Lead Opinion
Just a few months ago, we held in Zaldivar v. Prickett,
Does OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) allow the jury to assess a percentage of fault to the non-party employer of a plaintiff who sues a product manufacturer and seller for negligence in failing to warn about a product danger, even though the non-party employer has immunity under OCGA § 34-9-11?
Unless there is a compelling reason to treat nonparty employers with immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act differently than nonparties with other defenses or immunities against liability, Zal-divar requires an affirmative answer to the certified question. We see no such compelling reason, and so, we adhere to Zaldivar and respond to the District Court in the affirmative.
We begin with a brief summary of this litigation. Jock L. Walker was injured at work in August 2010 while he operated a machine that had been designed and manufactured by Tensor Machinery, Ltd. and Tensor Fiber Optic Technologies, Ltd. (collectively, “Tensor”). After reaching a settlement with his employer for workers’ compensation benefits, Walker sued Tensor, alleging that it negligently failed to warn him of safety-related defects in the machine.
Although our opinion in Zaldivar did not focus on this issue, we did have occasion to speak of it in our opinion. The defendant in that case, like Tensor, sought to assign some responsibility to the plaintiff’s employer, and we noted that if the plaintiff had sued his employer (for negligent entrustment),
he might well have lost as a result of comparative negligence ... or as a result of some other affirmative defense (such as the exclusive remedy provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act). But an affirmative defense or immunity does not eliminate “fault” or cut off proximate cause, it only bars liability notwithstanding that the “fault” of the tort-feasor was a proximate cause of the injury in question.
Zaldivar,
Immunity from liability does not prevent an immune party from acting or omitting to act. Rather, immunity shields that party from any liability stemming from that act or omission. There is nothing logically or legally inconsistent about allocating fault but shielding immune parties from liability for that fault. And there is no reason to imagine that the Legislature did not intend fault to be allocated against immune parties, insofar as that allocation can be of no detriment to those parties.
Mack Trucks v. Tackett, 841 S2d 1107, 1114 (III) (a) (Miss. 2003) (footnote omitted). See also Ocasio v. Fed. Express Corp., 33 A3d 1139, 1147 (II) (A) (3) (a) (N.H. 2011) (“[A]llocatingfault to an employer does not destroy, or even affect, the employer’s immunity from suit. Immunity does not mean that a party is not at fault; it simply means
Nevertheless, Walker says, the allocation of fault under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) to nonparty employers with immunity under the Workers’ Compensation Act would upset the careful balance that the General Assembly struck in the Act between the respective interests of employers and employees, and for that reason, Walker urges, OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) cannot reasonably be understood to permit such an allocation of fault. We disagree. The General Assembly has determined that the exclusive remedy provision and limited benefits of the workers’ compensation system, OCGA § 34-9-11, are “the quid pro quo for workers receiving a guarantee of prompt benefits for work-related injuries without regard to fault or common-law defenses and without the delay inherent in tort litigation.” Doss v. Food Lion,
The result of immunizing employers from fault as well as from liability is that third parties pick up the tab for the employer’s fault, potentially paying more than their share in order to make up for the excluded employer.... The question becomes whether the injured plaintiff must see his potential recovery diminished by an assignment of fault to his immune employer or whether a third party defendant may be made to respond in damages in an amount that exceeds that defendant’s proportionate share of fault in causing the injury.... [T]he more equitable result is to permit allocation of fault to the exempt employer. While this diminishes the injured party’s ultimate recovery in the tort action, the injured party has already obtained or may, post verdict, seek recovery under the compensation law from his employer. This right of recovery under workers’ compensation law is specifically intended to replace the previously-existing common law right of recovery against the employer in tort. To immunize employers from fault allocation in third-party tort suits would go against the spirit of the bargain between employers and employees that underlies workers’ compensation; instead,*301 the third party would pay the employer’s cost of compensation, and the employee would have the possibility of recovering in tort for his employer’s fault, since that would then be allocated to the third party. This certainly would benefit employers, and to some extent plaintiffs — but third parties should not be assessed to supplement our system of workers’ compensation.
Mack Trucks, 841 S2d at 1115 (III) (a) (citations and emphasis omitted). See also Sullivan,
Nor would the assignment of fault to a nonparty employer eviscerate the role that subrogation plays in the workers’ compensation system, as Walker suggests. Under OCGA § 34-9-11.1 (b), if an employer or its insurer has at least partially paid its workers’ compensation liability to an injured employee, the employer or insurer may have a right of subrogation against damages that the employee recovers from a third party. But this right of subrogation is limited to the amount of certain benefits paid to the employee, and importantly, it is available only “if the injured employee has been fully and completely compensated, taking into consideration both the benefits received under this chapter and the amount of the recovery in the third-party claim, for all economic and noneconomic losses incurred as a result of the injury.”
