466 S.E.2d 346 | S.C. | 1995
Appellant Sally Walker challenges the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1275 (Supp. 1993), which prohibits disclosure of motor vehicle accident reports if sought for commercial solicitation purposes. We find no constitutional violation and, accordingly, affirm the grant of summary judgment to respondent, South Carolina Department of Highways and Public Transportation (SCDHPT).
FACTS
Walker, an attorney, wished to solicit automobile accident victims as clients through mass mailings. Accordingly, to obtain the names of recent victims, she requested accident reports from SCDHPT and the City of Columbia.
ISSUE
Does S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1275 (Supp. 1993) unconstitutionally restrict Walker’s due process, equal protection, and free speech rights in violation of the First
DISCUSSION
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-9-330 (1991) requires the Highway Department, upon payment of a three-dollar fee, to furnish any person a copy of a vehicle accident report. Section 56-5-1275, however, limits access to such reports:
With respect to a motor vehicle accident, no employee of any law enforcement agency shall allow any person to examine or obtain a copy of any accident report or related investigative report when the employee knows or should reasonably know that the request for access to the report is for commercial solicitation purposes. No person shall request any law enforcement agency to permit examination or to furnish a copy of any such report for commercial solicitation purposes.
Walker alleges § 56-5-1275 abridges her First Amendment right to free speech. We disagree.
“Neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the . government’s control.” Houckins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2597, 57 L.Ed. (2d) 553 (1978). See also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 14 L.Ed (2d) 179 (1965) (First Amendment right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information).
The United States Supreme Court recently recognized that
Unlike the Florida Bar’s regulation of commercial speech in Went For It, the statute in question regulates only access to information; it in no way inhibits Walker’s exercise of her free speech rights in the form of direct mail to prospective clients.
Walker also asserts § 56-5-1275 violates due process and equal protection. We disagree.
To satisfy equal protection, a legislative classification must bear a reasonable relation to the legislative purpose sought to be achieved; members of the class must
We find no equal protection violation here. The statute is reasonably related to the legislative purpose of protecting the privacy of accident victims; all members of the class are treated similarly since no persons are permitted access to the reports for purposes of commercial solicitation;
Finally, we reject Walker’s due process argument.
This Court is not entitled to scrutinize reasonable measures unless some fundamental right is implicated. Washington By and Through Washington v. Salisbury, 279 S.C. 306, 306 S.E. (2d) 600 (1983). As noted previously, the statute in no way prohibits Walker’s exercise of commercial speech. Accordingly, no fundamental right is implicated. Moreover, due process bars only those statutes which manifest patently arbitrary classifications. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed. (2d) 1435 (1960). Here, the statute is reasonable. Accordingly, we find no due process violation.
The judgment below is
Affirmed.
The City of Columbia is not a participant in this appeal.
S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-1275 (Supp. 1993) became effective June 12, 1991.
U.S. Const. amend. I.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
We would be presented with different circumstance if § 56-5-1275 prohibited commercial solicitation itself. See In re: R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 102 S.Ct. 929, 71 L.Ed. (2d) 64 (1982).
Even if the first amendment applied, the State’s interest in protecting the privacy of victims is sufficient to justify the statute’s restriction on commercial solicitation. Went For It, supra; Lanphere v. Colorado, 21 F. (3d) 1508 (10th Cir. (1994).
The statute applies with equal force to physicians, insurers, chiropractors, etc., who might also wish to provide services to injured victims.