385 F.3d 321 | 3rd Cir. | 2004
CHERTOFF, Circuit Judges
Islam, a self-proclaimed Islamic sect that follows the teachings of Elijah OPINION Muhammad. Members of the Nation of McKEE, Circuit Judge . Islam fast during Ramadan and at other times during the year in accordance with In this § 1983 action, Michael the teachings of Elijah Muhammad. Tyrone Walker, a state prisoner, alleges Walker claims that since his incarceration that his rights under the First, Eighth and in 1988 he has engaged in periodic Fourteenth Amendments were violated religious fasts in which he abstains from when prison officials sought a state court solid foods but drinks liquids. [2] order authorizing them to force-feed him after he went nine days without eating. Walker’s Prison Adjustment Record The district court granted summary reflects that on August 20, 1995, he judgment to all of the defendants except became angry, allegedly because he was not receiving legal material. [3] He made Arthur Auxer, a prison official; and Dr. Mark Lasky, the medical director of the threats, became argumentative, and was prison. Shortly before their trial began, placed on further restriction even though he was already in the SMU. A few days Walker withdrew his claims against Auxer, later, while still confined in the SMU, leaving Lasky as the sole remaining Walker claims to have begun a religious defendant. The jury ultimately returned a fast which he planned to continue for three verdict in favor of Lasky, and Walker to fifteen days. Like his earlier fasts, he appealed. For the reasons that follow, we purportedly abstained from solid food, but will affirm.
drank liquids. I. BACKGROUND [1] Beginning on August 26, 1995, Walker was seen at least daily by prison In August 1995, Walker was medical staff. William Young, M.D., a incarcerated in the Special Management physician on the medical staff at SCI-Camp Unit (“SMU”) at the State Correctional Hill under Dr. Lasky’s supervision, Institution at Camp Hill, Pennsylvania examined Walker on that date. Walker (“SCI-Camp Hill”). The SMU was claims that Dr. Young checked his weight reserved for the most difficult prisoners in and blood pressure, listened to his the state system and Walker’s placement there meant that he was confined in his cell twenty-three hours a day.
Walker is a member of the Nation of breathing, and examined his eyes. [4] Walker On August 31, 1995, after what the also claims that Dr. Young noted that prison officials claim was nine days of Walker was fasting for religious purposes. documented refusal to eat, the Department Walker claims that Dr. Young recorded his of Corrections (“DOC”) filed an ex parte condition as “normal” on August, 26, 27, application for a preliminary injunction in 28, 29 and 30. Walker’s weight was state court pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1531. The recorded as 193 pounds on August 27, 192 complaint alleged that Walker was on a pounds on August 28, 189 pounds on hunger strike. An affidavit of Dr. Lasky August 29, and 190 pounds on August 30. dated August 30, 1995 was attached to the According to Dr. Young’s testimony, complaint. In that affidavit, Lasky stated weight loss becomes a concern when a that, based upon his observations earlier person who is fasting loses ten percent of that day, Walker “appeared somewhat their weight. Young directed that blood lethargic, slow walking and spoke with a and urine be obtained from Walker on slight slur.” Lasky’s affidavit further stated August 27 and 28. [5] According to Walker, that those symptoms “could be the effects Dr. Young never urged him to stop fasting of starvation and dehydration” and that or exercising. unless Walker received nutrition and
hydration “as soon as possible,” he could On August 26, 1995, the medical suffer “tissue breakdown . . . which may staff read Walker a form captioned, “The result in coma, cardiac arrest and possibly Effects of Starvation and Dehydration,” death.” The affidavit also stated that and Walker acknowledged the form by feeding was required to prevent signing it. In doing so, he attested to his “irreparable harm.” Lasky had not understanding “that the Department of examined Walker before executing that Corrections will do everything within its affidavit, but he had spoken to Walker power to prevent the death of any person through his cell door. However, Walker committed to its custody, and . . . this claims that Dr. Lasky had not spoken with means that permission may be sought from him and that the doctor actually confused a judge to force [an inmate] to eat or him with another inmate. drink.” In addition to Dr. Lasky’s affidavit, the complaint alleged that Walker’s [4] Dr. Young purportedly recorded “conduct threaten[ed] the good order of the Walker’s weight as 190 pounds. SCI-Camp Hill in that other inmates may engage in hunger strikes as a result of [5] According to prison officials, [Walker’s] conduct or may believe that [the medical personnel including Drs. Young Department] is not concerned with their and Lasky, had to devote time and well being.” Other prisoners were resources to observing Walker in his cell. allegedly already engaged in “copy-cat” In addition, prison employees had to scrupulously keep track of the food going in and out of Walker’s cell. hunger strikes. [6] cell to the prison infirmary. [7] Walker
claims that he was there stripped, strapped The DOC also asked the state court to a hospital bed, and placed in ankle and for authorization to provide treatment wrist restraints. His head was also including, but not limited to, nutrition, restrained, and a chest strap was used to hydration, and medication, as medically prevent him from moving. [8] A corrections necessary to preserve Walker’s health and officer then read Walker the court order, life pending the adjudication of the matter. and gave him a copy of it. The DOC also sought permission to involuntarily obtain specimens of bodily Walker claims that he told officials fluids for analysis. standing near his bed that he was willing to
stop his hunger strike to avoid being force- On August 31, 1995, the Court of fed as he was being strapped to the bed. [9] Common Pleas of Cumberland County However, Lasky testified that Walker never entered an order allowing the prison stated he was willing to eat before he was officials to, inter alia , “involuntarily force-fed. Rather, the prison officials administer . . . medical treatment including testified that Lasky gave Walker the option but not limited to nutrition, hydration and of eating, and Walker refused. Walker medication as may be medically necessary claims that Auxer told him that his to preserve [Walker’s] health and life concession to eat came too late. In any pending the adjudication of this matter, as event, after Walker was strapped to the is determined by the medical personnel bed, nurses placed a nasogastric tube duly charged with his care.” The court also scheduled a hearing for September 5, 1995, and appointed counsel to represent Walker [7] Walker acknowledged he was on a at that hearing. hunger strike when he arrived at the prison infirmary.
