SMITH v. STATE
2017 Ark. 236 | 523 S.W.3d 354
Supreme Court of Arkansas
of the judgment had it been 1known at the time of trial. See Smith v. State, 2017 Ark. 236, 523 S.W.3d 354. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proсeeding would have been different. Scott v. State, 2017 Ark. 199, 520 S.W.3d 262. Jones fails to establish that the withheld evidence was material or prejudicial.
Although Jones contends that his attоrney would have brought a different defense were Ferguson‘s confession available, Jones does not identify an alternative defense that might have been employed. Jones also ignores the fact that Ferguson‘s alleged confession was not to Killingsworth‘s murder; rather, he confessed only to burglаry. Moreover, even Jones recognizes that Ferguson implicated Jones in the murder. Ferguson‘s presence at the scene of the crime would have only marginally strengthened the credibility of Jones‘s testimony that Ferguson committed the burglary. Worse than that for Jones‘s sake, the testimony would have dirеctly contradicted Jones‘s testimony that Ferguson committed the murder. Ferguson‘s alleged confession would also have contradicted Jones‘s defense that Ferguson participated in both the burglary and the murder. In whole, if there was the alleged confession by Ferguson to the burglary only, and the State failed to disclose it, its absence was more favorable to Jones than to the State.
In sum, Jones fails to establish that the withheld evidence was mаterial or so prejudicial to the defense that the error would have prevented rendition of the judgment.
Petitions denied.
Charles Jerry WALKER, Tiffany Lognion, and Alphonso Wynn, Individuаlly and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons, Appellants v. WILMOE CORP., Appellee
No. CV-17-227
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion Delivered: November 30, 2017
2017 Ark. 340
Omavi Shukur, Little Rock, for appellant.
Williams & Anderson, PLC, by: Heather G. Zachary, Philip E. Kaplan, David M. Powell, Little Roсk, and Alec Gaines, for appellee.
1Charles Jerry Walker, Tiffany Lognion, and Alphonso Wynn, individually and on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons, appeal from the denial of their motion for class certification in litigation against appellee Wilmoe Corp. Appellants аrgue that the trial court abused its discretion by delving into the merits, that the pleadings and evidence demonstrate that the class should be certified, and thаt the trial court acted without due consideration of applicable case law. We affirm.
(1) Any and all persons who have owed, currently owe, or will incur debts to Wilmoe Corp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop pursuant to pawn transactions with Wilmoe Corp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop within five years of June 2, 2011, and continuing up through until judgment may be rendered in this matter; and
(2) Any and all persons who have owed, currently owe, or will incur debts to Wilmoe Cоrp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop pursuant to pawn transactions with Wilmoe Corp. d/b/a National Pawn Shop within one year of June 2, 2011, and continuing up through and until judgment may be rendered in this matter in which: 1) the amount financed exceeds $75.00 and the finance charge exceeds $7.50; or 2) the finance charge еxceeds $5.00.
Appellee opposed certification of the classes. At a hearing on the motion, appellee argued that nо class could be certified because no class existed and that the requirements of
The determination that the class-certification criteria have been satisfied is a matter within the broad discretion of the trial court, and this court will not reverse the trial court‘s decision absent an abuse of that discretion. ChartOne, Inc. v. Raglon, 373 Ark. 275, 283 S.W.3d 576 (2008). In reviewing a class-certification order, this court focuses on the evidence in the record to determinе whether it supports the trial court‘s conclusion regarding certification. Id. Neither the trial court nor this court shall delve into the merits of the underlying clаims when deciding whether the
The proposed class must be susceptible to precise definition, and before a class can be certified under
Appellees argued belоw and argue again on appeal that the class cannot be ascertained because no class exists. Al-though
With respect to class definition, it is axiomatic that for a class to be certified, a class must exist. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bryant, 374 Ark. 38, 53, 285 S.W.3d 634, 645 (2008). Furthermore, for a class to be sufficiently defined, the identity of thе class members must be ascertainable by reference to objective criteria. Id.
4In Southwestern Bell Yellow Pages, Inc. v. Pipkin Enterprises, Inc., 359 Ark. 402, 198 S.W.3d 115 (2004), the plaintiffs filed a class-action complaint in which they alleged that the defendant charged usurious rates of interest. The circuit court certified a class defined as: “All Arkansas customers of Defendants who paid or were charged usurious interest charges since November 15, 1997.” This court reversed the class certification, holding that certification was improper because the trial court would be required to determine whether the rates charged constituted usury before it would be able to determine whether a proposed plaintiff qualified for inclusion in the class.
Although the class dеfinitions in the instant case do not require a determination of whether potential plaintiffs paid or were charged usurious interest charges, this is not the only issue to be determined as part of this action. The class definitions require potential plaintiffs to have incurred a debt arising out of pawn trаnsactions with National Pawn Shop. Here, appellee contends that no loans were ever made and, by extension, no one ever incurred a debt pursuant to pawn transactions with National Pawn Shop. Thus, the circuit court would be required to determine one of the ultimate issues in the сase—whether a debt was incurred—before it could be determined whether prospective plaintiffs could properly be included in either оf the proposed classes. As in Southwestern Bell, the definitions of the proposed classes are not based on objective criteria. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to certify the classes.
Affirmed.
ARCH STREET PAWN SHOP, LLC, and Rocky Carter, Appellants v. Anita GUNN and Maurice Spencer, Appellees
No. CV-17-182
Supreme Court of Arkansas
Opinion Delivered: November 30, 2017
2017 Ark. 341