Walker argues as well that the allocation of fault to a nonparty employer under OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) would expose employers to new and substantial litigation costs, against which, he says, they previously were shielded by virtue of their immunity from tort liability
Certified question answered.
Notes
Walker’s wife also sued Tensor for loss of consortium. For the purposes of this opinion, however, there is no need to distinguish between Walker and his wife, and so, we refer to both simply as “Walker.”
In Zaldivar,
We observe at this point that in some jurisdictions, unlike Georgia, “employers may obtain full subrogation from the tort award, even though that award has been reduced by virtue of the employers’ own fault. While this result has been recognized as inequitable, one court[, Sullivan,
We concede that an employer not really at fault might still be assigned fault in a tort case brought by the employee against a third party - a case to which the employer is not a party — and that the employer may suffer a limitation of its right of subrogation as a result. The possibility that the right of the employer to subrogation might be effectively impaired by proceedings to which the employer is not a party exists whether or not fault can be allocated to a nonparty employer. Indeed, that is exactly why the employer or its insurer has a statutory right to intervene in the proceedings for the purpose of protecting its right to subrogation. See OCGA § 34-9-11.1 (b).
We also observe that the enactment of OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) did not affect the subrogation rights of employers in cases in which the plaintiff’s recovery is reduced by his own comparative negligence. It is true that, under OCGA § 51-12-33 (a) and (g), the plaintiff’s negligence reduces or eliminates his recovery in tort, thereby reducing the amount of the employer’s subrogation in the same way that assignment of fault to the employer effectively limits its subrogation rights. But comparative negligence had the same effect on the employer’s right to subrogation before the apportionment statute was enacted in 2005. Under Homebuilders Assn. of Ga. v. Morris,
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
In my opinion, this case calls on the Court to reconsider and refine the holding in our recent opinion Zaldivar v. Prickett,
When construing subsection (c) of the apportionment statute in conjunction with OCGA § 34-9-11, the exclusive remedy provision of Georgia’s workers’ compensation law, I conclude that a jury is not permitted to assess a percentage of fault to a nonparty employer of a plaintiff who sues a product manufacturer and seller for negligence in failing to warn about a product danger. I am convinced that the
Compliance with Georgia workers’ compensation law is compulsory. The employer, as defined by the workers’ compensation law, is subject to both civil and criminal penalties for failure to provide coverage of the benefits to employees required by that law.
An employee who sustains an injury that is compensable under the workers’ compensation law may, as in this case, pursue a claim for damages against a third party. One of the rights conferred to the employer under the workers’ compensation law is the right of subro-gation against the employee’s recovery of damages. Pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-11.1 (b), once an employer’s liability under the workers’ compensation law has been at least partially paid the employer or its insurer is granted a right of subrogation against the employee’s recovery of damages from a third party, up to the amount of workers’ compensation benefits paid to the employee.
the employer’s or insurer’s recovery under this Code section shall be limited to the... amount of... benefits... paid under this chapter and shall only be recoverable if the injured employee has been fully and completely compensated, taking into consideration both the benefits received under this chapter and the amount of the recovery in the third-party claim, for all economic and noneconomic losses incurred as a result of the injury.
OCGA§ 34-9-11.1 (b). Just as in the case of subrogation by an automobile insurance carrier or a medical insurer, “the injured party’s employer [is] not permitted to seek reimbursement from the injured party unless and until the amount of settlement received by or the judgment awarded to the injured party exceeds the injured party’s economic and noneconomic damages.” Thurman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 Ga. 162, 164 (
In determining whether an injured employee will be left “fully and completely compensated” after subrogation by the employer, the trial court is to consider the issue of full compensation as that term is used in the subrogation statute of the workers’ compensation law, not pursuant to the general principles of tort law, by which compensation is diminished as a result of defenses available to the defendant. Canal, supra,
If a percentage of fault, in the tort sense of the word, is assessed to the employer as a nonparty in a lawsuit by the employee against a third party, and that percentage of fault reduces the tort damages awarded to the plaintiff from the third-party defendant, then the injured employee will not have been fully compensated for his or her injury.
