165 Ark. 276 | Ark. | 1924
(after stating the facts). Counsel for appellants concede that the sole question is whether the deed of trust from H. A. Mashburn to J. F. Walker, as trustee, includes advancements made by the mortgagee to T. E. Whitmore, who was the grantee of H. A. Mash-burn, the original mortgagor.
The clause which is claimed to have that effect is copied in our statement of facts, and need not be repeated here. It recites that the deed of trust «hall be security for any other indebtedness that may be owing by the grantor to said American Trust Company np to the time of the foreclosure of the deed of trust.
Counsel for appellants claim that this language is sufficiently comprehensive to include subsequent advancements made by the mortgagee to Y. E. Whitmore. We do not think so. The word “grantor,” as used in the clause in question, both in its legal meaning and in its common acceptation, refers to the persons executing the deed of trust, of which the- clause in question is a part. It would be a stretch of the meaning of the word “grantor,” far beyond this, to make it refer to Y. E. Whitmore, who was not a party to the original deed of trust, and who simply acquired the property by mesne conveyances from H. A. Mashburn. If the bank had made any other advancements prior to the time of the foreclosure of the mortgage, the clause in question could cover them, because Mashburn is the grantor named and referred to in the instrument. Whitmore could in no sense be said to come within the meaning of the word “grantor,” as used in the original deed of trust. Therefore the chancellor properly held that the original deed of trust from Mashburn to the bank could not be foreclosed for subsequent advances made by the bank to Whitmore.
We think, however, the court erred in taxing the costs of the suit against Whitmore. The chancellor properly held that Y. E. Whitmore was liable for the amount due under the deed of trust from H. A. Mashburn to the bank; but the evidence shows clearly that Whitmore borrowed from a friend sufficient money to pay off this mortgage indebtedness, including the interest, and tendered the amount thereof to J. F. Walker, the vice president of the bank, who was handling the transaction. Walker refused the tender.
It appears from the record that, when the amount of said indebtedness was tendered to J. F. Walker, he stated that Mr. Poe was handling the matter, and refused the money. Poe was the attorney for the bank, and Y. E. Whitmore and the assistant cashier -of another bank went to Mr. Poe’s office. They tendered the money to Tom Poe, and he said that he had no authority to accept it. He is the son of Sam Poe, and a member of the firm handling the matter for the bank. Tom Poe said that he had no authority to accept the tender. He knew that Mr. Walker would not accept it, and knew that his father, Sam Poe, would not accept it unless the whole debt was paid.
As above stated, Tom Poe was a member of the firm instituting the foreclosure suit for the bank against Y. E. Whitmore and his codefendants. Whitmore, on cross-examination, stated that he was keeping the tender good, and offered to pay the first mortgage at. that time. The attorney and agent of the bank refused the tender unless Whitmore would pay the subsequent advances which the bank had made to him. The law never requires a vain or useless thing to be done. The action of the agents of the bank was, in effect, a refusal of the tender. Dickinson v. Atkins, 132 Ark. 84; Read’s Drug Store v. Hessig-Ellis Drug Co., 93 Ark. 487; and Thompson v. Baxter, 76 Ark. 326.
It is evident that the tender was not accepted because Whitmore failed to include in it the amount owed by him to the bank, which, as we have already seen, was not covered by the mortgage.
Therefore the decree of the court below will be modified so as to require appellants to pay all costs accruing after the tender was made, provided the tender is kept good and the money paid into the court within ten days, and, as modified, the decree will be affirmed.
