253 P. 1104 | Idaho | 1927
Lead Opinion
Robert P. Hyde purchased certain timber and entered into a contract with one Moore, whereby the latter was to have charge of cutting the timber and hauling it from the woods to the railroad track. Compensation insurance premiums on Moore and his employees were to be paid by Hyde, and were so paid, including premium on Clifford S. Walker, deceased. Hyde made an independent contract with one Hodson, whereby Hodson was to furnish a truck and driver for hauling some of the logs. The driver of the truck was paid by Hyde and such payments were ultimately charged to Moore and deducted from his contract. Moore employed Clifford S. Walker and one of Walker's sons as sawyers, whose sole work and employment was to cut down trees and saw them into logs for which they received a stipulated sum per thousand feet. They were piece workers.
Walker and his son resided a distance of about one mile from the scene of their employment, and sometimes would go home for their noonday meal, and at other times lunch would be brought to them by one of Walker's children. On August 18, 1924, at which time the logging operations were in progress, Walker and his son started home for lunch, but when they had gone some distance were met by one of the children bringing their lunch. After eating and upon their way back to work they were overtaken on the road by the Hodson truck, which was returning from the railroad right of way. As the truck approached the Walkers, they stepped to the left of the road to allow it to pass. A team a little ahead caused the driver of the truck to slow down, and as he *630 did so the elder Walker ran around behind the truck to the right side and attempted to board its front bunk. In his attempt to get on the track, Walker fell, and one of the rear wheels passed over his body causing instant death. The driver of the truck did not see Walker when he attempted to ride, and did not know that he intended so doing. It was known that the deceased had, on at least two occasions, ridden on the trucks, and others working for Moore had been known to ride on them. No orders or instructions had been given with reference to riding on the trucks, and the employer did not furnish transportation of any kind to the deceased or to his son.
The above is the substance of a stipulation of facts upon which a claim for compensation was made to the Industrial Accident Board by the wife and minor dependent children of the deceased. The board denied compensation and an appeal was taken to the district court which affirmed the decision of the board, whereupon the claimants prosecuted an appeal to this court.
The facts being stipulated and adopted as the findings of the board, upon which its ruling was based, the only question here for determination is one of law; namely, whether, under the admitted facts, the accident resulting in Walker's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. (Johnston v. A. C.White Lumber Co.,
It is well settled that the burden rests upon the one claiming compensation to show by competent testimony, direct or circumstantial, not only the fact of an injury, but that it occurred in connection with the alleged employment, and that it both arose out of and in the service at which the injured party was employed. The Workmen's Compensation Act (C. S., sec. 6213 et seq.) does not provide compensation insurance for the employed workmen for accidents or injuries which may befall them other than for such accidents or injuries which arise out of and in the course of *631
their employment.The words "out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and the words "in the course of" to the time, place and circumstances under which it occurred. (Rayner v. Sligh Furniture Co.,
From the weight of authority, the rule would seem to be that the injury must have been sustained or death caused due to some act or condition connected with the doing of the work, or that the injury must have been sustained or death caused at or near the place at which the injured party was required to work by the terms of his employment and in the doing of the things for which he was employed. The employment of the deceased was to cut down trees and saw them into logs. His place of employment was approximately one-half mile from where he was injured. The accident occurred during the noon hour, at which time deceased had left his place of employment and his employment. No transportation was furnished or was to be furnished by the employer. If the truck had been furnished as a means of transportation, there would be no question about the right of claimants to an award. (Flynn v. Carson,
While it is true that the Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed with a view to effecting its object and to promote justice, with which rule we find ourselves in accord, nevertheless, before recovery can be had *632
thereunder, a party seeking compensation must bring himself within the terms of the act. Each case must be determined largely upon its particular facts and the law as applied thereto; no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as controlling. The authorities are irreconcilable, and many of them may be said to be in direct conflict. The modern tendency of the decisions, however, to the spirit of the law, is to award compensation in all cases where a liberal construction of the statute would justify it. Even in view of this liberal construction, it is not enough for the applicant to say that the accident would not have happened if he had not been engaged in the particular employment or if he had not been at the particular place. He must go further and must say that the accident arose because of something he was doing in the course of his employment and because he was exposed by the nature of his employment to some particular danger. (In re Betts,
Can it be said, in view of the rule above stated, that there was the slightest causal connection between the work in which the deceased was engaged and his act in attempting to get on the truck, approximately one-half mile from the place of his employment and at a time when he was not engaged in anything connected with his employment? We think it cannot be said that the injury followed as a natural incident of the work, or that it could have been contemplated as a result of any exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment. On the contrary, it was wholly foreign to it. Under the facts in this case it is not material that the accident occurred on the premises where the operations were being carried on, unless it was over a way provided by the employer, which the employee was required to travel, so that he was under the domination of the employer.
As throwing light upon the conclusion reached, attention is called to the following cases: Taylor v. Binswanger Co.,
From what has been said, it follows that the judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered; costs awarded to respondents.
Wm. E. Lee, C. J., and Taylor, J., concur.
