162 Ky. 784 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1915
OPINION OF THE COURT BY
Affirming.
This action was brought by George W. Walker and certain of his children to have a trust in the property declared in favor of George W. Walker, because he had paid for the land with his money, though the deed was taken in his wife’s name. They also' asked that the deed be canceled because of the incapacity of the grantors and because of the failure of Nancy Maddox to carry out her part of the agreement. By amended petition George W. Walker asked that an allowance be made to him for his support and maintenance. The petition of the plaintiffs other than George W. Walker was dismissed. The only relief granted George W. Walker was a judgment directing Nancy Maddox to pay him at the rate of $100 a year when not at her home, the allowance to cease in the event he returned. From that judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The evidence conclusively shows that both Gemina Walker and George Walker had sufficient mental capacity to know and appreciate the effect of the deed which they signed. The contract was not made by reason of any influence which Nancy Maddox exercised over her parents. They were growing old, and not being able to do the work that they had formerly done and to look after their little home in a proper manner, asked their daughter, Nancy Maddox, to come and live with and take care of them. In consideration of these attentions they agreed to convey their home to her. The contract was freely and voluntarily entered into by the parties. While the deed recites a cash consideration of $500, it is admitted that this provision was inserted in the deed at the suggestion of the parties and of the scrivener, merely for the purpose of giving legal effect to the instrument.
It is unnecessary to consider the question of trust. It is sufficient to say that when George W. Walker, who had the mental capacity to contract, freely and voluntarily and for a valuable consideration united with his wife in the deed in question, whatever interest he had. in the property passed to his daughter Nancy.
The chief complaint of the appellant is that suitable provision for his support was not made in the event that he remained away from his daughter’s home. Fairly considered, however, the contract did not contemplate that he should be supported elsewhere than at his daughter’s home. The circumstances do not show that he had any reasonable grounds for leaving her home. The judgment does not deny him the right to return. It gives him that right, and, in lieu thereof, an allowance of $100 a year in the event that he elects to stay elsewhere. This is not a case where the grantee was at fault or the friction so great that permanent provision should be made for the support of the grantor elsewhere than at the grantee’s, home. It is a case where the grantor is welcome to return and should return. The grantor did not ask that the case be referred to the master commissioner to determine what was a reasonable sum for his maintenance and support if he
Judgment affirmed.