Appellant was charged by affidavit with the crime of Grand Larceny. On January 25, 1963, appellant
Triаl was had by jury on February 24, 1964, resulting in a verdict of guilty. Pre-sentence investigation was made and on Mаrch 20, 1964, appellant was sentenced to a term of one to ten years in the Indianа State Prison. On such date and after imposition of sentence appellant “requеsts Court appoint Pauper counsel for purpose of taking Appeal.”
Afterwаrds, on April 8, 1964, the court entered its order herein, by which Lewis Davis was appointed pauper counsel to take this appeal.
On April 16, 1964, appellant by pauper counsel filed his petition to file a Belated Motion for New Trial. On August 25, 1964, the court below granted appellant’s petition to file the Belated Motion for New Trial. On September 18, 1964, aрpellant, by his counsel, filed such belated motion. The grounds for such motion being:
“1. That the verdict.of the jury is contrary to law.
“2. That the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence.”
Thereafter, on November 12, 1964, the court overruled appellant’s motion for a new trial. From such ruling stems this appeal.
On March 5, 1965, appellee filed its Motion to Dismiss Appeal or Affirm Judgment.
Thereafter, on January 30, 1967, appellees Motion to Dismiss Appeal or Affirm Judgment was dismissed.
The issue to be determined in this apрeal is' the assigned error that the court erred in overruling appellant’s Motion for a New Trial. Appellant’s Motion for New Trial contained the two specifications, as shown.
The thrust of appellant’s argument is that there was insufficient evidence to legally authorize the jury to reach a verdict of guilty.
A brief resume of the evidence adduced at the trial .discloses the following: State’s witness Evelyn Henry testified that her place оf business located at 1271 South East Street, Indianapolis, Indiana, was broken into on the 16th day of December, 1962, between the hour of 4:00 a.m. and 8:30 a.m. She further testified that whiskey was taken from her place of business without her permission. Evelyn Henry further identified marks on the bottles of whiskey thаt were displayed to her in open court.
State’s witness, Jack Peters, police оfficer for the City of Indianapolis, testified that he arrested the appellant on Dеcember 20, 1962. He also identified appellant. Peters testified he made a search incidental to the arrest and found beer cases containing bottles of whiskey. Officer Peters identified the bottles of whiskey in open court as the identical bottles of whiskey which hе took from the possession of the appellant.
State’s witness, Riley G. Stewart, poliсe officer for the City of Indianapolis, also testified that he was present at the time of the appellant’s arrest and assisted in taking the whiskey from the possession of the appellant, and placed his initials and badge number upon the whiskey displayed to him in oрen court, and identified the whiskey exhibited to him in open court as the same whiskey taken frоm the appellant. The whiskey was then introduced into evidence as Exhibits 1, 1A and IB.
State’s witness, Lewis E. Eckhart, who was the bartender at the tavern which was broken into, identified State’s Exhibit No. 1, to-wit: а bottle of the whiskey, as the same whiskey which he had placed his mark upon at his plaсe of employment. This witness testified that each and every bottle of
Officer Peters testified that the appellant informed him that the bottles of whiskey were Christmas presents. Officer Josеph Chestnut testified that the appellant informed him that he had picked the whiskey up from а place that he could not name, and he was taking it to a place that he сould not name, and was delivering it to a person that he could not name.
From the evidеnce so adduced the jury could, and apparently did, conclude that there was suffiсient evidence to prove defendant-appellant’s guilt beyond a reasonаble doubt.
We do not weigh the evidence, or determine the credibility of the witnesses, that is the duty of the trier of the facts. Grecu v. State (1956),
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
NOTE.—Reported in