Dissenting Opinion
Prior to June 1, 1924, Robert P. Hyde purchased certain timber and thereafter contracted with W.E. Moore for the cutting of the timber. All compensation insurance premiums on Moore and his men were to be paid by Hyde and deducted from the contract price. The premiums were paid by Hyde, including that upon Clifford S. Walker, the deceased. Moore, as a part of his contract, was to haul the timber from the woods to the railroad track. Hyde made an independent contract with one Loy Hodson, whereby Hodson was to furnish a truck and driver for hauling logs at a certain sum per thousand feet. Jim Johnson was the driver hired by Hodson, Hyde paying his wages and charging it to Hodson. All these payments were ultimately charged to Moore and deducted from his contract. Clifford S. Walker, deceased, and his son Walter were employed, in July, 1924, as sawyers, their sole work being to cut down trees and saw them into logs, their pay being $1.25 per thousand feet. The deceased and his son lived at home and part of the time would go home to lunch, *634 while at other times would have their lunch brought to them.
On August 18, 1924, deceased and his son started home for lunch, but when they had gone some little distance they were met by one of the deceased's children bringing their lunch. After eating and upon their way back to work they were overtaken by Jim Johnson driving the Hodson truck over the logging road, returning from the rollways on the railroad right of way where he had unloaded. As the truck approached, the deceased and his son stepped to the left to allow it to pass. A team a little ahead caused the truck to slow down, and the deceased ran around the back of the truck to the right side, and, while attempting to board the front bunk of the truck, fell in some manner and one of the wheels of the truck passed over his body, causing instant death. Johnson, the driver, did not see Walker, and did not know he intended or attempted to ride. The deceased had ridden on the truck on at least two or three other occasions, and others working for Moore had also ridden. No orders or instructions with reference to riding the trucks had been given, and the employer did not furnish any transportation for the deceased or his son.
The board adopted the stipulation as its findings of fact, and denied appellant's claim for compensation, and an appeal was then taken to the district court, where the action of the board was affirmed, whereupon this appeal was taken.
The sole question for determination is whether the accident resulting in Walker's death "arose out of and in the course of" his employment. (C. S., sec. 6217.)
The general rule is that an injury occurring to an employee going to or from his work does not arise out of his employment. Various exceptions, however, have been recognized, based upon different grounds — for instance, that the employee is on the master's premises immediately adjacent to the actual place of employment; going or returning in a conveyance furnished by the employer; traversing the only means of ingress or egress, whether furnished by the employer *635
or by others, but used with the employer's knowledge and consent; performing some particular work for the employer, although the place of the accident and the cause was common to any traveler; when going to or from the employer's place of business at the specific instance and request of the employer, as, for instance, the case of a traveling man employed by an English house returning at his employer's request to England on the "Lusitania" at the time it was sunk by a torpedo. (Foley v. Home Rubber Co.,
Applying some of these tests to the case under consideration we find that the deceased was returning to his work. The employer had the right to use and occupy the land upon which the timber was growing and which he was logging off, and the deceased was merely crossing these premises in order to get to the immediate place of employment; he was therefore on the master's premises to the extent that it was necessary for him to cross the intervening land, although not on the premises in the sense that an employee would be on the premises of a factory where such ground might be inclosed by fence or other structure or in a building in some part of which the employee performed a specific task. The deceased was traversing a roadway furnished by the employer apparently for the primary purpose of hauling logs, but, go far as the stipulaton and map showed, the only roadway running from near deceased's home toward his immediate place of employment. The stipulation shows that twice before the deceased had ridden on a truck similarly used as that which caused his death if not the same truck, and that others had ridden on these trucks. The stipulation says, "It was known." While perhaps ambiguous, it is reasonable to infer that the knowledge meant was the knowledge of the employer. Certainly the employer knew that it was necessary for the deceased to cross the intervening land in the area containing the employer's timber to reach the place where he was called upon to cut down trees.
What may be called the Illinois rule appears to be that, if the injured employee was on the master's premises going *636
to or from his work, leaving at a reasonable time, and following the customary or permitted route off the premises, the accident arises out of the employment. Wabash Ry. Co. v.Industrial Com.,
A much stronger case is Porter v. Industrial Com.,
In Thomas v. Proctor Gamble,
Western Coal M. Co. v. Industrial Com.,
If Walker had not been an employee, he would have had no occasion to, and would have had no right to, be traversing the road in question. It was because of his employment that he sought to ride upon the truck. The road was the common way, and, according to the map, the only way provided for him to travel on his way to work. If he had not been so employed and if he had not been on his way to work — in other words, if he had not been engaged upon his master's business, though it was preparatory to his actual employment — the accident would not have happened to him as an employee; hence the accident arose out of the employment. (Terlecki v. Strauss,
Hills v. Blair,
There is no question of contributory negligence (C. S., sec. 6214), and there is no contention that he was attempting to board the truck for a purpose entirely his own, unconnected with his master's business.
The judgment should be reversed, with instructions to enter judgment for appellants.
I am authorized to say that T. Bailey Lee, J., concurs with me in this opinion.
Petition for rehearing denied. *639