Walker v. StateWalker v. State
Defendant, Thomas Walker, Jr., appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence for the crime of possession of marijuana. He claims reversible error was committed by the denial of his motion to suppress evidence (marijuana) found on his person subsequent to the arrest.
On December 6, 1965, at 4:30 P.M., Officer Nicholas Navarro of the Dade Sheriff‘s Office, received a telephonе call. The caller identified himself as one Grisby and said that a man had been trying to sell, or give, him marijuana for him to sell; that this man had just left the bar from where the call was being made; that he was carrying a package of marijuana in his left rear pants pocket, and that he, Grisby, would point the man out to the police.
Officer Navarro and a federal agent, Klick, immediately proceeded to the bar where they met Grisby, who told them that the defendant had just left the bar and was walking north. Officer Navarro arranged with Grisby to catch up with the suspect and to give a pre-arranged signal when he could verify that the suspect still had the marijuana.
Navarro and Grisby then proceeded north on opposite sides of the street. As they arrived at the next intersection, the defendant walked across the street to talk to Grisby. They engaged in a brief conversation, during which Grisby raised his hand. Officer Navarro crossed the street, placed the defendant under arrest for violation of the Florida Narcotics Lаws, and ordered him to surrender the contents of his left rear pocket. The defendant‘s pocket contained a quantity of marijuana which Officer Navarro seized.
The arrest and search of the defendant took place within approximately fifteen minutes after the initial telephone call from Grisby. Navarro testified that he had never spoken to Grisby prior to the telephone call, and that he had never met the defendant prior to the defendant‘s arrest. Grisby appeared at the trial and testified as to these events.
At the trial, the defendant made an oral motion to suрpress the evidence seized from him on the ground that the search was incident to an unlawful arrest of the
The State argues that the real point involved on appeal is “whether probable cause to make an arrest without a warrant exists when an individual advises the police that a man has attempted to sell narcotics to him, that said man has narcotics in his possession and said individual, upon conversing with the man within minutes аfter notifying the police and under their observation, signifies to them that the man has narcotics in his possession.”
As authority for reversal appellant relies upon Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959). There, an arrest without a warrant was made solely on the basis of infоrmation given to an officer, two days prior to the actual arrest, by a person described as a “reliable paid informer.” The search subsequent to the arrest revealed narcotics; the person giving the information died prior to the hearing on the defendant‘s motion to suppress the evidence, and the motion was denied. The Supreme Court held that the arrest without a warrant was legal, since the officer had probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested had committed a violation of the Narcotics Act, and that the agent could rely on heаrsay evidence from a reliable informer.
Appellant suggests that the law therefore is that a police officer may make a lawful arrest based on hearsay from a reliable informant so long as the hearsay has been reasonably corroborated by independent facts within the arresting officer‘s knowledge, and that such was not the case here.
When police officers receive a voluntary telephone call from a citizen who identifies himself but has no previous record as an informant, about an attempted sale of narcotics, they have not only a right but a duty to investigate the facts. When they go to a bar and meet and discuss the matter with the citizen who called, and when he recontacts the alleged culprit, talks with him, and by a prearranged signal advises the officers that the culprit still has narcotics on his person, they then have reasonable grounds to believe that a felony was being committed and that the person to be arrested was committing it.
It appears that from the short period of time involved (less than fifteen minutes) it would not have been feasible to have obtained an arrest warrant or the culprit might have escaped.
“In dealing with probable cause, * * * as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These arе not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, at 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302, at 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879, at 1890 (1949).
In State v. Mpetas, 79 N.J. Super. 202, 191 A.2d 186 (1963), the defendant and a co-defendant approached a group of 17 and 18 year old boys and girls at approximately
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“In the instant case the police had probable cause for bеlief that defendant had committed a crime, the gravity and seriousness of which is unquestioned. They had received information from Budman as to his conversation with defendant concerning defendant‘s possеssion of marihuana (sic). Budman had furnished a description of the men and the license number of the car. This was not an anonymous tip nor did it come from an `informer‘. It was volunteered by an 18-year-old college student who identified himself to the police.”
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People v. Lewis, 240 Cal. App.2d 546, 49 Cal.Rptr. 579 (1966), contains pertinent language concerning the distinction between a citizen who reports a crime and a rеliable informant:
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“In bookmaking and narcotics cases the courts have developed the concept of the `reliable informant,’ which, in that context means a person who has previously given the police information which has been found to be true. By that standard a known criminal, a drug addict, or even an anonymous voice on the telephone may become a `reliable informant,’ upon whose word the police may make warrantless arrests, break in doors and conduct searches. (See, e.g., People v. Prewitt, 52 Cal.2d 330, 341 P.2d 1.)
“But experienced stool pigeons are not the only sources of credible information, and the tests of reliability which must be applied to such persons are not necessarily applicable to every citizen who assists the police.
“Bookmaking and narсotics offenses are crimes which are usually committed in the presence only of the criminals themselves, where there is no innocent victim to complain. The persons most likely to furnish information are themselves criminally involved or disposed, and their reports to the police are generally motivated by something other than good citizenship. Such an informer rarely offers himself as a witness to crimes already committed. His usual function is to supply a tip in confidence whereby the police may witness a crime or uncover evidence of it for themselves. A citizen such as Mr. Owens, who reports a crime committed in his presence, is more than a mere informer. He is an observer of criminal activity who, by calling the police, acts openly in aid of law enforcement.
“Courts hаve not hesitated to find it reasonable for police officers to act upon the reports of such observers.”
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Clearly, a person who voluntarily calls the police with information cоncerning a violation of the law; who identifies himself and waits for the police to arrive; who cooperates in the apprehension of the
We find that this arrest was based upon probable cause and that the subsequent search was valid.
The judgment of conviction and sentence is therefore
Affirmed.