254 Pa. 220 | Pa. | 1916
Opinion by
A clear understanding of this case, and the manner in which it was tried, can best be had from an examination of the elaborate charge of the trial judge; in presenting to the jury the issues involved, he said: “May L. Walker is the plaintiff; T. W. Walker and the Walker Grape Products Company are the defendants. The suit is an action in ejecMent to recover the possession of a certain piece of land.......Prior to June, 1911, this property belonged to the Streuber heirs; at that time...... there were negotiations......looking to its purchase ......for the purpose of establishing a grape juice factory......and the property was purchased in the name of T. W. Walker, for $20,000......, ($2,000 was paid down); a mortgage was negotiated from J. F. Downing
After outlining the evidence, as just stated, the charge
The trial judge next called the jurors’ attention to “some circumstances tending to discredit” the testimony relied upon by the plaintiff; after which he said: “Mrs. Walker’s claim, if she has any, is second to the Downing mortgage; that will have to be paid in any event, because it is a lien on the property, and it was understood at the time of this purchase that there was to be a mortgage placed upon it to Mr. Downing, there is no question about that.” Then he referred to the fact that the property had been conveyed, subject to this $25,000 mortgage, by Mr. T. W. Walker to the corporation defendant named with him, and added, “The deed to the corpora
On the questions of the expenditures made upon the real estate, and their payment, the charge is full and adequate; referring thereto, the trial judge, inter alia, said: “Now have the defendants been reimbursed for the expenditures made on this real estate? There is no evidence tending to show that Mrs. Walker was ever concerned in the grape juice business, so if they invested money in the business, not as a part of the real estate, she is not bound for those investments; - but for what
Then, considering the other side, the charge proceeds: “Mrs, Walker contends, and the evidence for the plaintiff tends to show, that she expended some money there in clearing up and in improving the buildings”; after which the trial judge makes some fair comments upon . and references to the testimony, and states a correct enumeration of items with which the respective parties should be charged and credited in stating an account between them; following this the jury was told: “Taking what you find T. W. Walker paid out in improving the property, and what was paid out by the Grape Products Company along the samé line......, and all that they have expended on the faith of the real estate, not in the business, then taking what they received out of it, including what T. W. Walker got out of it, how does the account stand? Is there a balance due T. W. Walker? ......If there is, you should find a verdict for the defendants; because, before she (the plaintiff) can recover possession of this property, she must reimburse the defendants for what they have honestly expended on the faith of the transaction, so far as the expenditures upon the real estate are concerned.......If you find for the defendants on that ground, that ends this case.” Again returning to the plaintiff’s side of the case the trial judge continued: “It is the theory of the plaintiff that there is a large amount of mesne profits due to Mrs. Walker, and those are claimed......; the expenses of keeping in repair, and taxes and insurance, and all those things, should be deducted and only the net amount of rent should be allowed as mesne profits.......If you find for
The jury rendered a verdict for the plaintiff, but did not award her any damages; the defendants have appealed. They complain because (1) the trial judge refused to give binding instructions in their favor, (2) the court below refused them judgment non obstante veredicto, (3) their motion for a new trial was not granted, (4) of alleged error in a part of the charge submitting to the jury the issues as to “whether T. W. Walker had been reimbursed for all the moneys paid out on account of this trust,” (5) “the court erred in allowing the plaintiff’s counsel to call the attention of the jury to a certain letter, Exhibit 'Z’......, it not having been proved nor offered in evidence.” So far as the first four assignments are concerned, we need only state that, in the performance of our duties as a reviewing tribunal, we have read the 'evidence and are not convinced the issues involved could properly have been withdrawn from the jury, or that any material error was committed in the manner in which they were submitted. It is quite true, “no rule of law is better settled by the decisions of this court than that requiring the evidence in support of a trust to be clear, precise, convincing and satisfactory to the conscience of a chancellor” (Braun v. First German Evangelical Lutheran Church, 198 Pa. 152, 157); but we are not convinced the evidence at bar did not measure up to this standard. That the proofs depended upon fully satisfied the conscience of the learned judge who tried the case, is shown by the following excerpts from the opinion of the court below: “The verdict for the plaintiff, under the charge of the court, implies a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the title to the land in question was taken in the name of the defendant, T. W. Walker, in trust for the plaintiff, that the first
Both sides tried this case on the theory that it was essential to show possession taken by the plaintiff immediately after the purchase of the real estate in controversy; therefore, it is not necessary to enter upon a discussion as to the applicability of that doctrine to the facts at bar, although, under the law as laid down in Galbraith v. Galbraith, 190 Pa. 225, 228; Casciola v. Donatelli, 218 Pa. 624, 630; Ott v. Duffy, 246 Pa. 211, 216, it is not at all clear that any such burden rested upon the present plaintiff; but, however that may be, we cannot say the court below erred in ruling that the evidence was sufficient to show the plaintiff did, in fact, take such possession.
We recently ruled that the refusal of a new trial is not
There is no merit in the last assignment of error. The record shows this entry: “Plaintiff’s counsel offers in evidence the various exhibits from ‘A’ to ‘Z’......Defendant objects......for the reason that they are evidently offered in support of an attempt to establish by parol a trust......Objection overruled, exhibits admitted and exception sealed for defendant.” That in a case of this character a resulting trust may be proved by parol evidence, is too well established to require the citation of authorities, and, apparently, the appellants do not now question the correctness of the original ruling on that score, but contend that subsequent error was committed in connection with Exhibit “Z.” It is apparent from the record that the letter in question was, in fact, admitted in evidence; but it appears that, after the jury had retired, counsel for the defendant moved the exhibit be “stricken from the record and the jury instructed to disregard the same as not competent evidence.” Whereupon, the jurors were recalled; the trial judge stated to them that the exhibit had been “inadvertently admitted,” and struck it from the record. In this connection he said: “In our opinion that letter is not evidence against T. W. Walker; it has not been shown that T. W. Walker ever saw it; it seems to have got in the record with a lot of other letters......; we instruct you to disregard the letter entirely, as if there had not been anything said about it.” It will be observed that when the letter was originally offered there was no objection on any ground other than the general one already referred to; hence, the rule applies that when one specifically states his objection to the admission of evidence, all reasons not enumerated are waived, and on appeal he
Tbe assignments of error are all overruled, and tbe judgment is affirmed.