Following a bench trial, Daniel Avery Walker was convicted of felony obstruction for head-butting a law enforcement officer. The trial court denied his motion for new trial. Walker appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and that there was insufficient evidence to convict him. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
1. Walker moved to suppress all physical evidence, statements, and testimony resulting from his allegedly unlawful detention by a sheriffs deputy. “Because a motion to suppress under OCGA § 17-5-30 contemplates the suppression only of tangible physical evidence, [Walker] in effect proceeded under both a motion to suppress and a motion in limine.”
Hamrick v. State,
While a trial court’s findings as to disputed facts will be reviеwed to determine whether the ruling was clearly erroneous, “where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review.” (Citation omitted.)
Johnson v. State,
The record shows that on September 3, 2009, a sheriffs deputy *68 received a phone call from a staff member at an apartment complex in Hall County. 1 The staff member informed the deputy thаt the complex manager had received a complaint that a “male subject” had been involved in a “domestic disturbance” the previous night with the female resident of apartment 301 and that it had gotten “pretty ugly.” The male subject was not on the lease to apartment 301 but was currently there with the female resident. The staff member requested that the deputy accompany him to apartment 301, issue a written criminal trespass warning to the male subject, 2 and ask the male subject to leave the premises.
Upon arriving at the complex, the deputy accompanied the staff member to apartment 301. Although the deputy was dressed in civilian clothes, he was wearing his badge and gun in plain view and was carrying a clipboard with the criminal trespass warning attached to it. The staff member knocked on the door to the apartment. When the female resident came to the door, the staff member introduced himself, identified the deputy as a law enforcement officer, and explained why they were thеre. The female resident at that point went back inside the apartment and woke up Walker, who came to the door. The staff member then explained to Walker that they were there regarding the domestic incident that had occurred the previous night, that the deputy was going to issue him a criminal trespass warning, and that he would need to leave the apartment complex. The deputy asked Walker for his identification so that he could fill out the criminal trespass warning.
Walker became “very upset.” He patted the outside of his pants as if looking for his identification but then went back inside the apartment. When he came back to the door, Walker without any provocation approached the deputy, raised his middle finger in the deputy’s face, told the deputy he was leaving, and said “F_k you. I’m not going to give you my ID. It’s my right.” As Walker attempted *69 to “squeeze between the [deputy] and the doorjamb to get by the [deputy] to leave,” the deputy held оnto Walker’s arm, asked again for his identification, and told him to calm down.
When the deputy took hold of his arm, Walker aggressively “latched” onto the deputy and began fighting with him, to the point that the deputy and Walker ended up on the ground “scuffling” with one another. The staff member from the apartment complex also attempted to assist the deputy in subduing Walker. Walker “was very upset, screaming, cussing, [and] making threats” that could be heard from outside the apartment building. The deputy told Walker that if he calmed down, he would let him up from the ground. Walker promised to calm down, and the deputy and staff member let him up.
Walker started walking to his car as he cоntinued to curse at the deputy, who was following Walker and asking for his identification. When Walker got into his car and started the ignition, the deputy came over and placed one hand on the car door and one hand on the roof of the car so that Walker could not shut the door. The deputy told Walker that he still nеeded to see his identification. Walker responded by jumping out of the car and head-butting the deputy in the left eye. The deputy and Walker went to the ground and fought until the deputy and staff member from the apartment complex were able to get hold of Walker’s arms. Ultimately, the deputy was able to subdue and handcuff him.
Walkеr was charged with felony obstruction of an officer for head-butting the deputy. He filed a motion to suppress all evidence arising from when the sheriffs deputy first took hold of his arm as he attempted to squeeze by the deputy in the doorway and leave the apartment. According to Walker, the deputy unconstitutionally dеtained him at that point in their encounter, tainting all evidence gathered from that point onward. Because there was no physical evidence relied upon by the State to support the obstruction charge, Walker essentially sought to exclude all testimony about his conduct after his allegedly illegal detention began.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that the deputy’s temporary detention of Walker by holding onto his arm was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in light of the information communicated to the deputy that Walker had been involved in a domestic disturbance the previous night and could be lоcated in a specific apartment. After the denial of his motion to suppress, Walker was convicted of felony obstruction in a bench trial. The trial court denied his motion for new trial, and this appeal followed.