Thereafter, Lasky informed Walker that the medical department had obtained a [8] Lasky testified that he reasonably court order authorizing force-feeding. believed that it was necessary to use Walker claims that he told Lasky that he restraints so that Walker: (1) would not was fasting for religious reasons and that harm himself by trying to remove or Lasky ignored him. A short time later, partially remove the nasogastric tube on his correction officers took Walker from his own; (2) necessitate another procedure to insert the tube; (3) would not harm others; and (4) so that he could more easily be [6] It was alleged that two other observed. prisoners, neither of whom were members of the Nation of Islam, were on hunger [9] SMU Manager William Ward and strikes at the same time as Walker. They Associate Manager Arthur Auxer were were not force-fed because they ultimately standing by Walker’s bed along with Drs. agreed to eat. Young and Lasky. through his nose, down his throat and into risk of serious harm. Walker claims that he his stomach, and Walker was then force- only ate the meal under threat of force- fed through the tube. The procedure was feeding because he was in great videotaped. discomfort.
Walker claims that he was fed Walker testified that the force- liquified liver and mashed potatoes with feeding made him vomit during the night milk even though he told medical and that, since he was still restrained, he personnel that the did not eat meat or milk choked. Walker claims that he asked products because both foods upset his Lasky to remove the feeding tube the stomach. [10] Lasky allegedly let Walker be following morning, but Lasky said that the force-fed the foods that were being served tube would remain until after breakfast the to the general prison population for the following day. Walker also testified that noon meal. Lasky denies that Walker told he was strapped to the bed by ankle and anyone he was a vegetarian or that wrist restraints throughout this period and Walker’s medical records stated that that he was released from the restraints Walker was a vegetarian. However, Lasky only for short periods during the day. confirms that Walker was force-fed
The nasogastric feeding tube was mashed potatoes and milk. finally removed on September 2, 1995 – Sometime after the force-feeding of two days after its insertion. Lasky testified the noon meal, Walker claims to have told this was a reasonable period after Walker medical personnel, including Lasky, that he began eating on his own to insure against was willing to stop his fast and that he having to reinsert the tube, to minimize reiterated that certain foods upset his medical risks of complication, and to stomach. Lasky purportedly responded by assure that Walker could be provided with telling Walker that the feeding tube would nutrition if he again refused to eat. not be removed and that Walker would be
Three days later, Walker and his required to eat the evening meal with the lawyer were present at a hearing the Court feeding tube in place. When told that the of Common Pleas held on the DOC’s evening meal would include spaghetti with request for authorization to force-feed meat, Walker claims to have again told Walker. During that hearing, Walker’s Lasky that this meal would upset his counsel told the state court: “I would like stomach. to just add for the record, Judge, the Mr. Lasky denies any intention of Walker’s reason for the hunger strike was making Walker sick and testified that he to draw attention to some civil matters believed the food did not pose a substantial being addressed by Jim Flower [another
lawyer representing Walker] in another civil matter and that his agreeing to an extension of the preliminary injunction in [10] Walker claims his medical records this case in no way impacts or constitutes verified that he was a vegetarian. any admission for the purposes of Mr. Medical Director, SCI-Camp Hill and William Young, M.D., 1 3 physician, Flower’s proceeding.”
Medical Department, SCI-Camp Hill.
