Deanna Della Vedova WALL, Appellee, v. L. Stanley WALL, Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Decided Dec. 9, 1987.
534 A.2d 465
Argued Sept. 25, 1987.
Accordingly, on October 15, 1987, we entered orders denying the relief requested by the petitiоners and dissolved the stays previously entered.
Former Justice HUTCHINSON did not participate in the consideration or decision of these cases.
LARSEN and ZAPPALA, JJ., dissent.
Harvey A. Zalevsky, Greensburg, for appellee.
Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, MCDERMOTT, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.
OPINION
NIX, Chief Justice.
Appellee, Deanna Della Vedova Wall, filed a Complaint in Divorсe under section 201(d) of the 1980 Divorce Code1 (“Code“),
The bаsic argument of appellant is predicated upon the ground that section 206 of the Code,
§ 206. Proceedings to determine marital status
When the validity of any marriage shall be denied or doubted, either or both of the parties to the marriage may bring an action for a declaratory judgment seeking a declaration of the validity or invalidity of the marriage, and, upon due proof of the validity or invalidity thereof, it shall be declared valid or invalid by decree of such court, and unless reversed upon appeal, such declaration shall be conclusive upon all persons concerned. (Emphasis added.)
The above-italicized statutory language would suggest that an order in a proceeding brought under that section is a final one and therefore appealable. Appellant attempts to bolster this contention by noting that under the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act,
Plaintiff sued for a divorce and other relief. A condition precedent to a grant of the divorce was the finding of a valid marriage. However, finding a valid marriage did not resolve the plaintiff‘s cause of action for a divorce, alimony and property distribution. The question of whether the declaration as to the validity of the marriagе is a final order must thus be resolved in accordance with the standards and policies addressing interlocutory appeals. Viewing the issue in these terms persuades us that the Superior Court correctly characterized the order as nоn-appealable.
In Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985), we noted our approval of the approach of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), that “looks beyond the technical effect of the adjudication to its practical ramifications.” 509 Pa. at 94, 501 A.2d at 214. We also noted our disfavor of a policy that allows piecemeal appeals, because in our view:
[A] policy which allows piecemeal appeals from a single case serves only to increase the cost of litigation, and favors the party with the greater resources, who can strategically delay the action at the expense of the indigent party.
See, Stevenson v. General Motors Corp., 513 Pa. 411, 521 A.2d 413, 416 (1987); Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 75, 394 A.2d 542, 545-6 (1978); Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 289, 365 A.2d 147, 155 (1976); Piltzer v. Independence Federal Savings and Loan Association of Philadelphia, 456 Pa. 402, 406, 319 A.2d 677, 678 (1974); Estate of Marino, 440 Pa. 492, 494, 269 A.2d 645, 646 (1970); Adcox v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Casualty Insurance Co., 419 Pa. 170, 175, 213 A.2d 366, 368 (1965); Werner v. Commonwealth, Department of Highways, 416 Pa. 356, 359, 206 A.2d 317, 319 (1965); Winnet v. Brenner, 409 Pa. 150, 152, 185 A.2d 318, 319 (1962); McGee v. Singley, 382 Pa. 18, 22, 114 A.2d 141, 143 (1955); Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649, 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954);
In the present appeal our assessment of practical ramifications and the policy considerations persuades us that the order finding a valid marriage is non-appealable prior to an adjudication of the plaintiff‘s entitlement to a divorce and attendant requests for property distribution, alimony and costs. The practical effect of allowing separate appeals on issues that are not ultimate issues in the lawsuit engenders delay in the final resolution of the matter, whеre the prompt disposition may be critical to the physical, mental and social well-being of the parties.
Our decision today reflects the policy of law which abhors “piecemeal determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.” Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 649, 107 A.2d 854, 855 (1954). See also Marino Estate, 440 Pa. 492, 494, 269 A.2d 645, 646 (1970). The avoidance of unduly protracted divorce proceedings is consistent with the legislature‘s intent to mitigate harm to the spouses and their children during this emotionally taxing experience.
By its nature, divorce is аn action that has a unique impact upon the lives of the parties to that action as well as the lives of those who will be unalterably affected by the outcome. See generally, Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution 37-41 (1985); Kaslow, Stages of Divorce: A Psychological Perspective, 25 Vill.L.Rev. 718, 726 (1979-1980). The views expressed herein are unquestionably consistent with the expressed intent of the Code. The prompt judicial resolution of these issues focusses “primary consideration [upon] the welfare of the family rather than the vindication of private rights...“,
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed and the appeal is quashed.
HUTCHINSON, former J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion.
ZAPPALA, Justice, dissenting.
I must dissent from the majority‘s holding that the Appellant‘s appeal from the trial court‘s finding that a valid common-law marriage existed between the parties is prema
The majority‘s conclusion rests solely upon the nature of the aсtion which initiated the dispute between the parties as to the existence of a marriage. Citing
The majority‘s holding improperly premises the finality and appealability of an order relating to the validity of a marriage upon the nature of the proceeding, rather than its substantive effect. The effect of the trial court‘s order in this case is the same whiсh results from one entered in a declaratory judgment action. The relief sought and obtained by the Appellant in the trial court is identical to that requested in a declaratory judgment action—a determination as to the marriage‘s validity. The majority would have the Appellant file an action separate from the divorce action originated by the Appellee to insure the finality of the judgment. The duplicative nature and unnecessary expense of such a proceeding are abhorrent to the concept of avoiding piecemeal litigation and increased litigation costs which the majority uses in an attempt to support its holding.
The majority views the trial court‘s order as a mere decision as to a particular legal issue without a final resolution of each of the Appellee‘s economic claims. But, the very rights and obligations created under the law from which the Appellee seeks to benefit necessarily arise out of and are attendant to the existence of a marital relationship. While the trial court‘s finding did not resolve the Appellee‘s
It is absurd to burden the Appellant with the expense of defending eсonomic claims arising out of a relationship which may not exist. The policy concerns expressed in Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985) for the social and emotional well-being of the parties are not compelling when the existence of the marriage itsеlf is challenged. Indeed, the prompt disposition of that issue is more critical to the parties’ well-being for the existence of a marriage has its own grave legal and social consequences. Fried was based upon the presumption that the individuals are in fact spouses. In the instant case, no such presumption may be made. This is a crucial distinction which dictates a different result. I would not find Fried to be controlling, and note further that the concerns which I expressed in my dissent in that case are exacerbated by the extension of that analysis to the case before us.