United States Supreme Court holdings sculpt out, at least theoretically, three tiers of poliсe-citizen encounters: *70 (1) communication between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment, (2) brief seizures that must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and (3) full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Peters v. State,
Walker contends that when the deputy first held onto his arm to prevent him from leaving the apartment, their encounter escalated to a second-tier detention requiring a showing of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Among other things, Walker argues thаt there was no showing of reasonable suspicion because the deputy only had a generalized suspicion that he had previously been involved in a “domestic disturbance” without any knowledge that it was criminal in nature rather than simply a heated verbal argument. See, e.g.,
Gattison v. State,
We agree with Walker that his encounter with the deputy escalated to a second-tier detention when the deputy held onto his arm in an attempt to prevent him from leaving the apartment before showing his identification.
3
See
White v. State,
When examining whether evidence is inadmissible as fruit of an illegal detention, we ask whether the evidence was obtained “by exploitation of [the prior] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” (Punctuation omitted.)
State v. Nesbitt,
Walker’s violent reaction in response to the deputy merely taking hold of his arm at the doorway of the apartment constituted an intervening act that purged the taint of any illegal detention. While an individual is entitled to resist an unlawful arrest or detention, the individual is justified in using only such force as is necessary to prevent the arrest or detention, “i.e., force proportionate to the force being used in the unlawful detention.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
Sosebee v. State,
The uncontroverted record shows that in response to the deputy simply holding onto his arm at the doorway of the apartment, Walker aggressively “latched” onto the deputy and began fighting him, to *72 the point that the deputy and Walker ended up on the ground “scuffling” with one another, and the staff member frоm the apartment complex had to come to the assistance of the deputy. During the violent encounter, Walker “was very upset, screaming, cussing, [and] making threats” that could be heard from outside the apartment building.
Construed in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, Walker’s aggressive conduct toward the deputy was an unreasonable and disproportionate response to the allegedly unlawful detention, and thus constituted an intervening act that purged the taint flowing from any prior illegality. See
O’Neal v. State,
2. Walker also contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for felony obstruction of an officer under OCGA § 16-10-24 (b). In this regard, Walker argues that his head-butting of the deputy, who prevented him from closing the door of his car and driving away, did not constitute obstruction because an individual cannot be convicted of that offense unless the officer is engaged in the lawful discharge of his official duties, see
Green v. State,
We are unpersuaded. Once Walker used unreasonable and disproportionate force in responding to the officer holding onto his arm at the doorway of the apartment, the deputy was legally entitled to detain him. See
Lawson,
Nevertheless, when analyzing whether a person has been unconstitutionally seized, we are not bоund by the detaining officer’s subjective belief. Rather, the touchstone of any Fourth Amendment analysis is a determination of whether an officer’s conduct is reasonable based upon all of the objective facts. The circumstances presented here illustrate that the [deputy] ⅛ conduct was neither arbitrary nor hаrassing, but was reasonable in light of the objective facts available to him.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Johnson,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The deputy also served as the “courtesy officer” for the complex.
The purpose of the criminal trespass warning was to meet the notice requirement found in OCGA § 16-7-21 (b) (2) if the male subject at some point reentered the apartment complex after being asked to leave from the premises. That statutory subsection provides in relevant part:
(b) A person commits the offense of criminal trespass when he or she knowingly and without authority:
(2) Enters upon the land or premises of another person . . . after receiving, prior to such entry, notice from the owner, rightful occupant, or, upon proper identification, an authorized representative of the owner or rightful occupant that such entry is forbidden[.]
While the criminal trespass statute does not require that the notice be given in writing, see, e.g.,
Wingfield v. State,
The deputy was entitled to approach the apartment, knock on the door, speak with the occupants at the doorway, and request identification even if he did not have reasonable suspiciоn at that point, given that these actions did not go beyond a first-tier consensual encounter. See
Galindo-Eriza v. State,
At the bench trial, the apartment complex manager gave a more detailed description of the domestic incident, but there is nothing in the record reflecting that the other staff member who called the deputy and requested his assistance ever communicated this more detailed information to the deputy.
The deputy was performing official duties even if he also served as the “courtesy officer” of the apartment complex. See, e.g.,
Duncan v. State,