II. DISTRICT COURT
Walker alleged violations of the First,
PROCEEDINGS
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments On March 22, 1996, Walker filed a arising from being force-fed. [14] pro se § 1983 complaint against Martin The court appointed counsel for Horn, 1 1 Commissioner, Pennsylvania Walker and Walker thereafter filed an Department of Corrections, Jeffrey H. amended complaint. In time, the Beard, Deputy Commissioner, Kenneth magistrate judge filed a Report and Kyler, Superintendent SCI-Camp Hill, Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending William Ward, Unit Manager SMU, SCI- granting summary judgment to Horn, Camp Hill, Arthur Auxer, Manager SMU Kyler, Ward, and Young on all of Walker’s (hereinafter collectively “prison officials,”) [12] , Martin L. Lasky, D.O.,
officials but the Department as a whole, requ ests [11] Horn was the Commissioner at the monetary damages, it is time of the filing of the complaint. He has barred by the Eleventh since been replaced by Jeffrey Beard. Amendment. Similarly, because it is understood that
1 2 The prison officials are Walker seeks equitable represented by the General Counsel of the relief, Corrections officials Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. It is have not briefed the issue of unclear from Walker’s brief whether the qualified immunity, to which prison officials were sued in their official they would be entitled if or individual capacities. Their brief notes: monetary relief were sought. [I]t is understood based on c o n v e r s a t i o n s w i t h
Prison Officials’ Br. at 3 n.1. [Walker’s] counsel and the arguments posed by him, [13] Drs. Lasky and Young are that this appeal is against the represented by private counsel because Secretary of Corrections in they are not employees of the Department his official capacity for of Corrections. They work for medical injunctive relief. As such, contractors. the Eleventh Amendment is [14] Walker also asserted a claim under not implicated. To the extent that this appeal, which the Religious Freedom Restoration Act clearly does not involve the (“RFRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. The personal actions of any district court dismissed that claim and it is indiv idual Corrections not implicated in this appeal.
claims. The R&R also recommended rights. The district court thereafter entered granting Beard, Auxer and Lasky summary judgment in favor of Lasky. Walker then judgment on Walker’s Fourteenth filed this appeal in which he argues that the Amendment due process claim. However, district court erred in granting summary the magistrate judge rejected the qualified judgment to the defendants on his immunity arguments of Beard, Auxer and procedural due process claim and that the Lasky and also recommended against district court erred in admitting evidence of dismissing Walker’s First and Eighth his prior robbery convictions pursuant to Amendment claims under the Rooker- Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2) in the trial of his constitutional claims against Lasky. [16] Feldman doctrine.
The district court adopted the III. DISCUSSION magistrate judge’s R&R with two A. Our Jurisdiction to Address exceptions. The district court granted Walker’s Procedural Due Process summary judgment to Beard on all of Claim. Walker’s claims and found that the claims for injunctive relief were moot. The Walker submits that he has a liberty district court rejected claims of lack of interest under the Due Process Clause of jurisdiction and qualified immunity of the Fourteenth Amendment, and a state- Auxer and Lasky pertaining to Walker’s created liberty interest against being force- First and Eighth Amendment claims. Both fed. [17] He also claims that the Constitution Lasky and Auxer appealed but we requires procedural safeguards to ensure dismissed the appeals for lack of appellate that a decision to force-feed someone is jurisdiction because genuine issues of neither arbitrary nor erroneous, and that the material fact remained as to whether Lasky prison officials and Lasky ignored those procedural safeguards. [18] and Auxer were entitled to qualified immunity. [15] Walker v. Horn , 286 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2002). [16] Because no prison officials were Thereafter, Walker withdrew his involved in the trial, they have not briefed claims against Auxer and the case any issues related to the trial. proceeded to a jury trial involving only Dr. Lasky. The jury found that Walker was not [17] State-created liberty interests are involved in a religious fast and that Lasky
entitled to the procedural protections of the had not violated Walker’s constitutional Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Vitek v. Jones , 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (citation omitted). [15] We do have appellate jurisdiction where the district court finds that there is [18] Briefly, Walker argues that he no qualified immunity as a matter of law. should have been afforded the following In re Montgomery County , 215 F.3d 367, procedural safeguards: the decision to 373-74 (3d Cir. 2000). obtain a state court order should have been “The Rooker-Feldman [20] doctrine
Before we can address the merits of Walker’s constitutional claims, we must arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states first address the parties arguments about in relevant part that ‘[f]inal judgments or whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine decrees rendered by the highest court of a deprives us of jurisdiction over those state in which a decision could be had, may claims. [19] be reviewed by the Supreme Court. . . .’” [21]
Valenti v. Mitchell , 962 F.2d 288, 296 (3d Cir. 1992). “Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of review on the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has inferred that Congress did not intend to empower District Courts to
reviewed by a committee; he should have review state court decisions.” Desi’s Pizza, been invited to appear in state court by
Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre , 321 F.3d 411, telephone; all of his medical records should 419 (3d Cir. 2003)(citations omitted); see have been attached to the complaint; and a physician other than Lasky should have been the affiant in the state court proceeding. [20] The doctrine was spawned by two
Supreme Court cases decided sixty years [19] The district court held that apart, viz., Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , Rooker-Feldman did not preclude it from 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of having jurisdiction over Walker’s due Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983). process claim. We exercise plenary review over the district court’s application the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Parkview [21] In its entirety, § 1257(a) reads: Assoc. P’ship v. City of Lebanon , 225 F.3d “Final judgments or decrees rendered by 321, 323-34 (3d Cir. 2000). the highest court of a State in which a
Neither the prison officials nor decision could be had, may be reviewed by Lasky filed an appeal from the district the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari court’s Rooker-Feldman ruling. However, where the validity of a treaty or statute of because their argument, if accepted, would the United States is drawn in question or be an alternative way of affirming the where the validity of a statute of any State district court’s decision to grant summary is drawn in question on the ground of its judgment to the prison officials and the being repugnant to the Constitution, jury verdict in favor of Lasky, they need treaties, or laws of the United States, or not file an appeal to make this argument. where any title, right, privilege, or See Resolution Trust Co. v. Fidelity & immunity is specially set up or claimed Deposit Co. of Maryland , 205 F.3d 615, under the Constitution or the treaties or 635 (3d Cir. 2000). Moreover, since that statutes of, or any commission held or ruling goes to our subject matter authority exercised under, the United jurisdiction, it can’t be waived. States.” also Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc., relief can only be predicated upon a Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J. Police conviction that the state court was wrong.’” Dept. , 973 F.2d 169, 179 (3d Cir. 1992) Desi’s Pizza , 321 F.3d at 419 (citation (“[T]he fundamental principle of the omitted). In either case, “ Rooker-Feldman Rooker-Feldman doctrine [is] that a federal bars a litigant’s federal claims [and] divests district court may not sit as an appellate the District Court of subject matter court to adjudicate appeals of state court jurisdiction over those claims.” Id. at 419. proceedings.”).
