This is a bill with injunction granted thereon, filed in the circuit court of Kanawha county, in July, 1874. It alleges, substantially, that on the tenth day of February, 1871, the defendant, Lewis Summers, and Lucy W., his wife, conveyed to plaintiff, a tract of land in said county, situate on Kanawha river, immediately below the cityaof Charleston, and containing 160 acres ; that on the same day, plaintiff conveyed the said tract of land to W. Sydney Laidley in trust, to secure said Summers the deferred instalments of purchase money due upon said land, to-wit: #1,974, due first of January, 1872; $2,220, due first of January, 1873 ; $2,220, due first of January, 1874; $7,400, due first of January, 1874; $7,400, due first of January, 1875 ; $7,400, due first of January, 1876 ; $7,-400, due first of January, 1877; and $7,400, due first of January, 1878 ; that of these instalments, defendant paid in full the first three, and has made large payments on the instalment of $7,400, due first of January, 1874 ; that plaintiff had theretofore purchased a tract of land immediately above the Summers’ tract, from James L. Carr, and another tract immediately below the Summers’ tract, from Holly Hunt, and that thereafter, plaintiff, in conjunction with N. J. Bigley, purchased from Alethia Brigham, another tract of land, lying east of, and adjoining the Carr tract; that the two first named tracts of land were purchased by plaintiff, and the last by him and Bigley jointly, for the purpose of laying off said land into lots, streets and alleys, and as an addition to, and part of, the city of Charleston ; that the land was accordingly laid off as aforesaid, and a map thereof is filed as part of the bill marked exhibit Ho. 3; that, that part of the lands laid off on the map above Elk river, is the old town of Charleston, and the portion below Elk river,' is the land purchased as aforesaid, from Carr, Summers, Hunt and Brigham, and is commonly known and called the West End; that the streets,'alleys, and lots in the
At August rules, 1874, the defendant, Summers, filed his answer to the bill, which, at. its commencement, contains' a demurrer to the bill with special assignment of causes of demurrer, which it is not necessary here to notice. In his answer, Summers admits the sale and conveyance of the tract in the bill mentioned, the price, the execution of the notes, and deed of trust on the land to secure the payment thereof, as in the bill alleged;
At August Rules, 1874, Laidley, the trustee, filed his answer, in which he admits the deed of trust made to him upon the land therein described, for the purpose in the bill mentioned ; and that he, in pursuance of the directions of defendant, (Summers,) advertised the sale to pay the purchase money due on the land on the eighth day of July, 1874, in which notice of sale he fixed the time, place, and terms, &c., as stated in the notice, which is exhibited with the bill. He denies that there is anything in his conduct as trustee, “illegal or oppressive.” He also denies that the contract contained in the trust deed has been modified by any act of his. He says he purchased a lot from plaintiff, on Pennsylvania avenue, but before any map was recorded, except the map of J. L. Carr, and subsequently purchased lots on the Carr farm, but that there is no record of any map) extending
Sundry depositions were taken by the parties, and filed, and afterwards, at a circuit ..court, held in vacation, on the fifteenth day of August, 1874, in said county, the cause was heard, on a motion to dissolve the injunction awarded in the cause, upon the bill, exhibits, order of injunction, the demurrer and answers of Summers and Laidley, trus-. tee, exhibits filed therewith, and general replications filed thereto, and upon the several depositions taken and filed by the respective parties, including the exhibits referred to in, and accompanying the same, and upon the statements filed by complainant, marked, Statements Hos. 2 aud 3, and upon a motion made by plaintiff that a pre-emptory injunction should be granted him, as prayed in
This cause is now brought before us by appeal from, and supersedeas, to said order, or decree, dissolving said injunction, &c.
As already stated, a number of depositions have been taken, and filed. The exceptions filed are immaterial to be considered, under the view I have taken of this case.
Where there has been, no public use of a street, the •owner may dedicate his land to the public, for such use, by acts and declarations, without a deed. But in such •case, these acts and declarations must be deliberate, unequivocal and decided, manifesting a positive and unmistakable intention to permanently abandon his property to such public use. Z. M. Pierpoint v. the Town of Harrisville, decided at Wheeling, July 1876, and authorities cited in the opinion of the court.
