42 F. 812 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Mississippi | 1890
The questions now presented for decision arise upon the demurrer of Edward Godfrey, R. C. Kyle, James Tyson, and W. J. Kyle, defendants in this cause, to complainant’s bill. The bill, in substance, states that, in the year 1851, Sam Stone and Cynthia Ruffin, with the consent of their master, they both then being slaves, were, in the state state of Tennessee, lawfully married; that m the year 1852 the complainant, Candis Wallace, was, as the fruit of said marriage, born, being the legitimate child of said Sam Stone and Cynthia Ruffin, as far as the same could be under the laws of the state of Tennessee, where her parents then lived, and where she was born; that some months after her birth her mother died; that her father, said Sam Stone, ever afterwards, and up to his death, recognized and treated her as his law/ful child, as much so as could be done under his condition as a slave, and under the laws of said state; that complainant and her father remained slaves until emancipated by the thirteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, and continued to reside in said state as citizens thereof until some time
The question thus raised, and which has been ably argued by the learned counsel on all sides, is of first impression in this court, and, in some respects, in any other court to which I have been referred. The validity of the marriage between the complainant’s parents, and the legitimacy of complainant as their child, must depend upon the statutes-of the state of Tennessee, where the marriage took .place,1 and where the parties resided when the act of May 26, 1866, was passed, and became a law as construed by the supreme court of that state, and upon the statutes of this state on the subject of descent of real’estate of persons dying
I have been referred to but two decisions made by the- supreme court of Tennessee in reference to the subject of marriage between slaves while they were such, and as to the effect of the act of 1866. The first is the case of McReynolds v. State, 5 Cold. 18. This was a case in which the defendant -was indicted for the crime of bigamy. The defendant while a slave married a woman who was also a slave at the time. Thejr lived together as husband and wife until after the emancipation act, when he abandoned his wife, and married another colored woman. For this marriage he was indicted. It was held by the court in that .case that while a slave he was incapable of making a valid contract, and that the marriage was void, and that it wras his privilege to treat it as a nullity as soon as he was capable of making a valid contract; yet, if he continued to live with the woman he had married when a slave, after emancipation, it was a ratification of the marriage. A mutual recognition of each other, after the emancipation, as husband and wife, completes the act of matrimony between those who had been married according to the custom of marriage between slaves during the time of slavery. Under this decision, the mother of the complainant having died before the emancipation," the legitimacy as the heir at-law of her father could not be maintained.
But this question came before the supreme court again in the case of Andrews v. Page, 3 Heisk. 653. The facts in that case were as follows: On the 3d day of December, 1857, (the statement in the report by mistake puts it 1867,) Henry Page, a free man of color, bought of the complainant three slaves, said to be his wife and two children, for the sum of $3,200, and took a bill of sale from the complainant, the vendor. Henry paid part of the purchase money, and was to pay the residue in one, two, and three years; and having absconded privately, and left the country to parts unknown, as the bill alleged, an attachment in chancery was issued and levied upon the real estate of Page, to recover the unpaid purchase money. The bill was filed in January, 1861. Henry Page died in October, 1864. No further steps had been taken in the cause" until February, 1866, when a decree was rendered in favor of the complainant for the balance due in August, 1866, at which time Dilly Page, the widow of Henry, and his children, filed a petition to reopen the case, which was granted. The widow set up her claim to dower in the lands,, and the children set up-their claims, as heirs at law, all of which claims were “resisted by the complainant. The court examined the case with great care, and Justice Nelson delivered an elaborate opinion, in which it was held that the general doctrine held in the slave states, that the-municipal law did not hold as valid marriages between slaves, had not prevailed, in the state of Tennessee, and in that particular overruled the ease of McReynolds v. State. The court further held that the power to
I understand this decision of the supreme court of Tennessee, and the last one on the subject, to hold: (1) That marriages between slaves in Tennessee, which would have been valid under the common law but for the restrictions growing out of the institution of slavery, were valid marriages, as far as the condition of the parties as slaves would permit, and that the children born of such marriages were not bastards, but legitimate, and capable of inheriting the property of their parents, as far as that could be done under the law. (2) That the purpose of the act of 1866 and its legal effect was to give to such marriages full effect so far as might be without interfering with vested rights; and to give to the children, born of such marriages, while slaves, all the inheritable rights to which they would have been entitled had their parents been legally married white persons. Henry Page died in 1864, before the act of 1866 was passed, though their master was their father, and a portion of them must have been born while Andrew's was their owner. Notwithstanding this, they were declared, under the provisions of the act of 1866, to be the heirs at law of their father, and entitled to an inheritance in his estate. The legislature, at the time this act of 1866 was passed, passed another act, directing that all administrators and other persons having money in their hands, to which children of parents married when slaves, and the children born in slavery, aside from slavery, would have been entitled, shall pay the same over to such children; which shows the intention of the legislature to have been to place such marriages and children in the position of lawfully married persons, and their children as born in lawfful wedlock, and entitled to inherit the estate of their parents. Under this construction of the act of 1866, and its effect, I am of opinion that as to slave parents, when one of them died during slavery, the meaning of the act is that such parents shall be held as having been lawfully married, as husband and wife, and their children born of such marriages their legitimate children, and entitled to an inheritance of their parents’ estate, when they may have died intestate.