174 Mo. App. 110 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1913
This is an action upon a policy of insurance. Plaintiff recovered, and defendant prosecutes the appeal.
The cause originated before a justice of the peace, and was instituted by plaintiff, Joseph Wallace, a brother of the insured, and one John Collins, an undertaker. They recovered before the justice, and the defendant duly appealed to the circuit court, where a trial was had before the court and a jury. During the trial the cause was dismissed as to said Collins, and proceeded to verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff, Joseph Wallace, respondent in this court.
The policy in question was issued August 23, 1909, insuring the life of Wiliam L. Wallace in the sum of $176, in consideration of a weekly payment of ten cents. It provided that, in case of the death of the insured within six months after the issuance of the policy, only one-half of the benefits thereunder should be payable. The insured died on or about
The evidence shows that plaintiff was present at the time the policy in question was issued to the insured through one Taylor, an agent of the defendant company, that the insured wanted the policy made payable to plaintiff, and he and plaintiff requested that it be so issued, but the agent told them that this was unnecessary, saying, “the holder of every policy gets the money; you will get the money, all you have to do is to have the policy.” It was shown .that the agent solicited the insurance, delivered the policy, and collected the weekly premiums thereunder, and that the insured and plaintiff dealt solely with him in the premises. The plaintiff kept the policy until the death of his brother, when he went to Collins, the undertaker, and arranged with him to bury the insured, turning over the policy to him as security for the payment of tbe funeral expenses. The undertaker, at the instance and request of plaintiff, buried the deceased at an expense of $86.50, and through him proofs of death were furnished defendant and demand made for the payment of the amount - due under the policy. The defendant refused to pay the amount due under the policy either to Collins or to plaintiff, but tendered to the latter two dollars and some cents, the amount of tbe premiums paid thereon.
, Luring the trial in the circuit court, plaintiff asked leave to amend the statement upon which the cause was tried in the justice court, by inserting allegations to the effect that the defendant in issuing the policy, had, through its authorized agent, agreed with insured and plaintiff that in the event of the death of the insured the amount of the policy would be paid to plaintiff, Joseph Wallace, on production of the receipt book and policy. The court refused to permit this amendment, but admitted proof of the conversation with the agent, above mentioned.
I. We need not set out the statement originally filed in the justice court and upon which the cause was tried. The point that plaintiff could not recover upon the policy in evidence, under the allegations of the statement, is not well taken. In a cause originating before a justice of the peace formal pleadings are not required, and much latitude is allowed in the statement of the cause of action.' It is well settled by a long line of decisions that a statement before a justice of the peace is sufficient (1) if it affords reasonable notice to the defendant of the claim relied on, and (2) is sufficiently definite to operate as-a bar to another suit on the same cause of action. [See Lord & Bushnell Co. v. Railroad, 155 Mo. App. 175, 134 S. W. 111; Guaranty Interior Fixture Co. v. Baseball Co., 152 Mo. App. 601, 133 S. W. 849; Union Brewing Co. v. Ehlhardt, 139 Mo. App. 129, 120 S. W. 1193.] The statement before us is sufficient in these two respects, and the plaintiff was entitled thereunder to have his right to recover on the policy adjudicated, without the necessity of amending it.
II. The alleged error in admitting the testimony concerning the conversation had with defendant’s agent, when the policy was issued and delivered, involves the question of the authority of the agent to bind the defendant company by any such oral agreement or representations in the premises, as well as the point made that such testimony tends to vary or
This question has been recently passed upon by this court in Jones v. Insurance Company, 173 Mo. App. 1, wherein the court, speaking through Nortoni, J., said: “If it were competent for James to induce the insurance and collect the premiums and deliver the policy therefor, it was certainly competent for him to waive the condition of the policy, which waiver alone rendered the insurance valid to the use contemplated and which he utilized to the end of negotiating it. [See Wagaman v. Security, etc. L. Ins. Co., 110 Mo. App. 616, 85 S. W. 117.] Moreover, in answer to the suggestion that it is not competent as a rule for a mere soliciting agent to either waive such a condition of the policy or estop the company thereabout, the nature and character of the business and the authorized duties of such agents are to be considered. As before stated, the business of industrial insurance is conducted principally among people of the poorer classes, many of
This, we think, applies with full force to the facts of this case, regarding the agent’s authority in the premises.
