WALKER v. THE STATE.
S19A0177
Supreme Court of Georgia
June 3, 2019
306 Ga. 44
MELTON, Chief Justice.
FINAL COPY
1.
In the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence presented at trial revealed that, around December 2014, Walker and Benton broke up over allegations of Walker cheating. However, in January 2015, Benton invited Walker to move into her apartment and stay in a separate bedroom. At that time, Benton lived with her niece, Shanise McGill. Around early March 2015, McGill overheard Benton and Walker arguing over Benton‘s password-protected cellular telephone.
On Friday, March 27, 2015, Benton told her neighbor, Blanche Holloway, that Walker was jealous and “too controlling,” so she had told him to move out. Sometime that night, Walker attacked Benton in her master bedroom with a blunt object, lеaving a pool of blood in the corner of the bedroom. Walker then fired a shot from a handgun that went into the bedroom ceiling. When Benton tried to escape to the kitchen, Walker fired a second shot, but this shot missed Benton. Walker fired a third time, and this time hit Benton in her back.
On the morning after the murder, Walker called a friend and told her, “I might be going to jail,” before calling 911. Around 7:30 a.m., emergency personnel responded to Walker‘s 911 call summoning them to Benton‘s apartment, where they found Benton
On the way to the hospital, Walker told a paramedic that he and Benton had gotten into an altercation where she shot him, and he then had to wrestle a butcher knife out of her hаnd. Walker testified at trial that he stabbed Benton “a couple” of times in self-defense. However, a medical examiner confirmed that Benton suffered one gunshot wound to her back right shoulder and a total of 27 sharp-force injuries, which included both stab wounds and incised wounds. In all, Bentоn suffered six stab wounds to her torso, one stab wound and nine incised wounds to her extremities, and three stab wounds and eight incised wounds to her head. One of the
The evidence presented at trial was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to reject Walker‘s claim that he had been acting in self-defense at the time that he shot and stabbed Benton and find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder and the other crimes of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also, e.g., Roper v. State, 281 Ga. 878 (1) (644 SE2d 120) (2007) (witness credibility is for the jury to decide, as is the question of justification; therefore, the jury is free to reject claim that defendant acted in self-defense).
2.
Walker contends that the trial court erred by excluding his sister Helen Walker‘s potential testimony in which she would have stated that Walker told her after the shooting that “[Benton] tried to kill me.” However, pretermitting the question of whether the trial court erred in excluding this testimony, аny error was rendered harmless.3 To begin with, the testimony was somewhat cumulative of Walker‘s own testimony in which he claimed that he acted in self-defense and his statement to the paramedic and the responding officer in which he claimed that Benton had shot him and that he had to wrеstle a knife out of her hand. See Nix v. State, 280 Ga. 141 (5) (625 SE2d 746) (2006) (the trial court‘s error, if any, in excluding
3.
Walker argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of thе 2007 domestic violence incident with his ex-wife,
Here, the State filed a notice of its intent to introduce evidence of Walker‘s prior aggravated assault of his ex-wife pursuant to
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts shall not be admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, including, but not limited to, proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowlеdge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. . . .
The trial court granted the State‘s request on the ground that the evidence was relevant to the issue of Walker‘s intent to commit the crimes that he had been accused of perpetrating, and specifically
[i]n order to prove its case the State must show intent. To do so the State will offer evidence of another crime allegedly committed by the accused. You are permitted to consider that evidence оnly insofar as it may relate to that issue and not for any other purpose. You may not infer from the evidence that the defendant is of a character that would commit such crimes. The evidence may be considered only to the extent that it may show the issue that the State is rеquired to prove in the crimes charged in the case now on trial. Such evidence, if any, may not be considered by you for any other purpose.
Any error in the admission of the prior acts evidence was rendered harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of Walker‘s guilt. Seе Parks v. State, 300 Ga. 303, 308 (2) (794 SE2d 623) (2016) (citing United States v. Hosford, 782 F2d 936, 939 (11th Cir. 1986) (where evidence of guilt is “overwhelming,” erroneous admission of Rule 404 (b) evidence is harmless)). Walker not only admitted to having “f**ked up” by stabbing Benton, he also called a friend the morning after the murder and indicated that he knew that he “might be going to jail” for what he did. Furthermore, “in stark contrast tо [the defendant‘s] testimony that his intent was merely to prevent
4.
Lastly, Walker contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for a mistrial after the court erroneously admitted into evidence, as a prior “conviction,” his first-offender guilty plea relating to the 2007 domestic violence incident with Wilson. See Davis v. State, 269 Ga. 276, 277 (496 SE2d 699) (1998) (“A first offender‘s guilty plea does not constitute a ‘conviction’ as that term is defined in the Criminal Code of Georgia.“). We disagree.
Even though the trial court denied defense counsel‘s request
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Decided June 3, 2019.
Murder. Clayton Superior Court. Before Judge Mack.
Stanley W. Schoolcraft III, for appellant.
Tracy Graham Lawson, District Attorney, Elizabeth A. Bаker, Christopher D. Sperry, Assistant District Attorneys; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Matthew M. Youn, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
