75 Ga. 474 | Ga. | 1886
The defendant was indicted for larceny from the house, and was charged with stealing therefrom a bale of cotton, alleged in the indictment to be worth fifty dollars. On the trial, it was proved that the cotton was sold for thirty-
(1.) That the defendant had the possession of the cotton, and that his employer had not, and hence, if he was guilty of any offense, it was larceny after a trust, or embezzlement, and not larceny from the house.
(2.) That although the bill of indictment charged him with a felony, yet the evidence showed, if it established any crime at all, that he was guilty of a misdemeanor, and that the misdemeanor was barred by the statute of limitations ; and that the judge erred in refusing so to charge..
(3.) That there was error in instructing the jury, that the evidence of accomplices in cases of misdemeanor did not require corroboration, in order to justify the jury in convicting on it.
1. If the cotton stolen had never been in the possession of. the prosecutor, or if the defendant had Iona fide acquired possession of it as a bailee, unless there had been a breaking of bulk or some other rupture of the condition
2 The point made as to the statute of limitations is covered by Clark's case, 12 Ga., 350, 352, in which it was held, 1 hat the statute applied to the offense for which the defendant was indicted, and not to any minor offense included therein, of which he might be found guilty on the traverse of that indictment.
3. There is no complaint of the judge’s charge as to the corroboration of the testimony of accomplices required to convict in felony cases. In the absence of any exception, it must be presumed that the jury received proper instructions upon this question. The objection here is, that the judge charged that such corroboration was not essential, if the j ury should be of opinion that the offense amounted to nothing more than a misdemeanor. There is no error in this instruction. Parsons' case, 43 Ga., 197, 199; Hammack's case, 52 Ga., 398, 403. Were it essential to maintain this conviction, we do not think it would be difficult to show that the accomplices who testified in this case are not without sufficient corroboration from other witnesses and unquestioned circumstances deposed to by those who are subject to no such discredit.
Judgment affirmed.