owner, and in the absence of specific language the court may not extend the general provisions to include acts of the owner or its agents. Mitchell v. Southern Ry. Co., 124 Ky. 146, 74 S. W. 216, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2388. See, also, Manhattan Ry. Co. v. Cornell, 54 Hun, 292, 7 N. Y. S. 557, affirmed 130 N. Y. 637, 29 N. E. 151; Houston & T. C. R. v. Diamond Press Brick Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 188 S. W. 32; San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Adams, 6 Tex. Civ. App. 102, 24 S. W. 839; Marshall v. Maryland, etc., R. R. Co., 1 W. W. Harr (Del.) 170, 112 A. 526; Mynard v. Syracuse, 71 N. Y. 180, 27 Am. Rep. 28; Dingledy Lbr. Co. v. Erie R. Co., 102 Ohio St. 236, 131 N. E. 723.
The contractor was bound to furnish libelant a reasonably safe place in which to. work. This duty was discharged until the place was made unsafe by the owner, for which act, in the absence of specific stipulations, the owner is liable. Liability in rem is not necessarily coextensive with personal liability of the owner; hence the suggestion that stipulation in issue is meaningless unless applied here is without force.
The disclosed physical condition of libelant and the pain and suffering endured, and reasonable probability of continuance, warrant a judgment of $25,000. Formal judgment against the United States for this sum, together with interest from date of entry, may be presented.