Determining whether a plaintiff “To ensure that Congress’s intent to “actually litigated” a federal claim in the prevent the lower federal courts from state court for Rooker-Feldman purposes is sitting in direct review of the decisions of not always as easy as may at first appear a state tribunal is given effect, the Rooker- because Rooker-Feldman “has a close Feldman doctrine prohibits District Courts affinity to the principles embodied in the from adjudicating actions in which the legal concepts of claim and issue relief requested requires determining preclusion.” Valenti , 962 F.2d at 297. whether the state court’s decision is wrong Therefore, a plaintiff cannot ordinarily or voiding the state court’s ruling.” [22] litigate one constitutional claim in state Desi’s Pizza , 321 F.3d at 419 (citations, court and then raise a related constitutional internal quotations, bracket and ellipses claim in the district court. Id. In Valenti , omitted). Although § 1257 refers to orders plaintiffs litigated an equal protection and decrees of the highest state court, the claim in state court and then sought to raise Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been applied a First Amendment claim in the district to final decisions of lower state courts as court. We held that Rooker-Feldman well. Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc. , deprived the district court of subject matter 973 F.2d at 178. jurisdiction to adjudicate the First
Amendment claim. We explained: Thus, “a claim is barred by Rooker- Feldman under two circumstances: first, if [Plaintiffs] each had an the [federal] claim was ‘actually litigated’ opportunity to raise a first in state court prior to the filing of the amendment challenge [in federal action or, second, if the [federal] state court] and failed to do claim is ‘inextricably intertwined with [the] so. They cannot be allowed state adjudication,’ meaning that ‘federal to escape Rooker-Feldman
b y r a i s i n g a n e w constitutional theory in [22] Habeas corpus petitions are, of federal court. Under course, an exception to the Rooker- p r i n c i p l e s o f c l a i m Feldman jurisdictional bar. Blake v. preclusion, they had a full Papadakos, 953 F.2d 68, 72 n. 2 (3d and fair opportunity to Cir.1992)(quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 litigate their first amendment
U.S. 539, 543-44 (1981)).
claim in the state court, and Walker’s procedural due process claim is, here they merely seek a in essence, a request to a lower federal second bite at the apple. court to review a state court injunction
authorizing the prison officials to force- feed Walker. They claim that a finding in
Valenti , 962 F.2d at 296. Walker’s favor on his procedural due process claim would necessarily be a A federal claim is “inextricably federal ruling that the state court order was intertwined” with an issue adjudicated by a wrong. They are thus claiming, in Rooker- state court when: (1) the federal court must Feldman terminology, that Walker’s due determine that the state court judgment was process claim is “inextricably intertwined” erroneously entered in order to grant the with the state court adjudication. requested relief, or (2) the federal court Therefore, say the prison officials, the must take an action that would negate the procedural due process claim is barred by state court's judgment. Desi’s Pizza , 321 Rooker-Feldman and the district court F.3d at 421 “In the first circumstance . . . lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that Rooker-Feldman bars the plaintiff's federal claim. claim because granting the plaintiff relief would require the federal court to conclude In making this argument, they rely that the State Court made an incorrect heavily on Port Authority Police factual or legal determination. In cases Benevolent Association, Inc. v. Port falling into this category, federal relief can Authority of New York and New Jersey only be predicated upon a conviction that Police Department , 973 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. the state court was wrong.” Id. (citation 1992). There, the Port Authority obtained and internal quotations omitted). That an injunction from a state court prohibiting inquiry requires that we identify the pillars a nonprofit organization employed by the on which the state-court judgment rests. Police Benevolent Association from “To do this, we consider the questions of soliciting contributions from Port state law that the state court was obligated Authority tenants. In state court, the Police to reach in order to render its decision.” Id. Benevolent Authority unsuccessfully In the second situation discussed above, argued that solicitation was protected “the plaintiff's federal claim is precluded speech under the First Amendment and that because the relief sought would undo or the Port Authority regulations prohibiting prevent the enforcement of the state court's soliciting tenants violated its First order.” Id. at 422. In other words, Amendment rights. “ Rooker-Feldman does not allow a
