160 F. 856 | 9th Cir. | 1908
(after stating the facts as above). The question first to be determined is whether the use for which condemnation is sought is a public use. Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California makes provision for the exercise of the right of eminent domain in behalf of public uses, and enumerates among other public uses the following:
“Gauals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for supplying and storing water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for the supply of mines, quarries, railroads, tramways, mills and factories with electric power; and also,for the supplying of electricity to light or heat mines, quarries, mills, factories, incorporated cities and counties, villages and towns; and also for furnishing electricity for lighting, heating or power purposes to individuals or corporations, together with lands, buildings and all other improvements in or upon which to erect, install, place, use or operate machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for any of the purposes or uses above set forth.”
There- can be no doubt that within this provision the furnishing of electricity as it is proposed to be furnished by the defendant in error is a use for which the Legislature intended that' the right of eminent domain might be exercised. The purpose of the statute is to remove obstacles in the way of development and progress in the state, and it is in harmony with the Constitution and with section 1001 of the Civil Code which gives to any person, without further legislative action, the power to acquire property for any of the uses specified in section 1238, “either by the consent of the owner or by proceedings had under the provisions of title 7, part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and any person seeking to acquire property for any of the uses mentioned in said title, is an agent of the state or a person in charge of such use within the meaning of these terms as used in such title.”
The Legislature cannot by its enactments make that a public use which is essentially a private use, and the question whether the use is public in its nature is a judicial question to be determined by the courts. But it is the general rule that, where it is uncertain and doubtful whether the use to which the property is proposed to be devoted is of a public or a private character, the legislative determination of the qrtestion is of persuasive force, and the courts will not undertake to disturb the same. It has been so held in California. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 Pac. 919, 10 Pac. 674; In re Madera Irrigation District, 92 Cal. 296, 28 Pac. 272, 675, 14 L. R. A. 755, 27 Am. St. Rep. 106; County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 63 Pac. 78, 621. And it has "been generally held by the courts that the generation of electric power for distribution and sale to the public on equal terms is a public enterprise, and that water used for that purpose is devoted to a public use. Light & Power Co. v. Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531, 58 Atl. 46, 66 L. R. A. 581; Hollister v. State, 9 Idaho, 8, 71 Pac. 541; Grande Ronde Electrical Co. v. Drake, 46 Or. 243, 78 Pac. 1031; In re Niagara L. & O. Power Co. (Sup.) 97 N. Y. Supp. 853; Minnesota Canal & Power Co. v. Koochiching, 97 Minn. 429, 107 N. W. 405. In the case last cited the Supreme Court of Minnesota said:
*860 “Electric lighting is universally recognized as a public enterprise, in aid of which the right of eminent domain may be invoked.”
In Light & Power Co. v. Hobbs, 72 N. H. 531-535, 58 Atl. 46, 66 L. R. A. 581, the court said:
“Like water, electricity exists in nature in some form or state, and becomes useful as an agency of man’s industry only when collected and controlled. It requires large capital to collect, store, and distribute it for general use. The cost depends largely upon the location of the power plant. A water power having a location upon tide water reduces the cost materially. It may happen that the business cannot be inaugurated without the aid of the power of eminent domain, or acquisition of necessary land or rights in land. All these considerations tend to show that the use of land for collecting, storing, and distributing electricity for the purposes of supplying power and heat to all who may desire it is a public use similar in character to the use of land for collecting, storing, and distributing water for public needs — a use that is so manifestly public that it has been seldom questioned, and never denied.”