Applying subsection (c) to the fault of employers infringes upon another benefit granted to employers in exchange for their no-fault liability under the workers’ compensation law. Since workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy available against an employer for injuries covered under the law, one of the trade-offs to the no-fault liability imposed by the law is the employer’s exemption from the costs associated with defending tort litigation. Even though OCGA § 51-12-33 does not diminish the employer’s immunity from tort liability, it means the employer may very likely be required to bear the expense and business disruption of responding, as a nonparty, to discovery in the employee-plaintiff’s action against a third-party defendant seeking to apply the apportionment rule to the fault of the employer. The defendant to that litigation will want to maximize the fault assigned to the employer in order to diminish the damages it must pay if found liable to the employee plaintiff, and the plaintiff will want to minimize the fault assigned to the employer in order to maximize recovery from the defendant. The dispute over the employer’s percentage of fault for the plaintiff’s injury may very well be protracted and expensive to the employer, even though the employer “has no dog in the fight,” since it is clear that a finding of fault against an employer does not create liability on the part of the employer for damages. See OCGA § 51-12-33 (e). Predictably, the parties will seek
Preventing the injured employee from being fully compensated for his or her injury obviously prejudices the employee. While it is part of the employee’s trade-off, pursuant to the quid pro quo of the workers’ compensation scheme, not to be able to recover tort damages from the employer, no support whatsoever exists for the notion that the workers’ compensation law is meant to deprive an employee of his or her ability to recover fully in tort from a third-party tortfeasor whose fault is shown to be a proximate cause of a work-related injury. But that is exactly the consequence of including an employer, exempt from tort liability under the workers’ compensation law, as a non-party, pursuant to OCGA § 51-12-33 (c), whose tort liability may be considered by a trier of fact to reduce a damages award from a third-party defendant. See Carroll v. Whitney,
The workers’ compensation subrogation statute was originally enacted in 1992,
to be construed in connection and in harmony with the existing law, and as a part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, and its meaning and effect is to be determined in connection, not only with the common law and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes and the decisions of the courts.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Retention Alternatives, Ltd. v. Hayward,
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein joins in this dissent.
See OCGA §§ 34-9-126; 34-9-18.
See OCGA §§ 34-9-1 (4); 34-9-11.
For example, pain is not compensable unless that pain itself results in a physical disability. See Bouldware v. Delta Corp.,
In fact, this Code section grants the employer the right to intervene in an action brought by the employee against a third party in order to protect its subrogation right, and even the right to assert the employee’s claim against the third party in an action brought either in the
Only if the employer is found by the trier of fact to hear no fault for the plaintiff-employee’s damages, and yet the employer paid workers’ compensation benefits to the employee, will the plaintiff remain whole once the damages awarded against the third-party defendant are reduced by the value of workers’ compensation benefits paid, pursuant to the subrogation rule.
Regardless of the expense that may be incurred by a nonparty employer whose fault becomes an issue at trial, that the nonparty employer has no interest in the outcome of whether it is deemed to have some fault highlights another issue - the uncertainty of determining the actual fault of a party without that party’s interested participation in the suit. That is one of the reasons the Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1977 provides for apportionment of damages only to parties to the action and excludes nonparties from being assigned a portion of responsibility for plaintiff’s injury. See Jonathan Cardi, Apportioning Responsibility to Immune Nonparties: An Argument Based on Comparative Responsibility and the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 82 Iowa L. Rev. 1293, 1335 (1997) (citing Uniform Comparative Fault Act § 2 (a), 12 U.L.A. 46 (Supp. 1990) and former comment to section 2 (a), now found at Comment at “Parties”).
Responding to the majority opinion, I do not believe the Tennessee Supreme Court’s discussion of the “basic unfairness” of permitting apportionment to reduce damages due a plaintiff in an action against a third party, when the employer could then reduce the award pursuant to subrogation permitted under workers’ compensation law, to he diminished by the fact that Tennessee’s apportionment law was created by case law and not by statute.
An employer’s statutory liability to an injured employee under the workers’ compensation law does not correlate to the amount of damages the employer would owe the employee if it were subject to common law tort liability, or to the employer’s percentage of fault as applied to the employee’s damages if OCGA § 51-12-33 (c) is deemed to apply to an employer. This is because workers’ compensation benefits are defined by statute and not according to the employee’s actual damages that may, or may not, have been proximately caused by the employer’s negligence, if any. Because the benefits are due regardless of fault, they may exceed in some instances the amount the employer would owe if it were liable for damages in tort. But in many instances, workers’ compensation benefits will not equal the damages that would be owed if the employer were liable in tort. For example, as noted in footnote 8 of this opinion, supra, typically, the employee may not recover benefits for pain and suffering, whereas pain and suffering may be included in tort damages. Also, workers’ compensation benefits do not fully cover lost wages, whereas full compensation for lost wages may be included in tort damages.
Ga. L. 1992, p. 1942, § 2.
Ga. L. 2005, p. 1, § 12/SB 3.