The Police Benevolent Association plaintiff to seek relief that, if granted, then went to federal court and asserted the would prevent a state court for enforcing same constitutional claim they had asserted its orders.” Id. in the state court action. They asked the Here, prison officials argue that district court for an injunction preventing the Port Authority from enforcing its Lasky never examined him and, in fact, antisolicitation regulations. The confused him with another prisoner. Association conceded that the federal Moreover, says Walker, the complaint injunction would effectively enjoin the seeking state injunctive relief did not enforcement of the state court’s injunction include an affidavit from Dr. Young, who if granted, and the district court abstained had examined him several times, or a copy under Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37 of relevant medical records. In Walker’s (1971). On appeal, we held that the district view, had there been a Department of court properly abstained under Younger , Corrections requirement that his medical but also noted that the district court could records and an affidavit of his treating have dismissed the complaint pursuant to physician be attached to the complaint, the Rooker-Feldman because assertion of state court would have learned that Walker jurisdiction over the compliant would have was being examined by a physician on a required the district court to decide issues daily basis, was not dehydrated, sustained that were “inextricably intertwined” with no weight loss between August 26 and the state court’s decision. 973 F.2d at 177. August 30, 1995, and was otherwise in
good health. However, says Walker, because of the lack of procedural
The prison officials argue that Port safeguards, the state court record lacked Authority Police Benevolent Association the information necessary to guarantee that controls because Rooker-Feldman prevents the state court’s decision was not arbitrary the district court from ruling on the or erroneous. He writes: “Had minimal propriety of the state court order allowing procedural safeguards been provided, the Walker to be force-fed. Walker counters state court would have learned that the by arguing that his procedural due process affidavit [of Lasky] was incorrect and that claim does not require the district court to force-feeding was not warranted because review the propriety of the state court Mr. Walker’s treating physician had injunction or to find that the state court’s concluded that Mr. Walker was in good decision was wrong. A d m i t t e d l y, health.” Walker’s Br. at 14. Walker’s due process claim is not a frontal attack on the propriety of the state court In our view, Walker is simply saying order. However, it nevertheless questions that the state court’s decision was wrong the propriety of the state court’s order. and blaming the error on certain alleged Walker’s constitutional claim is bottomed procedural deficiencies. on his theory that the prison officials had
For example, Walker argues: inadequate procedural safeguards to insure that the state court’s ruling would be based [b]ecause Dr. Lasky never examined upon accurate and complete information. Mr. Walker and, . . . confused [him] with Walker correctly claims that the state another inmate . . . important statements in court’s order was based exclusively on [Lasky’s] affidavit were erroneous . . . As Lasky’s affidavit. However, says Walker, a result, the state court was completely misled . . . Had Mr. Walker been given B. Admission of Robbery Convictions. notice and the opportunity . . . to
As noted earlier, as a result of the participate in the proceeding, the state district court’s summary judgment rulings court would have learned that statements in and Walker’s withdrawal of claims against Mr. Lasky’s affidavit were erroneous. Auxer, Walker’s only remaining claims Moreover had DOC regulations required were his claims that Lasky violated his defendants to attach to their application for First and Eighth Amendment rights, and . . . ex parte relief a copy of Mr. Walker’s the jury returned a verdict in Lasky’s favor medical records or an affidavit from the on those claims. [24] treating physician, it would have been immediately apparent to the state court that Dr. Lasky’s affidavit was incorrect. County Court of Common Pleas , 75 F.3d
834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996), it cannot bar his due process claim because there was no
Walker’s Br. at 16-17 final decision by a state court. Rather, there was only a preliminary injunction, which, under Pennsylvania law, is not a
Walker is clearly claiming that had final merits decision, but a temporary he been given adequate procedural due remedy granted until a dispute can be process, the state court would not have completely resolved. Reply Br. at 4. entered an erroneous order to force-feed However, this contention ignores that we him. Thus, Walker’s due process claim is
have held that the doctrine also applies “inextricably intertwined” with the state where a state court issues a preliminary court adjudication. He cannot prevail on injunction because “the preliminary his procedural claim unless we pull the
injunction issued by [the state court] thread that will unravel the constitutional resolve[s], at least for the moment, the fabric of the state court’s order. dispute between the parties that forms the Consequently, Rooker-Feldman bars
basis of the federal complaint.” Port Auth. Walker’s due process claim and the district Police Benevolent Assoc. , 973 F.2d at 178. court had no subject matter jurisdiction [24] As noted in n.13 supra , Lasky is over it. Accordingly, we need not address not an employee of the DOC. He is an Walker’s argument that the district court employee of a private medical organization erred by granting summary judgment to the under contract to provide medical services defendants on his procedural due process to the inmates at SCI-Camp Hill. claim. [23]
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that a physician who is under contract to [23] Walker argues that because we provide medical services to inmates at a have repeatedly held that Rooker-Feldman state prison acts “under color of state law” applies only to “final decisions” of state for § 1983 purposes. West v. Atkins , 487 courts, see, e.g., FOCUS v. Allegheny U.S. 42, 54 (1988).