But both private purposes and public uses are contemplated in the articles of incorporation of the defendant in error, as those articles stood at the time of the commencement of the suit. On that ground its power to exercise the right of eminent domain for the promotion of the public purposes is challenged, the contention being that, when such purposes are so blended, the want of power to exercise the right of eminent domain for the private purpose excludes its exercise for any public use. But the question whether the exercise of the right of eminent domain is to be denied or withheld is not to be tested solely by the description of the objects and purposes set forth in the articles of incorporation. It may be governed by evidence aliunde showing the actual purpose in view. Matter of Niagara Falls & Whirlpool R. Co., 108 N. Y. 375, 15 N. E. 429. “The fact that the charter powers of a corporation to which the power of eminent domain has been delegated embrace both private purpose and public use does not deprive it of the right of eminent domain in the promotion of the public use.” 15 Cyc. 579; Lake Koen Nav. I. & R. Co. v. Klein, 63 Kan. 484, 65 Pac. 684; Cole v. County Commissioners, 78 Me. 532, 7 Atl. 397; Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 61 Atl. 785. Cases are cited which are said to hold the contrary; but they are all cases in which there is absence of proof of the actual purpose of the plaintiff in the condemnation proceedings to séver the public use from the private use, and to exercise the right of eminent domain solely for the former. Thus in Fallsburg Power & Mfg. Co. v. Alexander, 101 Va. 98, 43 S. E. 194, 61 L. R. A. 129, 99 Am. St. Rep. 855, the corporation was created by a special act of the General Assembly and given authority to manufacture and generate electrical or other power, light, or heat, and utilize and transmit and distribute the same to. any place or places for its own use or for the use of other individuals and corporations. The company proceeded to condemn lands and water rights for that purpose “for the company’s use or for the use of other individuals or rorporations.” The court held that since it had power under its charter to devote only a share, or none at all, of its products to public use, the public could not be said to have such a definite right to the use of its product as to. render constitutional the provision giving it the right of eminent domain. Said the court:
*861 “In such a case the private benefit too clearly dominates the public necessity to find constitutional authority /<«• the exercise oí the power of eminent domain, and it is the equivalent of taking of private property for a private use.”
So in Berrien Springs Water P. Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 133 Mich. 48, 94 N. W. 379, 103 Am. St. Rep. 438, the plaintiff in the condemnation suit was incorporated under an act which authorized it to acquire water rights and water for private and public purposes. In its petition for condemnation it alleged that it required certain lands “for the purposes of its incorporation, and that the taking thereof is necessary for the public use and benefit.” The court denied the right of condemnation, saying:
“After the waiter power is erected, though it may be used for a public purpose, relator has the option to use it entirely for private purposes.”
But in that case the court sustained the doctrine that land can be taken under the power of eminent domain for a legitimate purpose, even though a private purpose will be thereby incidentally served. In Gaylord v. Sanitary District, 204 Ill. 576, 68 N. E. 522, 63 L. R. A. 582, 98 Am. St. Rep. 235, the petitioner in condemnation proceedings alleged in his petition that he was about to build a public gristmill under an act of the Legislature authorizing the condemnation of private property for the purpose of public mills and machinery other than public gristmills, and that he was also about to construct other machinery and operate the mill and other public machinery. The court held that, to constitute a public use such as will justify the taking of private property, the contemplated improvement must be one which the public to some extent will have a right, to use, and not one which is merely a benefit to the public, and that authority to condemn private property for public use does not justify the taking of such property for a public and also a private use. Of similar import are Attorney General v. Eau Claire, 37 Wis. 400, and State ex rel. Harris v. Superior Court, 42 Wash. 660, 85 Pac. 666, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 672. In the latter case the testimony was to the effect that the condemnation was sought for the purpose of obtaining additional power, “not only for use in operating the light plant and electric car system, but for the purpose of selling power to the different manufactories and for different purposes.” The court held that for all these purposes the petitioner was not entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain, since the use was not a public one. We find no case which holds that the bare fact that a corporation has in enumerating its functions expressed a purpose of engaging in a private enterprise as well as serving a public use shall deprive it of the right to exercise eminent domain for the public use. Not only is there no authority for such a proposition, but there is no reason for it. Why should the fact that the defendant in error here was incorporated under articles giving it the power to serve a prívate use be an obstacle to its condemnation of property necessary, and which it proposes and proves shall be used exclusively for a public service? The fact that it has such power imposes no greater or additional burden or servitude upon the property which it seeks and proposes to take for the public use only.
We find no error for which the judgment should be reversed. It is accordingly affirmed.
