74 Mo. 594 | Mo. | 1881
The demurrer to the evidence, was well taken. The injuries occurring, as they did, within the corporate limits of a city, it devolved on plaintiff, in order that he might recover, to show that the actual negligence of the railroad company caused such injuries; (Lloyd v. Railroad Co., 49 Mo. 199; Swearingen v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 73;) as in cases like the present one, the law raises no inference of negligence from the mere fact of the animal being killed on the railroad track. Wier v. Railroad Co., 48 Mo. 558; Calvert v. Railroad Co., 34 Mo. 242. We find no evidence in this record which, in the light of the authorities already cited, shows the defendant to be liable, since it does not appear what distance the colts were in advance of the train when first seen upon the track, nor that after they came upon the track they could have been seen by the agents of defendant in time to prevent the accident.
As a matter of law, no rate of speed at which a train is being run constitutes negligence per se. Maher v. Railroad Co., 64 Mo. 267. The circumstances of each particular case must be considered; negligence is altogether a relative term, and the question in cases of this sort is whether, when the stock is discovered on the track, the company could, without imperiling the persons or property entrusted to it for transportation, avoid injury to the stock. Whenever, in such circumstances, the injury can be avoided after the danger is discovered, then the company will be j ustly chargeable with culpable negligence, and not before. Pryor v. Railroad Co., 69 Mo. 215. Nor does the failure to ring the bell or sound the whistle constitute negligence per se; there must appear to be some necessary connection between the failure and the injury. Holman v. Railroad Co., 62 Mo. 562. It follows from the foregoing that the