During the trial, Lasky’s counsel credibility of a witness, sought to introduce evidence of Walker’s prior record to impeach his credibility. In the ten year period before the trial, Walker (1) evidence that a witness had been convicted of two charges of other than an accused has simple assault, four firearms violations, been convicted of a crime one charge of terroristic threats and nine shall be admitted, subject to robberies. Lasky’s counsel referred to Rule 403, if the crime was these convictions in his opening statement. punishable by death or Later, Walker moved to exclude the imprisonment in excess of convictions pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. one year under the law under 609(a)(1). [25] In a two-part ruling, the which the witness was district court granted Walker’s motion with convicted, . . . .; and respect to the convictions for assault, firearms violations and terroristic threats, finding that the probative value of the (2) evidence that any witness convictions was outweighed by the danger has been convicted of a of unfair prejudice. However, the district crime shall be admitted if it court held that, because the crime of involved dishonesty or false robbery involves dishonesty within the statement, regardless of the meaning of Fed.R.Evid. 609(a)(2), the punishment. court was “without discretion to weigh the prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence against its value” and, therefore, “evidence Fed.R.Evid. 609(a). Therefore, “if the of the [robbery] conviction is automatically prior conviction involved dishonesty or admissible for impeachment purposes.” false statements, the conviction is App. at 8. automatically admissible insofar as the
district court is without discretion to weigh Fed.R.Evid. 609 provides, in the prejudicial effect of the proffered relevant part: evidence against its probative value.” Walden v. Georgia-Pacific, Inc. , 126 F.3d (a) General rule. For the purposes of attacking the 506, 523 (3d Cir. 1997). “Because Rule
609(a)(2) does not permit the district court to engage in balancing, . . . Rule 609(a)(2) [25] Walker’s counsel admits that he must be construed narrowly to apply only initially conceded that the robbery to those crimes that bear on a witness’ convictions were admissible; however, propensity to testify trut hf ul ly.” before the second day of trial began, Id. (citation omitted). counsel changed his mind and argued that Walker contends that the district they were not admissible. Walker’s Br. at court erred by holding that robbery is a 30 n.15. crime involving dishonesty, and that the Conference Report provides district court therefore erred in allowing sufficient guidance to trial counsel to use his robbery convictions for c o u r t s a n d t h a t n o impeachment purposes. [26] In support of that a m e n d m e n t [ t o t h e argument, he cites to the original d ishonesty and fals e Conference Committee Report which statement provision] is spoke of the types of crimes contemplated necessary, notwithstanding by subsection (a)(2): some decisions that take an
unduly broad view of By the phrase “dishonesty “d isho ne sty” admitting and false statement” the convictions such as for bank Conference means crimes robbery or bank larceny. s u c h a s pe rj ur y o r subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud,
Fed.R.Evid. 609 Advisory Committee Note embezzlement, or false to 1990 amendment. In light of these pretense, or any other statements, Walker submits that crimes offense in the nature of involving dishonesty are limited to the crimen falsi , the commission types of crimes explicitly detailed in the of which involves some two statements above and this excludes e l e m e n t o f d e c e i t , robbery because it is not a crime involving u n t r u t h f u l n e s s , o r dishonesty. falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to It is somewhat surprising that we testify truthfully. have not yet decided whether robbery
involves dishonesty within the meaning of Rule 609(a)(2). However, in a case
H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d decided before the effective date of the Sess. 9, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. p. Federal Rules of Evidence, we did hold 7051, 7058, 7103. He then refers to the that petit larceny is not a crimen falsi Advisory Committee note following the crime. In Government of the Virgin 1990 amendment to Rule 609(a)(2) which Islands v. Toto , 529 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. reads: 1976), we wrote:
The Advisory Committee The term crimen falsi has c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e roots in the common law
doctrine that persons convicted of certain kinds of [26] The construction of Rule 609 is an crimes were disqualified issue of law over which we have plenary from testifying. While the review. Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. , doctrine of testimonial 126 F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 1997). disqualification has withered district court so aptly put it: from our law, the term “Petit larceny is just not crimen falsi has retained that.” vitality in the context of i m p e a c h m e n t . T h e established law in this circuit Id. at 281 (citations omitted) (emphasis is that a witness may be added). However we also noted that, in impeached by evidence of a certain cases, petit larceny may be a crimen prior conviction only if it is falsi crime. We explained: “It is for (a) a felony or (b) a conceivable that a conviction for petit misdemeanor in the nature of larceny might subsume a crime in the crimen falsi . The specific nature of crimen falsi , e.g., ‘petit’ stealing contours of crimen falsi are by false pretenses.” Id. In a case decided uncertain. Crimen falsi after the effective date of the Federal Rules describes crimes involving, of Evidence, we held that a crime must or at least relating to, involve expressive dishonesty to be admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). In