And the contention that testimony as to the conversation in question was inadmissible as tending to vary or contradict the written contract between the parties is without merit. The policy is not by its terms payable to the executors or administrators absolutely and in any event. The “facility of payment” clause provides that the company may pay to any one in the position of plaintiff, coming within the class there designated. An oral representation or agreement, therefore, that the company would pay plaintiff, provided he had the possession of the policy,
III. It follows that tbe demurrer to tbe evidence was properly overruled. The testimony of plaintiff concerning tbe conversation with defendant’s agent cat the time the policy was issued prima facie established plaintiff’s right to recover thereon. It was for the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witness and the weight of the evidence. It is the contention of appellant that tbe “facility of payment” clause merely gave the company the option to pay to one other than the executors and administrators, and that under the terms of the policy only the executor or administrator can sue to enforce the same. The latter is certainly not true in this case, where there is evidence that defendant’s agent reprensented to plaintiff and the insured that the policy would be paid to plaintiff, if he had possession of it after the death of the insured. Beyond this, we are not concerned with this point, upon which appellant lays so much stress.' We are aware of what this court has said concerning the “facility of payment” clause in such policies in the eases referred to by learned counsel for appellant, but since plaintiff may enforce the policy, as though he were named as beneficiary therein, the effect, in general, of such a provision is immaterial to the determination of the issues in this case.
We may say, however, that defendant has not paid the amount due under the policy to anyone. It is not a case where the company has elected to pay some one appearing’ to be entitled thereto under the ‘£ facility of payment” clause, and asserts this in defense of the action. Its position that it will pay only the executor or administrator comes, we think, with rather bad grace, when, by the very argument advanced by appellant it might have paid either the undertaker who buried deceased, or plaintiff who had the policy
The chief aim and object of this form of insurance is to provide a fund to defray funeral and other expenses attendant upon the last illness of the. insured, and one that will be available when needed for such purposes, and not be subject to the delay incident to administration and to be consumed in the costs and expenses thereof. The amount here involved, exclusive of interest, is eighty-eight dollars. If appellant has any real defense to the policy it has not asserted it, but is standing upon what it conceives to be its right to be sued only by the executor or administrator of deceased. As a result this small fund, instead of being at once available ■ for the payment of the undertaker’s bill, has been the subject of litigation for more than three years. The courts should not lend their sanction to the attitude here assumed by defendant; and it should be the policy of the law, where possible, to enforce such policies of insurance without the necessity of administration.
IV. The point that the instructions submitted the case upon an issue not raised by the pleadings, i. e., whether or not insured and plaintiff were led to believe that the policy would be payable to any one who held it after the death of the insured, is disposed of by what we have said above concerning the statement filed in the justice court.
The ■ second instruction is assailed upon the ground that it submits an issue of law to the jury. The portion of this instruction, with which we are concerned, is as follows:
“The court instructs the jury that if they find from the evidence that at the time William L. Wallace made application for the policy of insurance referred to in the evidence he stated to the agent of the defendant that he desired to have it made payable to his
It is contended that the portion of this instruction which we have italicized above submits a question of law. Appellant construes the language of the instruction to require the jury to find that defendant’s policies “were so payable to the person presenting the same,” etc.; whereas, it is evident that this portion of the instruction refers to the representations of the agent — that is to say, finding the other things mentioned, a recovery is authorized if the jury find that the agent represented that the policy would be payable to plaintiff or any other person who might present it, and represented that the policies issued by defendant- were so payable, etc. But were we to accept appellant’s construction thereof, which indeed would make it submit a question of law to the jury, we are unable to understand how appellant could possibly have been prejudiced thereby. It would simply require the jury to find more than was necessary to be found to entitle plaintiff to recover, and could not be error prejudicial to appellant.
Y. • The appeal appears to be wholly without merit. We are asked to assess the statutory penalty of ten per cent as for vexatious appeal, under section 2084, Revised Statutes 1909. Our conclusion is, that it is a case coming within the purview of 'that statute. No defense whatsoever on the merits is suggested, and we can find no just or reasonable ground for the appeal, inasmuch as the judgment below in favor of plaintiff would have fully protected appellant from