It appears by the evidence of Joel S. Quarrier, clerk ■of the county court of Kanawha county, that the map, Exhibit No. 3, filed by plaintiff with his bill, has never been recorded in the -clerk’s office of the county court of
The defendant, (Summers,) admits that he purchased these lots of plaintiff, but he avers, and the evidence in the cause clearly shows, that neither of the lots, described in said deed, constitutes any part of the land sold by him to plaintiff, and embraced in said deed of trust; that these lots are a part of another, and distinct tract of land, purchased by plaintiff and one Playford, from J. L. Carr. The fact that Summers purchased the above named lots upon the Carr tract of land is not sufficient evidence to establish the alleged fact, that Summers had recognized and consented, that plaintiff should lay off the land, described in said trust deed, info town lots, streets, avenues and alleys, as alleged in the bill, and shown by said exhibit No. 3, therewith filed; and that he would be-bound thereby in having said deed of trust executed by a sale, or sales, to pay any part of his purchase money; and it cannot, and should'not be inferred, from the fact that said Summers purchased said lots, that he thereby -consented to any change of the contract contained in the
I.do not. feel satisfied that the trustee could have prejudiced the rights and liens of the cestuique trust, by. any recognition of the acts of Walker, in laying off the land embraced by the deed of trust, without the concurrence . of the cestui que trust. As trustee, he had no .power ’ or authority, to change or modify the contract contained, in the deed of trust. . But it is unnecessary to determine this question, as it does not appear that the trustee did any act-, from, which it-could rightfully, or justly be. inferred, that he did recognize the .acts of Walker, in laying off the said Summers’ farm into town lots, streets, &c., or concur therein, or agree thereto. .It-w.as not in the power of Walker, the grantor, to dedicate the streets and alleys laid off -by- him on the Summers, tract, to the public .usé, so as to. destroy, or • release the trust lien of •the cestui que trust thereo.n,. or. .estop him fisom the asser.tion. thereof,.without fiis concurrence clearly, established. .This.has not been.dpue.in this case.
It is, manifest from. the. evidence in..the cause, that ft .was .not..error to -dissolve :t-he injunction, awarded, with
The plaintiff alleges that he has sold some nineteen lots on the Summers land, but he fails to allege to whom the sales were made, or whether he has received payment in whole or part, and, in fact, he makes no allegations in reference thereto, except, he does state the average price at which he sold. He fails to make the alleged purchasers, parties to the bill, and to allege that the trustee is about to, or will, sell these lots. In fact, it is fairly in-ferrable from the allegations of the bill, that plaintiff docs not expect or anticipate a sale of these lots. He does not pray that other lots or portions of said land be sold under said trust deed, to pay the note due, before ■the lots he has sold; nor does he allege the time, or times, at which he made sale of said lots, or either of ■them. But the court, in its order of dissolution, does direct that if the plaintiff, with ten days from the entry of the order, shall designate in writing, filed within that time with the clerk, from which one of the exterior boundaries of the trust property he desires the lots, to be sold, to be selected; the trustee shall sell lots on the boundary so selected. This is ample protection to the plaintiff against the sale of said nineteen lots, at the an
But the burden of the plaintiff's bill, is to prevent the sale of the streets, alleys, and avenues, laid out by him on the Summers land, which, he alleges, he dedicated to the public use, as indicated on said map, filed as exhibit ISTo. 3, and as to which, he claims the contract of the ■deed of trust was changed, and the lien of the deed of trust, released. Under the allegations of the bill, and the evidence, it would not have been error to have dissolved the injunction, without giving the plaintiff the privileges provided in the order of dissolution. These privileges, under the pleadings and evidence, are mere favors extended in the order to the plaintiff, which are in no wise to his prejudice, but were given for his benefit, and if they are prejudicial to any person, it is defendant ; (Summers) but he makes no complaint of them, but asks this Court to affirm the order of dissolution.
■ It does not appear from the pleadings and evidence, that there is no necessity for selling the streets, avenues, and alleys, or that the lots, as laid off by plaintiff, would probably sell for sufficient to pay the Summers debt due, ■and to beco.me due, without the streets, &c. Summers has a deed of trust lien upon the whole land for his debt, in the deed of trust mentioned. Upon a proper case, made by proper parties, by the pleadings and evidence, the Court might properly direct, that the nineteen lots aforesaid, should not be sold under said deed of trust, until the residue of the land was first sold, and until it should become necessary. But under the views I have expressed, it is unnecessary to consider that subject further in this case, as now presented.
For the foregoing reasons, the said order dissolving the said injunction must be affirmed with costs, and $30 damages in favor of the appellees, (Summers and Laid-ley) and against the appellant, (J. Brisben Walker.)
Degree Affirmed.