Cree communicativ e, often verbal, dishonesty ; we have v. Hatcher , 969 F.2d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 1992), said that they are crimes we stated: “The proper test for admissibility under Rule 609(a)(2) does not which touch on the honesty of the witness. For our measure the severity or reprehensibility of purposes here, we have no the crime, but rather focuses on the difficulty in accepting the witness’s propensity for falsehood, deceit government’s formulation of or deception.” Applying that teaching the concept: “Although the here, we readily conclude that, although term ‘ crimen falsi ’ has been robbery is certainly a very serious crime, it subject to many definitions, does not involve communicative or expressive dishonesty. Therefore, the the generally accepted scope of the term would be crimes district court erred by holding that robbery that are in the nature of is a crime involving dishonesty that is automatically admissible under Rule perjury, criminal fraud, 609(a)(2). [27] embezzlement, false pretense or any other offense the commission of which [27] The Model Penal Code states: “an involves some element of individual commits robbery if in the course u n t r u t h f u l n e s s , o r of committing a theft he inflicts or falsification bearing on the threatens injury, or commits or threatens to accused’s propensity to commit a felony. . .” U.S. v. Williams , 344 testify truthfully.” Absent F.3d 365, 375 (3d. Cir. 2003) (internal special circumstances, as the quotation marks omitted). One can protein supplement by Lasky. [29] Therefore, Of course, that does not end our inquiry. Under Fed.R.Evid. 103(a), according to Walker, the evidence of his admitting Walker’s robbery convictions for r o b b e r y c o n v i c t i o n s s i g n if i c a n tl y impeachment is not reversible error “unless undermined his credibility. He argues: “the a substantial right of a party is affected.” only reasonable explanation for the jury Our standard of review of a district court’s finding that [he] failed to prove he was nonconstitutional error allows us to find an engaged in a religious fast was that he was error harmless only if it is highly probable not, in their minds, a credible witness.” that the error did not affect the outcome of Walker’s Br. at 37. the case. McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust
Walker stresses that his lack of Co. , 779 F.2d 916, 917 (3d Cir. 1985). credibility was the central theme of Lasky’s counsel’s closing argument. [30] According Not unexpectedly, Walker argues that the admission of his robbery to Walker, Lasky’s counsel argued that Walker’s testimony about the religious convictions was not harmless error because basis of his fast was simply not credible. his credibility was central to his ability to prove his claim that Lasky violated his First Rather, argued Lasky’s counsel, Walker just did not want Dr. Young, who and Eighth Amendment rights. He reminds examined him daily, to interfere with his us that he was the only witness who hunger strike, and Walker therefore used testified that he is a practicing member of the magic words “religious fast.” Walker the Nation of Islam and that he was also contends that Lasky’s counsel argued engaged in a religious fast when he was that even though Walker told Dr. Young forcibly fed. He was also the only witness that he was on a religious fast and Dr. who testified that, contrary to Lasky’s affidavit, he gave a blood and urine sample Young noted this in the medical records on as ordered by Dr. Young. [28] Finally, his August 26, Dr. Young had no independent verification that the fast was religious and testimony also provided the only evidence that he had never been offered a liquid that Walker’s statement could not be taken
at face value. Lastly, and finally, Walker contends that Lasky’s counsel told the jury that they needed to consider Walker’s credibility obviously commit a theft without employing deceit (i.e. a pickpocket). Therefore, the theft that is required for robbery does not transform that crime of [29] Lasky’s affidavit recites that violence into a crimen falsi crime. Walker refused a liquid protein
supplement. [28] Lasky’s affidavit recites that Walker refused to permit a physician to [30] However, Walker does not claim obtain blood and urine samples for analysis that Lasky’s counsel’s closing argument to determine his condition. was improper. while deliberating reminding them that injunction in the state court. In fact, Walker had been “convicted of crimes of Walker’s counsel in the state court said the dishonesty nine times, the robberies.” In fast was not religious at all, but was an Walker’s telling, because the robbery attempt to focus attention on Walker’s then convictions were central to Lasky’s efforts pending litigation. Lasky supports this to discredit his testimony, the introduction with evidence that a friend and fellow of the convictions was not harmless. litigant of Walker’s, Darrel Alston,
engaged in a hunger strike and was not a Lasky contends that, given the very member of the Nation of Islam. limited use of the robbery convictions and the amount of other evidence bearing on Lasky cites evidence corroborating Walker’s credibility, it is highly his contention that Walker’s motives were improbable that the robbery convictions not religious. As we noted earlier, just affected the outcome of Walker’s case at before Walker stopped eating, he had an all. Moreover, says Lasky, since Walker argument with the guards over access to his testified on direct examination that he was legal materials. He was written up for residing at SCI-Camp Hill at the time of misconduct and put on further restriction. the incident eight years earlier, and was Walker had five civil and two criminal currently residing at SCI-Pittsburgh, the cases pending at the time, and access to his jury had to have known that Walker had a legal materials was therefore important to significant criminal record that included him. Prison policy allowed only one box convictions for serious crimes. Further, of legal materials in his cell at any one says Lasky, during cross-examination, time, and the rest had to be kept in Walker mentioned a third prison, SCI- storage. [31] Lasky claims this policy was the Smithfield, where he had been reason for the argument and Walker went incarcerated. In Lasky’s view, given the on a hunger strike in protest, that he now small amount of time spent on the actual seeks to redefine as a religious fast. impeachment and the fact that Walker
Lasky notes the conflicting evidence testified that he had been incarcerated in about when Walker would fast, the number three different prisons over at least the of years he had engaged in fasts and the previous eight years, any prejudice from average duration of his fasts. The evidence t h e r o b b e r y c o n v i c t i o n s w a s of fasting was first once or twice a month, inconsequential. then every weekend, then for three days or Lasky next refers us to the as long as fifteen days. Walker’s trial significant amount of other evidence testimony was different than his deposition, regarding Walker’s credibility. According and that was different than allegations in to Lasky, even Walker’s religious motive for fasting is something of a red herring. [31] Walker could trade at any time to No mention was made of a religious fast get different materials, but was limited to during argument over the preliminary one box at a time. his amended complaint. There was also a improbable that the error in admitting the discrepancy about when Walker became a robbery convictions had an impact on the member of the Nation of Islam. outcome of the trial. [32]
Walker testified on direct C. Collateral estoppel. examination that he was forced to eat and One small matter remains. Lasky drink milk which made him ill. He also argues that Walker’s First and Eighth testified that he was a vegetarian, but Amendment claims are barred by the admitted on cross-examination that he ate doctrine of collateral estoppel or issue meat, just not red meat, and never notified preclusion. [33] We disagree. “Under the prison that he was vegetarian although collateral estoppel, once a court decides an he claims his medical records state that he issue of fact or law necessary to its was. He testified that he could not have judgment, that decision precludes milk for health reasons, but on cross- relitigation of the same issue on a different examination admitted that no one ever told cause of action between the same parties.” him that he was lactose intolerant. In fact, Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp. , 456 U.S. argues Lasky, there was a video of Walker 461, 467 n.6 (1982) (citation omitted). “It voluntarily drinking milk with breakfast. is now settled that a federal court must give Not only did Walker not get sick, he asked to a state-court judgment the same for more milk. Finally, Walker testified preclusive effect as would be given that that he told Lasky and the prison officials judgment under the law of the State in that he would eat, but later admitted that he which the judgment was rendered.” Migra had not eaten when given the opportunity. According to Lasky, given this stream of contradictions, the admission of [32] We also note that the jury may the robbery convictions was harmless. well have entertained other doubts about Lasky argues: “It is counterintuitive to the nature of Walker’s fast. He testified to think that the passing reference to Mr. fasting from August 25 th to August 30 th . Walker’s robbery convictions, in light of Yet, he weighed 190 pounds on the 25 th the jury’s knowledge of three prison stays and still weighed 190 pounds after five over at least the past eight years, affected
days of fasting. Moreover, after two days the outcome in light of all of the other of fasting, on August 27 th , he actually evidence elicited at trial.” Lasky’s Br. at
gained three pounds. 24. We agree. Walker’s own testimony [33] The terms “collateral estoppel” that he had been incarcerated in three state and “issue preclusion” are frequently used prisons certainly informed the jury that he interchangeably. See Burlington N. R.R. v. had a substantial criminal record. There Hyundai Merchant Marine, Co. Ltd. (3d. was also a substantial amount of other Cir. 1995). 63 F.3d 1227, 1231, n.2. We evidence that affected Walker’s credibility will refer to the doctrine as “collateral as noted above. Therefore, it is highly estoppel.” v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. , 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984). Under Pennsylvania law, the following conditions must exist before collateral estoppel may be invoked: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the later action; (2) there was a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom the plea is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom it is asserted has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in question in a prior action. Shuder v. McDonald’s Corp. , 859 F.2d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1988). It is readily apparent that the first requirement for collateral estoppel is not met here. The only issue decided in the state court was whether Walker would suffer irreparable harm if he were not force-fed. The issue in the district court was whether Lasky violated Walker’s constitutional rights by force-feeding him. Those issues are obviously not identical. Therefore, Walker’s constitutional claims against Lasky are not barred by collateral estoppel. They nevertheless fail for the reasons we have explained.
IV.
For the above reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the district court.
NOTES
[2] The fasts last from three to thirty days.
[1] Unless otherwise specified,
[3] Walker had numerous civil and references to testimony refer to testimony that was presented in the district court. criminal cases pending at the time.
